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Saskia van Goelst Meijer (1976) finished her
Masters degree in Humanistic Studies with a
thesis on Gross National Happiness, linking
existential questions and international
development. She is interested in
investigating the interface between questions
of personal meaning and social justice. She
obtained her PhD, with this dissertation on
contemporary nonviolence, and currently
works as Assistant Professor at the
University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht.
This dissertation studies nonviolence in the context of
Humanistic Studies, a multi-disciplinary academic field that
criticallly explores issues of (existential) meaning and
humanization; the personal and social aspects of 'good living'.
From this background this study focusses on contemporary
nonviolence, using this term not only to point to the absence
of violence, but to that which can take its place. Nonviolence
is thus understood as a substantive method to create societal
and interpersonal change, and even as a paradigm.
The aim of the study is twofold. Firstly to descern if it is
possible to understand nonviolence a concept independent
from specific cultural, religious or practical context. Secondly
to see if from such an independent notion it is possible to
develop a framework for analysis and practice.
The Gandhian understanding of nonviolence is the
startingpoint ot this study. However, many developments in
nonviolence theory and practice have taken place after
Gandhi. This dissertation studies the way Gandhian concepts
have caried over, and are changed and expanded by other
thinkers and practitioners and what remains the same.
From this search it is concluded that five basic elements
form the core of contemporary nonviolence: satya (truth-
seeking), ahimsa (non-harming), tapasya (self-suffering),
sarvodaya (the welfare of all) and swadeshi/swaraj (relational
autonomy). Together they point to a specific way of wielding
power called integrative power, which lies at the heart of
nonviolence.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
Nonviolence, Research, Humanistic Studies
lesson number one from human history on the subject of
nonviolence, is that there is no word for it.
Mark Kurlansky (2007)
THERE IS NO WORD FOR IT
Nonviolence has been a part of every major religious
tradition  and  has  been  practised  for  centuries
(Kurlansky, 2007; Martin, 2005; Nagler, 2004). Yet, no
language in the world has a general term to express the
idea  of  nonviolence  as  an  authentic  and  proactive
concept.  It  is  only  referred  to  as  a  negation  of
something else. Nonviolence is not violence. 
In  his  book  Nonviolence:  The  History  of  a
Dangerous Idea Mark Kurlansky (2007) claims that this
is  because  nonviolence  is  a  profoundly  revolutionary
concept that “seeks to completely change the nature of
society” (Kurlansky, 2007, p. 5) and is “a threat to the
established order” (idem.).  The notion,  he states,  has
therefore  been  marginalized  and  discarded  as  “a
fanciful  rejection of one of society's  key components”
(idem). 
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Michael Nagler has a slightly different explanation. The
lack of a proactive term, he says, is not due to some
(conscious or unconscious) conspiracy, but to the fact
that  the  idea  is  indeed  counter-intuitive,  yet  also
primordial  and  therefore  very  hard  to  express.  He
argues that in ancient literature it was quite common to
refer to such profound notions in  seemingly  negative
terms because it was felt that 
phenomena  like  love,  absolute  courage,  and
compassion (…) cannot be fully expressed in fallible,
conditioned human language (Nagler, 2004, p. 44).
We  could  only  point  to  them,  by  abnegating  the
opposite.  But,  he goes on to say, because this was a
common  practise,  people  would  immediately
understand such an abnegation as pointing to authentic
and substantive.  And so, the negating terminology is
ancient,  and  although  we  do  not  understand  it
immediately as a positive any more, the term has stuck.
But  that  leaves  us  today  with  the  question:  if
nonviolence it is not violence, what is it?
Marginal  concept  or not,  nonviolence has often been
treated  as  something  profoundly  dangerous  and  its
active  proponents  have  been  regarded  as  highly
suspicious  and  as  threats  to  (national)  security  and
stability  (Kurlansky,  2007).  This  might  seem odd  for
something  that  is  at  the  same  time  regarded  as
harmless and powerless. 
Nonviolent  action  is  known to  invoke  tremendous
violence in those to whom it is directed. Examples of
regimes  that  brutally  beat,  arrest,  torture  or  kill
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nonviolent  activist  abound.1 Apparently,  Kurlansky  is
right  in  noting  that  there  is  something  deeply
threatening  about  nonviolence.  Perhaps,  this  is
connected to René Girard's analysis that violence, and
the  mechanism of  'scapegoating'  in  which  the  peace
and  cohesion  of  one  group  is  secured  by  (violently)
outcasting specific others, are essential characteristics
of  human  societies.2 The  violence  that  nonviolence
provokes  could  well  be  an  example  of  Girard's
primordial  violence,  that  is  needed  to  maintain  the
social  order,  which  nonviolence  “seeks  to  change”
(Kurlansky,  2007,  p.  5).  On  the  other  hand,  Michael
Nagler then might also have a point with his claim that
nonviolence  itself  is  something  primordial,  and  so
different from what most people are used to that there
is  (certainly  in  contemporary  languages)  no  word  to
express it. 
Whatever  the  case,  people  who  have  actively
promoted nonviolence in recent times, have stumbled
over this lack of adequate terms. It caused them time
and again to figure out for themselves what it means.
Taken  at  face  value,  nonviolence  has  often  been
1
 Some striking examples can be found in the excellent documentary “A force more
powerful” (York, 1999), not just of state violence in response to nonviolent action, but
also  in  interpersonal  dynamics.  A  clip  that  shows  an  episode  from  the  Civil  Rights
Movement in the USA, never failed to shock my students (as it did me the first time I
watched it) whenever I have shown it as part of a lecture.  A young African-American
protester, well-dressed and composed, silently  sits at  a whites-only lunch-counter in
the Southern United States. He is part of a sit-in protest to integrate restaurants. After
a few palpable moments of tension, a white customer throws his glass of milkshake at
the young man after which others jump up and drag him off his bar-stool and viciously
beat him up. Police, billy club in hand, watch on, later arresting the young man for his
unlawful conduct (sitting at a lunch-counter). The shock is of course due to the violence
towards a clearly unarmed man who is not behaving in any obviously threatening way,
but also to the fact that both the police and the white customers seem to find the
beating quite justified. 
2
 See chapter 4 in this volume for a more in-depth exploration of Girard's theory.
5
understood to mean passivity, non-interference or even
cowardice. To explain that this was not at all what they
were getting at,  practitioners of nonviolence have, in
many  instances,  come  up  with  their  own  way  to
describe the pro-active nature, and explain it to others
in  contextually  relevant  terms.  Gandhi,  for  instance,
coined the new term satyagraha (holding on to truth) to
express his method for waging struggle. People in the
Philippines  used  the  phrase  alay  dangal  (to  offer
dignity). But these different terms do not clear up the
question as to what nonviolence is. Is one expression of
it (satyagraha) the same as another (alay dangal)?  
Nonviolence  is  still  the  term that  is  most  widely
used,  certainly  in  research  and  in  broader
(international)  discussion  on  the  topic.  There  is
something to be said for settling for this term to use in
a  wider  context  and  finding  context  specific  ways  of
expressing it  in particular instances,  because it  leads
each movement and person to deeply reflect on what,
in  their  situation,  is  the  bottom  line.  Noting  the
inadequacy  of  the  term,  I  still  hang  on  to  it  in  this
study,  simply  because  it  is  the  most  commonly  used
term. 
In this  study  I  describe nonviolence  in  a five-fold
way. The five terms that I use are not substitutes for
the term nonviolence, but point to elements, or aspects
of it. Because this book is a collection of independent
articles,  each  reflecting  an  aspect  of  the  study  as  a
whole,  some  overlap  and repetition  of  information  is
inevitable. Each article on its own needs, for example,
an introduction to concepts and their specific uses, and
needs  to  provide  context  for  the  topic  at  hand.
Furthermore,  the  articles  represent,  at  least  to  a
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certain  extent,  the  course  of  a  work  in  progress.
Notions  that  were  in  some  articles  not  yet  fully
developed, are more so in others. I trust that this book
as a  whole  nevertheless  provides a  complete  and in-
depth rendition of this study.
This chapter serves as an introduction to the study.
In the  next  sections  I  will  describe where this  study
stands with respect to other studies on nonviolence or
related subjects and outline the research question and
purpose. Subsequently, I will discuss the importance of
nonviolence  for  and  its  relation  to  humanism  and
humanistic  studies.  In  the  last  section  I  will  give an
overview of the results and some suggestions for future
research.
RESEARCH ON NONVIOLENCE
People  have  been  engaged  with  nonviolence  for
centuries  and  during  all  that  time  people  have  also
been developing it, thinking about it, testing it out and
gathering  evidence.  To  a  certain  extent  this  can  be
called research, though mostly not academic research
(Martin,  2005).  Research  efforts  have  become  more
systematic  from  the  19th century  onward,  especially
since the satyagraha movement led by Gandhi.
The roots of contemporary nonviolence as a method
for social action lie in the work of Mohandas Gandhi,
who used mass organized nonviolence for the first time
to  create  major  social  and  political  change  (Barak,
2003). Finding roots for his approach in many of the
world’s religious traditions as well as in the works of
Thoreau,  Tolstoy,  the  British  suffrage  movement  and
others, he acted as both a thinker and experimenter to
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develop  his  method.  His  work  later  inspired  many
others to develop their own approaches to nonviolence. 
Though Gandhi himself was not a scholar, his work
has become the subject of much academic work. The
most famous is probably the study by Joan Bondurant
(1965),  resulting  in  the  book  Conquest  of  Violence
which later had a profound influence on the Civil Rights
Movement  in  the  United  States.  Other  important
studies  include  work  on  the  Gandhian  approach  in
general (Brown & Parel, 2011; Mamali, 1998; Richards,
1991) on specific aspects of his work (Bilgrami, 2002;
Gonsalves,  2010; O’Brien, 2006) and his influence on
others  (Ardley,  2002;  Panter-Brick,  2008;  Roberts  &
Garton Ash, 2009; Scalmer, 2011). Study has also been
done into the relevance of Gandhian concepts for other
fields like economics (Dasgupta, 1996; Ghosh, 2012; T.
Weber,  1999,  2011),  post-colonial  thinking (Abraham,
2007;  H.  Trivedi,  2011),  and  ecology  (Burgat,  2004;
Cox, 2007; Næss, 2005a).
Most of the nonviolent movements that came after
Gandhi  have  also  received  quite  some  academic
attention. Examples include the Civil Rights Movements
and the life and work of Martin Luther King (Ansbro,
2000;  Bruns,  2006;  Farmer,  1998;  R.  H.  King,  1996;
Roberts,  1968),  the  Tibetan Independence  Movement
(Ardley, 2002), the French Larzac movement (Alland &
Alland,  2001;  G.  Williams,  2008)  or  the  Sarvodaya
Movement  of  Sri  Lanka  (Chowdhry,  2005;  Thodok,
2005).
Although much attention has been paid in the above
mentioned  studies  to  the  philosophical  backgrounds
and  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  practice,
many, if not most research into specific movements is
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of a sociological nature. The focus is there on questions
like: who or what are these movements and what do
they  do?  Who  are  the  key  figures?  How  did  they
develop?  Examples  of  such  research  include
(Chenoweth, 2011; Zunes, Kurtz, & Asher, 1999). In a
similar  way,  research  has  been  done  into  nonviolent
groups,  elements  or  episodes  within  large  scale
conflicts, revolutions or uprisings. Examples include the
role of nonviolence in the Second World War (Sharp,
1959;  Stoltzfus,  2001),  in  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet
Union and other European communist regimes (Bleiker,
1993; Eglitis, 1993; Miniotaite, 2002; Roberts, 1991), in
the Arab Spring (Achcar, 2013; Muravchik, 2013; Tripp,
2013) and in the Palestinian Intifada (Hallward, 2011;
Hallward & Norman, 2011; Pearlman, 2011).
One of the foremost researchers on nonviolence is Gene
Sharp, whose work is also used by activists all over the
world.  Taking  a  rigorous  and  systematic  approach
Sharp describes hundreds of specific nonviolent tactics
(Sharp, 1973a, 1973b, 1973c) and discusses the use of
civilian based defence as a viable alternative to warfare
(Sharp, 1980, 1985). However, where nonviolence is a
moral imperative for people like Gandhi, King or Havel,
who stress that its moral framework is just as, if not
more,  important  than  the  actual  actions,  Sharp  sees
nonviolence  as  simply  more  effective  than  warfare
(Martin,  2005).  The  difference  between  these  two
approaches  is  often  described  as  principled  versus
strategic  nonviolence  (Nagler,  2006).  In  Sharps
strategic  description,  the  moral  framework  for  (the
choice  for)  nonviolence  is  considered  much  less
relevant (McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993) for the outcome
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and  the  process  of  a  nonviolent  struggle.  Sharp’s
strategic  approach  to  nonviolence  focuses  mostly  on
the best way to obtain the desired ‘objective’ outcome
(for instance the overthrow of a regime). His work has
been very important for understanding the working of
specific  tactics  and  for  understanding  the  power
dynamics  that  play  a  role  in  a  nonviolent  struggle.
Sharp's  work  in  turn  inspired  research  by  others
(Chenoweth, 2011; Helvey, 2004; Mattaini, 2003),  and
forms  the  basis  of  the  research  and  practice  of  the
Albert  Einstein  Institution  (Holst,  1990;  McCarthy  &
Kruegler,  1993;  Sharp  &  Albert  Einstein  Institution,
2010).
But  the  strategic  approach  to  nonviolence  is  not
shared by all. I already mentioned how most nonviolent
leaders emphasise the moral aspects at least as much
as the specific  tactics.  More recently,  another aspect
has been getting more and more attention, namely the
psychology  of  nonviolence.  Inspired by the principles
showcased by mass nonviolence, specific interpersonal
methods for change have emerged. Probably the most
well known is Nonviolent Communication, developed by
Marshall Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 2003, 2005). Another
that also features in this study is Nonviolent Resistance
to teenage violence as developed by Haim Omer (Omer,
2004,  2011;  Omer,  Schorr-Sapir,  &  Weinblatt,  2008;
Weinblatt  &  Omer,  2008).  These  methods  and  their
effects  also  have  themselves  become  the  subject  of
subsequent  study  (Burleson,  Martin,  &  Lewis,  2012;
Hilsberg, 2005; Lebowitz, Dolberger, Nortov, & Omer,
2012;  Nash,  2007;  Sears,  2010).  What  these
interpersonal  methods  emphasise  is  the  connection
between action, moral conviction and the psychological
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needs,  skill  and  tools  that  are  necessary  for
nonviolence.  In  a  more  general  sense  these
psychological aspects of nonviolence have been getting
attention  within  peace  psychology.  Examples  of  such
work include (Kool, 2007; Mayton, 2009; Pelton, 1974).
Lastly,  the  study  of  nonviolence  also  takes  place
within  Peace  and  Conflict  studies  (Malley-Morrison,
Mercurio,  &  Twose,  2013;  Matyók,  2011;  Webel  &
Galtung,  2007),  be it  in a marginal way (J.  Johansen,
2007).  This is  possibly  related to the fact  that peace
and  nonviolence  are  by  no  means  synonymous,
although they are sometimes understood as such. Many
peace groups advocate nonviolence, whether strategic
or  principled,  but  the  important  difference  with
outspokenly  nonviolent  groups  or  actors  is  that  the
latter focus on the means (the way to come to social
change, peace or other specific goals) and the former
on the end goal of peace, which means many different
things  to  many  different  people.  Peace,  may  for
instance imply the end or absence of war and violence
(negative  peace)  or  it  might  imply  social  justice,
freedom and autonomy for all,  or might even include
efforts  towards  a  sustainable  world  (positive  peace)
(Galtung, 1969). 
Neither  positive  nor  negative definitions  of  peace
automatically imply nonviolence as a means to ensure
peace. Nor does the term peace itself necessarily imply
nonviolence.  There is  a big difference between third-
party,  nonviolent  intervention  or  protective
accompaniment  as  the  organization  Peace  Brigades
International  (PBI)3 is  doing,  and  the  deployment  of
3 See: www.peacebrigades.org
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armed  peacekeeping  forces.  Yet,  both  aim  to  create
peace. 
QUESTION AND METHOD
According  to  all  above  cited  research  there  is
something  that  can  be  called  nonviolence  and which
can be adopted by groups and individuals. However, it
proves  to  be  very  hard  to  find  clear  and  explicit
definitions (Govier,  2008).  This is perhaps due to the
fact  that  most  studies  have  focussed  on  specific
elements,  outcomes or aspects of nonviolence, on the
work of specific nonviolence practitioners or thinkers.
Or they have focussed on specific contexts each giving
a definition that is linked with the focus of their study.
Some  solve  this  by  first  defining  violence  and  then
using nonviolence in its  literal sense,  to point to any
method that does not use, or actively counters violence
(Arendt, 1970; Galtung, 1969; Govier, 2008). However,
with  the  exception  of  those  who  adhere  to  strategic
nonviolence,  for  most  practitioners  and  thinkers,
nonviolence  points  to  something  more  than  just  the
absence of violence,  physical force or war. Rather,  it
points to a substantive approach, and sometimes it is
even referred  to  as  a  paradigm (Nagler,  2004).  As  I
have touched upon in the introduction,  it  has proven
very  hard  to  come  to  a  suitable  term  for  this
substantive approach, so the word 'nonviolence' is still
used,  though it  causes confusion.  The lack of a clear
and generally accepted definition for nonviolence adds
to this confusion. 
It is my view that it is important to come to a more
comprehensive understanding of nonviolence, if we are
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to  assess  its  usefulness  and  possibilities  in  different
circumstances. In this research I have attempted to do
so, and come to an understanding of nonviolence that
does not rest on specific circumstances, but points to
its  universal  characteristics.  This  has  led  to  the
following research question:
What is contemporary nonviolence? 
To which the following sub-questions have been added:
Can  we  understand  contemporary  nonviolence
independent of specific contexts?
Which universal characteristics of nonviolence can
be found?
What do these entail?
This  research  question  points  at  the  formation  of  a
definition of nonviolence based on universal elements
or  characteristics  that  can  be  found.  Many  different
forms  of  definition  exist.  In  this  case,  the  research
question  points  to  a  theoretical  definition  (Hurley,
2011). Such definitions are meant to propose a way of
thinking  about  a  phenomenon  and  are  to  an  extent
normative,  not  only  descriptive.  The  five-fold  model
presented  here  as  nonviolence  should  be  taken  as  a
hypothetical  construct  (Cronbach  &  Meehl,  1955)
consisting  of  groups  of  related  attitudes,  behaviours
and so on, containing surplus meaning. Thus, I do not
merely  attempt  to  point  out  what  nonviolence  is,  or
report how the term is used, but attempt to come to a
theory that can be used for understanding and further
analysis of nonviolence and can be further developed.
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The research has been a literature study into the
work  of  nonviolence  thinkers,  practitioners  and
movements.  The  Gandhian  understanding  of
nonviolence  has been the starting point  of  my study.
However,  even  though  Gandhi’s  work  provides  an
important  basis  for  understanding  nonviolence,  many
developments have taken place in nonviolent practice
and theory after Gandhi. To come to an understanding
of contemporary nonviolence it is therefore important
to  go  beyond  Gandhi  and  also  study  the  way  the
Gandhian concepts  have been taken up by others.  In
doing so I have looked at which concepts have carried
over to the work of other thinkers and practitioners and
how these concepts have been developed and changed
and what remained the same. 
In a similar vein, although I have looked at the life
and  work  of  many  thinkers,  practitioners  and
movements, my study does not specifically focus on one
of  them.  My  question  was  not  how  each  specifically
understood  nonviolence  or  practised  it,  but  which
overarching  or  universal  elements  (if  any)  could  be
found.  However,  in  the  description  of  my  research
results in the articles or chapters in this volume I do
refer to many of the above mentioned individuals and
movements, as examples or to clarify and explore the
different elements of nonviolence. 
It became clear that nonviolence understood solely
in a strategic sense does not  allow us to  understand
most of the reasoning and moral aspects that are for so
many  a  fundamental  part.  I  understand  nonviolence
here  therefore  in  a  principled  sense  and  this  study
focuses on the philosophical and intentional aspects of
nonviolence, within which the strategies take shape. 
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The aim of this study then is twofold. First is to discern
if  it  is  possible  to  understand  nonviolence  as  a
substantive  and  pro-active  concept,  independent  of
specific cultural, religious or practical contexts. And, if
so, what that would look like. The second is to see if
from  such  an  independent  notion  it  is  possible  to
develop  a  framework  for  analysis  and  practice  of
nonviolence.
HUMANISTIC STUDIES
This  research  was  carried  out  in  the  context  of
humanistic  studies,  a  multi-disciplinary  academic
discipline that critically explores issues of (existential)
meaning  and  humanization,  or  personal  and  social
aspects  of  ‘good  living’.  Humanistic  Studies  is
grounded in humanism, a worldview or meaning frame
(Derkx, 2015) that emphasizes the value,  dignity  and
agency of human beings. The aim of humanistic studies
is  to  give  a  theoretical  and  practical  shape  to  the
humanist  pursuit  for  a  meaningful  life  in  a  humane
(global) society, to critically question and examine its
humanist  foundations  and  to  contribute  to  the
development of this modern humanist  meaning frame
(Alma, Derkx, & Suransky, 2010). 
In  relation  to  existential  meaning,  humanistic
studies  asks  and tries  to  answer questions  like:  how
and when do people find meaning in their life? What
makes  their  life  valuable,  meaningful,  appropriate?
Which  frameworks  do  they  apply  to  determine  their
attitude to life and society? What happens when people
experience  a  sense  of  loss  of  meaning?  And  so  on.
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Where  humanization  is  concerned  it  studies  issues
concerning  the  fostering  of  more  humane  social
relations. Questions that are asked in this context are:
how can we organize social constellations and societies
so  that  every  person  can  have  a  humane  and
meaningful  life?  Can  we  create  social  circumstances
that  foster  the  experience  of  meaning?  What  would
those look like? How can we address social exclusion
and  unequal  power  relations  on  different  levels  (see
also Jacobs, 2002)?
The study of nonviolence is, against this backdrop
an important  one,  I  feel.  I  think  that  the theory and
practice  of  contemporary  nonviolence  shares  insights
and a  number  of  important  normative  premises  with
humanism. Yet, I also believe that nonviolence as I have
described it  in  this  thesis  addresses  some difficulties
that  contemporary  humanism  and  consequently  also
humanistic  studies  are  confronted  with.  They  are
mainly related to the connection between (existential)
meaning and humanization. In the following section I
will  explore  the  importance  of  and  relation  between
nonviolence and humanism and humanistic studies. 
NONVIOLENCE AND HUMANISM
Humanism  has  a  long  standing  tradition  in  The
Netherlands is a worldview that holds on to values such
as  freedom  and  self-determination,  justice,
righteousness and solidarity, tolerance, appreciation of
diversity  and  respect  for  human  dignity  (Duyndam,
Alma,  &  Maso,  2008).  Characteristics  of  a  humanist
view of  life  are  confidence  in  one’s  own insight  and
powers  of  observation,  orientation  towards  dialogue
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and an aversion to dogmatism. It is especially since the
Enlightenment  that  humanism  is  considered  a
philosophy of life in which the human perspective is a
defining  factor  in  the  understanding  of,  and  giving
meaning to, life and to the world (Derkx, 2011).
Peter  Derkx,  professor  of  Humanism  and
Worldviews  at  the  University  of  Humanistic  Studies,
tries  to  come  to  a  contemporary  understanding  of
humanism that fits the 21st century,  and has elaborated
on this most recently in his contribution to the Wiley
Handbook of  Humanism,  (Derkx,  2015)  and  his  book
Humanisme  en  Nooit  Meer  Ouder  Worden  (Derkx,
2011).  He posits  that  humanism is  a  meaning  frame
with four characteristics. The first characteristic is that
humanism is a context-dependent human product. This,
he  states,  is  an  epistemological  tenet,  which  implies
that  from  a  humanist  perspective,  worldviews,  life
stances  or  meaning  frames  can’t  be  conceived  as
objective or neutral positions. This implies that as far as
worldviews,  life  stances  or  meaning  frames  are
concerned, objective or neutral positions can’t exist:
No human is in a position to survey the landscape of
different meaning frames from a neutral height and
say how – apart from his own experience and history –
life and world should be understood (Derkx, 2015, p.
2).
The remaining three characteristics are of a moral kind.
The second characteristic that Derkx mentions is that
all  human  beings  are  equally  endowed  with  human
dignity and ought to treat each other as such. Derkx
links this characteristic mostly to individual autonomy
and personal  responsibility.  Each  individual  can  only
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decide for him or herself how he or she wants to live,
no one else can do this in his/her stead. However, when
Derkx  connects  equality  to  the  recognition  of  the
dignity  of  all,  the  larger  social  context  also  becomes
important.  Only  societies  that  recognise  this  equal
dignity  of  all  people  can  be  called  humanistic,
expressed  for  instance  through  the  recognition  of  or
standing  up  for,  human  rights  (Derkx,  2011).  This
characteristic therefore also has a political connotation
and  is  connected  to  humanization  (Schuhmann  &
Goelst  Meijer,  2012).  Thirdly, Derkx asserts that self-
development, linked to positive freedom and autonomy
is a moral imperative for humanists. People should use
their freedom and autonomy to develop themselves and
strive  to  give  their  life  purpose  and  meaning
(Schuhmann  &  Goelst  Meijer,  2012).  For  the  last
characteristic  of  humanism  Derkx  follows  Todorov
(2003), in stating that humanists ought to cultivate love
for  specific,  vulnerable,  unique  and  irreplaceable
people and make them the “highest aim of his or her
actions”  (Derkx,  2015,  p.  5).  This  characteristic  has
both personal and political implications (Derkx, 2011).
Not only do we as individuals connect to specific people
in  our  lives,  societies  need  to  foster  options  for
individual choice in people’s lives and prevent people
from harming the (options for) individual development
of others.
Thus,  personal  responsibility,  autonomy,  love  for
unique and irreplaceable people and self-development
take centre-stage in Derkx’s view on humanism. This
seems to point to a concept of humanism that is mainly
focussed  on  individual  well-being  and  good  living.
Although  he  mentions  the  importance  of  the  social
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aspect  of  humanism  by  stating  that  people’s  actions
only get their full meaning from the responses of others
and that the social element of human life is not second
to  the  individual  aspects  (Derkx,  2011),  the  focus
remains  on  the  individual.  In  this  definition  of
humanism,  the  equality  and  equal  dignity  of  people
refers  to  their  personal,  individual  responsibility  for
their life and its fulfilment. 
However, as I have mentioned above, the principle
of equality implies humanization. Somehow the human
rights  and the  equal  opportunities  for  each to  live  a
meaningful  life,  need  to  be  guaranteed  and  fostered
(Schuhmann & Goelst  Meijer,  2012).  Derkx mentions
that people are deeply social beings and that tensions
between the individual and the social good should not
be overlooked and goes on to say that it is unhelpful to
think of the pursuit of personal meaning as necessarily
opposed to the greater good (Derkx, 2011). However,
the text says very little about how the two aspects are
related,  or  about  the  way  these  tensions  should  be
handled. That this is nonetheless an important part of
humanism and something that should be worked out, is
stressed  for  instance  by  Nimrod  Aloni  in  his  book
Enhancing Humanity (Aloni, 2007).
Aloni describes four approaches to the matter of “how
to be a human being” (Aloni,  2007, p. 5) that can be
considered  the  founding  traditions  of  contemporary
humanism  (Schuhmann  &  Goelst  Meijer,  2012)  They
are: 
(1)  a  classical-cultural  approach  which  begins  in
ancient  Greece  and  continues  in  various  forms  in
Rome,  the Renaissance,  and the New Era  until  the
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present day; (2) a romantic naturalistic approach (…);
(3)  an  existential approach  built  on  existential  and
phenomenological literature and research; and (4) the
radical-critical  approach  that  coalesced  in  the
"counterculture" of the 60s (Aloni, 2007, pp. 5–6).
The  first  three  traditions  ring  through  in  the
description  of  contemporary  humanism  summarized
above, but the fourth, the radical-critical approach does
so much less. This critical approach stresses the need
for  awareness  of  and  change  in  the  existing  social
reality.  This  social  reality  is  not  neutral  but  rather
normative and does not grant equal opportunities to all
people  and  all  ways  of  life.  The  pursuit  of  personal
meaning  takes  place  within  socio-political  contexts.
Furthermore,  these  social  realities  directly  and
indirectly affect the ways in which people are able to
pursue their personal fulfilment and lead a meaningful
life. They also affect the things that count as personal
fulfilment.  Moreover, the self-development of one can
interfere  with  that  of  another  (Schuhmann  & Goelst
Meijer, 2012). Power relations and the ways in which
they  are  (socially)  organized  thus  play  a  big  role  in
something as private as the pursuit of a meaningful life.
In contemporary humanism as described above, the
importance  of  social  relations  and  human  rights  is
mentioned and it  is acknowledged that the individual
and the social good can sometimes be opposed. But this
seems to  be a thin  base,  compared with the radical-
critical approach that Aloni describes. 
Thinkers  in  this  radical  tradition  emphasize,  for
instance, the deep psychological effects of oppression,
poverty, lack of education and lack of insight into larger
societal mechanisms. These forms of deprivation harm
20
people’s  abilities  “to  take  their  fate  into  their  own
hands  and  act  towards  changing  and  improving  the
reality of their lives” (Aloni, 2007, p. 48). Central in this
critical-radical  tradition  is  not  just  the  fulfilment  of
personal meaning (whether or not in relation others),
but “the development of critical awareness and moral
sensitivity”  (idem.)  and  finding  ways  to  “rationally,
morally and responsibly cope with the main challenges
facing humanity in the last third of the 20th century”
(idem.).  The  critical-radical  tradition  stresses  the
necessity  of  social  engagement  and  critical  self-
reflection, aimed not just at assessing how one’s own
life is developing, but how it is developing in light of
that  of  others.  Dynamics  of  power,  opportunity  and
opposition are central in this respect. 
The principle of equality, that has been described as
a  humanist  fundament,  implies  that  striving  towards
humanization is important as is critical reflection on the
connection  between  humanization  and  personal
meaning.  When  engaging  with  the  search  for  a
meaningful life, the question of what this will mean in
light of humanization processes needs to be taken into
account.  The  dehumanising  aspects  of  personal
development  and  personal  meaning  need  to  be
assessed  and  addressed.  Engaging  with  this  kind  of
reflection  makes  the  tensions  between  processes  of
personal meaning and self-development and processes
of humanization stand out. 
For  one  thing,  when  we have to  make room for  the
meaningful  fulfilment  of  the lives  of  others,  our  own
fulfilment might be compromised. For another, striving
towards  the  personal  fulfilment  of  our  lives  is  not
necessarily humanizing. When different trajectories of
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personal  fulfilment  clash,  humanization  seems  to
amount  to a form of  conflict  management.  Curiously,
questions of conflict  and conflict  management do not
really  feature  in  the  description  of  contemporary
humanism, nor are they central to humanistic studies
(Schuhmann & Goelst Meijer, 2012). The perspective of
nonviolence,  with  its  emphasis  on  both  meaning  and
worldview,  and on power relations,  social  justice and
relationality  has,  in  my  view,  a  lot  to  offer  in  this
respect.
That this perspective is not totally new in (Dutch)
humanism, can be gained from the work of  Jaap van
Praag,  founding  father  of  the  Dutch  humanist
movement. His experiences in the Second World War
have always been a source of reflection in Van Praag’s
work. Both before and after the war Van Praag was an
active  member  of  different  peace  organizations  and
emphasized nonviolence. The humanist worldview was
to him an expression of his attempts to live a nonviolent
life, and was connected with respect for life and human
dignity (Goelst Meijer, 2012). He wrote: 
What it means to be truly human can’t be understood
from the  individual  fulfilment  of  existence,  because
man can only be fully understood as a human being in
the world,  between fellow human beings.  Thus,  the
message  of  humanism  is  the  enunciation  of  the
possibility  of  an  existence  in  which  man,  on  every
stair  of  development  realizes  himself  through  his
concern with the non-self (Praag, 2009, p. 69).4
4
 Translation SvGM.
22
As  in  nonviolence  thinking  as  it  is  presented  in  this
study,  Van  Praag's  ideas  expressed  here  a
fundamentally relational view on ‘what is means to be
human’.  Such  a  relational  view  is  also  described  by
other humanistic thinkers like Hans Alma (2005), who
explain that processes of meaning giving and personal
fulfilment  take  place  in  the  space  of  a  relationship
between an individual and other people or the world.
Confrontations  with the views of  others  lead us  to  a
more complex form of being human. But this relational
view does not imply that these meetings with others are
always  easy  or  conflict-free.  Conflicts  are  part  and
parcel of every aspect of life. But this is not necessarily
a  bad  thing.  Conflicts  force  us  to  engage  with  new
perspectives and can ultimately help to create a more
complex way of understanding reality. Humanization is
then  not  just  about  the  prevention  or  removal  of
conflict,  but  about  handling  or  preventing  its
destructive  aspects  (Schuhmann  &  Goelst  Meijer,
2012), or in other words about 'waging good conflict'
(Lindner, 2009).
HUMANISTIC STUDIES AND NONVIOLENCE
As stated above, nonviolence as it has been presented
and  analysed  in  this  study  is  about  more  than  the
removal or absence of violence. It represents a way of
dealing  with  social  relations  that  both  incorporates
questions of meaning and of humanization and deeply
relates  them. For this  reason alone nonviolence  is  of
interest  for  humanism  as  a  worldview  and  for
humanistic studies as the academic discipline focussed
on  meaning  and  humanization.  But  there  are  more
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specific  ways  in  which  humanistic  thinking  could
benefit  from  reflection  on  and  critique  from  the
nonviolence paradigm. As an example, we can look at
the first  characteristic  of  contemporary humanism as
stated by Derkx. This epistemological premise is very
much  in  line  with  the  ideas  on  truth  and  life-
perspectives in the nonviolence paradigm that I  have
tried to capture with the term satya5. 
The basic premise of satya, one of the five elements
of nonviolence, is that even if there might be something
like  an objective  or  ultimate  reality,  people  can only
know and understand it in a relative, contextual sense.
Opposing  and  conflicting  truth  claims  constitute  an
appeal to: “develop new and more complex conceptions
and visions of reality, of different strategies of being in
the world, of new forms of good living, both personal
and social” (Goelst Meijer, forthcoming).6 This connects
to  Derkx’s  statements  about  humanism and meaning
frames in general, that these are constantly evaluated,
challenged  and  changed  by  people’s  experiences,  by
applying reason and through encounters  with others.
To  a  large  extent  then,  the  first  characteristic  of
humanism overlaps with ideas found in the nonviolence
paradigm.  However,  a  note  of  difference  creeps  up
towards  the  end  of  this  section  of  his  article  in  the
handbook of humanism. 
In the plea for humanism as an 'inclusive' meaning
frame it is stated that an attitude akin to the humanistic
one described by Derkx can also be found within other
religions and worldviews. “Some Christians,  Muslims,
Jews etc. are humanists because they accept the core
5 See chapter 3 in this volume.
6 Chapter 3 in this volume.
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humanist  principles”  (Derkx,  2015,  p.  3).  Although  I
think  it  is  important  to  recognize  that  notions  like
personal responsibility for one's life, autonomy, love for
unique and irreplaceable people and self-development
can  be  found  within  every  other  world  religion  or
worldview,  and  although  I  do  believe  that  this  is
essentially what is meant here, I think that the claim
that those who adhere to these principles are therefore
humanists  (regardless  of  their  faith)  is  somewhat
problematic. By claiming that all who adhere to these
notions  in  their  religion  or  worldview  are  therefore
humanists,  whether  they  view themselves  as  such or
not, we run the risk of embarking on a slippery slope of
appropriation. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that in a different article,
in the edited book Waarvoor je Leeft (Alma & Smaling,
2010) Derkx himself writes something along the same
lines: 
Humanism  is  to  some  people  a  word  they  use  to
denote their own worldview and with it  all  kinds of
things  they  value  positively:  individual  freedom,
tolerance,  humaneness.  (…).  If  we  want  to  prevent
that humanism becomes a receptacle of all  kinds of
things  that  we  find  good  or  bad  according  to  our
individual preferences, we should take the history of
humanism  seriously  and  depart  from  the  most
important  meanings humanism has  had  in  the  past
centuries (Derkx, 2010, p. 43).7
But the remark in the Handbook of Humanism seems to
disregard  that  specific  history.  Religious  believers,
oriented  towards  personal  responsibility,  autonomy,
7 Translation SvGM.
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self development and love for specific individuals (and
who  find  motives  for  this  within  their  respective
religions), might not agree with or adhere to humanism
as  a  life  stance,  with  its  specific  history,  at  all.
Moreover, in the handbook Derkx speaks not just about
humanism,  but about humanists and who is or is not
one.  Thus  it  becomes  a  question  of  identity.  By
assigning  the  identity  'humanist'  to  everyone,  even
those who specifically consider themselves Muslim, Jew
or  belonging  to  whichever  other  specific  faith,  who
nevertheless also adhere to these four tenets, one runs
the  risk  of  stepping  over  their  'otherness'  (Irigaray,
1996), and create precisely the receptacle he says not
to want. There is a tension between the wish to define
humanism as open, tolerant and dialogical as possible
and  at  the  same  time  define  it  as  a  very  specific
worldview.
As Derkx addresses in his article, humanism itself is
a diversified worldview and there will be many groups
who call themselves humanist, who do not agree with
his definition. But, it is one thing to try and define what
humanism is (even if  not everyone agrees),  but quite
another  to  claim this  identity  for  others  who do  not
claim it for themselves.
I  think  that  the  statement  in  the  Handbook  of
Humanism  forgoes  something  that  in  the  nonviolent
paradigm, specifically in relation the notions of satya8
and  ahimsa9 is  very  important.  It  is  perhaps  best
described in the words of philosopher Irigaray (1996)
as  the  recognition  of  “the  other  as  other”.  Irigaray
states:
8 See chapter 3 in this volume.
9 See chapter 4 in this volume.
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Recognizing you means or implies respecting you as
other, accepting that I draw myself to a halt before
you as before something insurmountable, a mystery, a
freedom that will  never be mine, a subjectivity that
will  never be mine, a mine that will  never be mine
(Irigaray, 1996, p. 104) 
I  think  that  here  the  nonviolence  paradigm  has
something to offer for thinking through humanism. It
certainly  offers  some  important  insights  for  the
academic  discipline  of  humanistic  studies,  concerned
with  creating  a  just  world  in  which  all  can  live  a
meaningful life. ‘Drawing oneself to a halt’ is also one
of  the  implications  of  the  element  tapasya,  part  of
nonviolence,  which  is  described  in  this  study.10 That
this  attitude  is  important  in  nonviolence  is  not  only
expressed by nonviolence thinkers like Gandhi, but also
for  instance  by  Evelin  Lindner  (2006,  2009,  2010),
founder  of  the  network  on  Human  Dignity  and
Humiliation studies.11 She explains how the recognition
of limits in both action and intention are important in
dynamics of humiliation and dignity. To her, humiliation
and the removal  of  dignity  form the core of  violence
and violent conflicts (Lindner, 2006). To safeguard the
dignity of all, it is important to cultivate an attitude of
humility  and  of  something  that  John  Koller  has
described as  “epistemological respect for the view of
others”  (Koller,  2004,  p.  88),  as  other,  without  the
necessity of a claim. That this is not an easy endeavour
can  be  easily  understood  from  the  clashes  between
10 See chapter 5 in this volume.
11 See www.humiliationstudies.org 
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different religious and cultural groups, both within and
between countries the world over. But humanization is,
in  my opinion,  connected  to  cultivating precisely  this
attitude. 
That  the  cultivation  of  such  an  attitude  is  not
something  far-fetched,  and  in  fact  quite  possible  to
achieve  by  ordinary  people,  prove  the  different
examples cited in this study. But these examples also
show  that  training,  and  a  firm  commitment  to
nonviolence are necessary. 
In situations in which we are surrounded by others
that are thinking, feeling and acting in ways that are
similar to our own, the practice of making space for the
other will  not be so hard. Cultivating love for unique
and irreplaceable others, an element of contemporary
humanism,  becomes  a  salient  issue  in  situations  of
conflict,  violence  and  humiliation.  This  love  is  not
cultivated  by  reflection  and  reasoning  alone,  but  by
practice and by engaging in situations in which it is put
to the test (Schuhmann & Goelst Meijer, 2012). In the
theory and practice of nonviolence, as described in this
study,  this  cultivation  takes  centre  stage  and  the
practical examples show that in certain circumstances,
conflicts and situations of oppression can be humanised
from within. 
It  is  remarkable  that  nonviolence  receives  little
attention in Humanistic Studies and that the emphasis
on  nonviolence  has  all  but  disappeared  from
contemporary humanist thinking, even though it lies at
its  foundation.  Yet,  as  described  above,  nonviolence
addresses  a  lot  of  topics  that  are  important  for
humanism and humanistic studies. Both strive, from a
value laden (normative) perspective for a humane and
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just  (global)  society  in  which  each person can live  a
meaningful life in dignity. Both emphasize the role and
importance  of  an  existential  perspective  and  of
worldviews and connect  meaning to humanization.  In
nonviolence  the  emphasis  is  on  concrete  social  (and
personal) practises. It is for all of these reasons that I
think nonviolence is an important and relevant topic of
study for humanistic studies.
In the next section I will present an overview of my
understanding  of  nonviolence,  its  five  elements  and
how  they  are  linked  together  by  way  of  a  first
introduction.  In  the  last  section,  I  will  make  some
suggestions  for  further  research  based  on  my
understanding  of  nonviolence  and on the  importance
and role I see for nonviolence as a topic for study in
general and specifically within humanistic studies.
OVERVIEW OF RESULTS
Looking at all these different practises and analyses of
nonviolence five elements stand out that are present in
each  account.  The  nonviolent  approach  rests  on  the
search  for  truth  (satya),  the  firm  intention  not  to
commit harm (ahimsa), aiming for autonomy and self-
reliance  (swadeshi/swaraj)  while  limiting  oneself
(tapasya)  so  the  well-being  of  all  (sarvodaya)  can
emerge.  These five  elements,  in  their  Sanskrit  terms
originating  from  Gandhi’s  work,  together  form  a
dynamic framework, that is the core of contemporary
nonviolence.
The terms were (re)conceptualised by Gandhi in a
new way that made them applicable in contemporary
society.  As  a  result  of  all  nonviolent  efforts  and
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experience gained after Gandhi’s struggle, the meaning
of  these  terms  has  expanded  even  more.  Although
Gandhi mentions all five terms throughout his work, he
never  made  the  claim  that  they  together  formed
nonviolence. Gandhi  was not looking for a systematic
framework. The term he used for his nonviolence was
satyagraha (holding  on  to  truth).  But  to  explain
satyagraha he referred to each of the terms. 
It is my assertion that, when we analyse instances
of  principled  nonviolence,  these  elements  are  all
present.  This  does  not  mean  that  each  individual  or
group  working  with  nonviolence  necessarily  uses  all
these terms, but it does mean that the dynamics they
represent  are  always  to  be  found.  Nonviolence,
consisting of these five elements, amounts to a specific
form of  wielding power,  best  captured with the term
integrative power (Boulding, 1990; Nagler, 2004). 
In  the  following  sections  I  will  give  a  brief
introduction  to  these  five  elements  and  the  way  in
which they are linked together and come to an answer
to the research question. The subsequent chapters of
this  book  consist,  with  the  exception  of  the  first,  of
articles that each focus on one element specifically. In
the next section I take some more time to address the
last element, that of sarvodaya, because this element is
not addressed in an article of its own.
FIVE ELEMENTS
The first element, explained more in-depth in chapter 3
of  this  book,  is  that  of  satya,  meaning  ‘truth’  in
Sanskrit.  This  might  seem  odd  because  conflicting
truth-claims,  can  and  often  do  lead  to  violence.  Yet,
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satya points to a very specific understanding of truth,
or rather to a form of truth-seeking, that prevents this. 
For Gandhi the search for truth forms the essence
of his work (M. K. Gandhi, 1927a). He is convinced that
there  was  such  a  thing  as  universal  truth,  yet  that
people  could  only  understand  it  in  a  relative  sense.
Gandhi  wants  people  to  examine  each situation,  and
understand what is at stake for all involved. Although
people should strive to understand the truth of every
situation,  one  can  never  claim  to  be  all-knowing.  In
Gandhian  thought,  truth  is  based  in  experience
(Bilgrami, 2011a). We can experience something to be
true,  yet  someone  else  can  come  to  an  opposite
conclusion based on his or her own experiences. These
truths  cannot  cancel  each  other  out  because  both
experiences are real. In times of disagreement, it could
be  that  the  other  party  sees  something  more  of  the
truth than we do, even though we are convinced that
we are right. This does not mean that we should give
up our  own ideas  about  the  truth;  it  means  that  we
allow for the possibility  for  both truths to exist.  This
would make satya an extremely relative concept, except
each  experience  still  has  universal  value.  The
experience of truth does not lead to a rule for everyone
to follow, but it does lead to a rule for oneself to follow.
Satya therefore implies that “we are dedicated to the
truth we perceive, to the truth we understand” (Thakar,
2005,  p.  20).  If  we  live  from  our  own  truth  as  we
understand it,  setting  an example,  we can share  our
truth  with  others  and  others  their  truth  with  us
(Bilgrami, 2011b; Thakar, 2005). 
This element also takes a central place in the work
of Václav Havel, and in this study I have focussed on his
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ideas to explore satya. Havel’s work shows that satya
demands  that  we  see  the  world  as  an  arena  where
different truths meet and interact,  something that he
denotes  with  ‘the  logic  of  stories’.  Both  Gandhi  and
Havel  stress  that  the  personal  and  the  political,  the
individual  and  the  public  quest  to  live  in  truth  as
intertwined. The personal search for one’s identity and
truth are done in private, but acting upon one’s truth, is
a public act and has social consequences. So, the role
of satya in nonviolence is not just a moral imperative to
‘live in truth’, but a call to action, to participate in the
creation of social realities that are more nonviolent.
The second element is that of Ahimsa, addressed more
in-depth  in  chapter  4  of  this  book.  Ahimsa  literally
means  ‘the  absence  of  the  intention  to  do  harm’.
Gandhi adapted ahimsa from a philosophical notion that
he  found  to  be  too  “negative  and  passive”  (Parekh,
2001,  p.  46)  and  widened  it  with  ideas  from  other
religions and secular thinkers that were “activist and
socially  oriented”  (idem.).  Blended  they  “yielded  the
novel idea of an active and positive but detached and
non-emotive love” (idem).
Ahimsa also points to addressing harm, for instance
through  social  service.  When  we  encounter
circumstances  in  which  we  or  others  experience
injustice and we do not venture to remedy the situation,
we  are,  from the  point  of  view  of  nonviolence,  to  a
certain  extent  complicit.  Thus,  acting  without  the
intention to do harm, means addressing the problems
we  encounter  as  best  we  can.  However,  we  should
address  the  situation  in  a  way  that  does  not  create
32
harm in itself. In other words, we can’t fight injustice
by inflicting harm on the perpetrators. 
Ahimsa is that element in a process of nonviolence
which  calls  one  to  make  a  qualitative  shift  in  our
relationship to others. Instead of hating our opponents
one  should  cultivate  goodwill  and  disinterested  love
towards all others, regardless of the attitude the other
takes towards you. This means, as M.L. King has put it
‘condemning the sin, not the sinner’ (M. L. King, 2001).
Ahimsa thus also requires satya, a search for and an
understanding of the different viewpoints of others and
their needs.
Whereas in nonviolence thinking this is understood
foremost  (though  not  solely)  in  a  social  way,  a  very
similar attitude is developed in relation to the natural
world,  in  the  context  of  Radical  Ecology.  Radical
Ecology is a way of thinking that asks how a radical
transformation of human “being in the world” can be
brought  about,  that  would  allow  humans  and  non-
human  beings  both  to  flourish.  In  this  study  I  have
compared the notion of ahimsa to this specific way of
relating to 'the other'  that Radical  Ecology proposes.
The shift in attitude that is proposed by Radical Ecology
is  not  in  the  first  place  related  to  dealing  with  an
antagonistic other (although nature is sometimes cast
that way in western thinking), but with an 'other' that is
a different life form. However, in both cases the other
has a different outlook on life, and different needs for
flourishing  that  might  conflict.  Although  the  term
ahimsa  is  seldom  mentioned  in  a  radical  ecological
context,  the  shift  in  attitude  it  represents  is  very
similar, amounting to “saying “yes” to all living beings”
(Aristarkhova, 2012, p. 637). 
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The  third  element,  tapasya, which  is  the  subject  of
chapter  5,  is  usually  the  most  difficult  to  grasp,
certainly  from  a  western  point  of  view.  Its  most
common translation in the context of nonviolence; self-
suffering,  brings  to  mind  the  idea  that  nonviolence
involves accepting the violence or wrong-doings of the
other without responding to them. This interpretation is
linked  to  another  common  misinterpretation  of
nonviolence  as  passivity  and  acquiescence  (Roedel,
2007).  However,  tapasya  points  to  something
completely different. 
Tapasya implies the willingness to suffer instead of
retaliating when confronted with violence or injustice
and  subverts  the  ‘reasonable’  idea  of  eliminating
suffering for oneself. This breaks the cycle of violence.
It is not the same as giving in. It means addressing the
violence by not participating in the dynamic it calls for;
fight, flight or freeze. Tapasya is thus an agent for self-
transformation  and  strongly  related  to  ahimsa.  An
example is  the  firm internal  struggle  to  overcome ill
will to the opponent. The removal of ill will is part of
ahimsa, engaging in the struggle to do so is a form of
tapasya, and so, tapasya also points towards dedication
or discipline. 
Tapasya is related to satya when it is understood as
a means to “penetrate the heart” of those to whom we
are  appealing.  By  making  the  suffering  visible  by
undergoing  it  openly,  it  becomes  clear  that  the
injustices  people  face are afflicted on them by  other
humans.  That  means  that  it  can  also  be  stopped
(Tercheck, 2011), but for that to happen, the problem
has to be acknowledged.
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In the context of this study I have compared tapasya
to  the  work  of  philosopher  René  Girard.  To  Girard
violence  is  connected  to  sacrifice.  However,  in  their
writings on nonviolence, Gandhi, King and others speak
of  the  role  of  sacrifice  in  nonviolence  and  the
dedication  of  one’s  life  to  the  well-being  of  all.  The
sacrifice  that  tapasya  refers  to  is  the  creation  of  a
situation in which the humanity of all people can rise to
the surface, rather than adhering to self-preservation at
the expense of the other.
Girard himself remains sceptical about the practical
realities  of  a nonviolent society,  but he states that it
would mean “the complete and definitive elimination of
every form of vengeance and every form of reprisal in
relations  between  men”  (Girard,  1987,  p.  197).  I
maintain that this is what is meant by tapasya. 
The  fourth  aspect  is  that  of  swadeshi/swaraj.  An  in-
depth  exploration  of  this  notion  can be  found  in  the
final chapter of this book, chapter 6. 
Swadeshi means 'from one’s own' (swa-) 'country' (-
deshi),  though  the  most  commonly  used  direct
translation  is  self-reliance  (Cox,  2007).  In  a  political
sense  swadeshi  implies  economic  and  socio-political
self-reliance.  For  individuals  it  means  to  be  as  self-
sufficient as possible, to have agency and self-efficacy
and create the circumstances that allow you to do so.
Swaraj means 'self-' (swa) 'rule' (raj). This can refer to
political autonomy. But it also implies autonomy at the
personal  level.  Where  swadeshi  points  to
empowerment,  creating  the  conditions  for
independence,  swaraj  points  to  actual  autonomy  and
self-rule (Jahanbegloo, 2013).
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Put  together  swadeshi/swaraj  point  to  something
slightly  different  than  autonomy  in  the  traditional
sense, with which it is often compared (Prabhu, 2008).
Rather  it  points  to  a  form  of  autonomy  that  is
understood as relational. Relational autonomy departs
from  the  premise  that  people  are  essentially  social
beings,  whose  identities  develop  within  relations
(Sherwin  &  Winsby,  2011)  and  who’s  autonomy  is
constrained and complicated by but also made possible
through relationships. Swadeshi/swaraj points to a form
of  autonomy  in  which  becoming  fully  human,  fully
oneself does not rest on freeing oneself from these ties
(Prabhu,  2008),  but  is  rather  seen as  a search for a
“contextually  sensitive  decision  making  processes”
(Cox,  2007,  p.  114).  In such a relational  approach it
becomes crucial to analyse the effect and role of norms,
values,  institutions,  attitudes  and  beliefs  to  see  how
they  help  or  hinder  the  (capacity  for)  autonomy
development for each person (ibid.) (satya) and to then
act in such a way that helps to increase the capacity for
autonomous action for each (ahimsa, sarvodaya). 
In  this  study  I  look  at  a  specific  practice  of
nonviolence to clarify this concept further: a method for
working  with  violent  and  self-destructive  children
developed by Israeli Psychologist Haim Omer. Omer’s
method  is  to  a  large  extent  concerned  with
empowerment  and  creating  circumstances  in  which
parents (and by extension also the child) are not swept
away by each other’s responses. Instead they learn to
deal  with  the  violence  in  a  way  that  addresses  the
problem,  and  also  helps  the  family  as  a  whole  to
function  better.  Swadeshi/swaraj  points  to  such  an
attitude of autonomy within a web of relations.
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The  final  aspect  of  nonviolence  is  sarvodaya,  or  the
welfare of  all.  This  is  the one element  that does not
have  a  separate  chapter  in  this  book  and  so  I  will
elaborate on it here more in depth.
The  term  sarvodaya,  was  coined  by  Mohandas
Gandhi, and in his work this notion points mostly to his
ideas on the socio-economical organization of India as
an independent country, specifically the betterment of
the poorest and marginalised. However, as with most of
Gandhi’s  notions,  sarvodaya  had  much  wider
implications (see also: Mayton, 2001). Sarvodaya points
also to the desire and attempts to resolve problematic
situations  of  conflict  or  injustice  with  literally  the
welfare of all in mind, even the parties that could be
taken as the perpetrator of violence. The notion in this
wider  sense  has  travelled  to  all  other  modern
nonviolence movements,  though often under different
names, as a central element of a nonviolence process.
The word sarvodaya appears in Gandhi’s work first as
the title of his paraphrased translation of John Ruskin’s
book  Unto  This  Last  (1921)  into  his  native  language
Gujarati. Ruskin’s book was to a large extent a critique
of  modernity,  specifically  of  modern  industrial
capitalism  (Parel,  2008).  According  to  Ruskin  and
Gandhi, modern economic thinking made the mistake of
seeing  self-interest  as  the  sole  motivator  of  human
action.  It  had  overlooked  the  importance  of  “social
affection” (Parel, 2008, p. 25). According to Gandhi and
Ruskin, a healthy economy would take both self-interest
and social affection into account. Related to this was a
critique of the concept of wealth. True wealth does not
consist of possessions, which hold only relative value,
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according to a corresponding human capacity.  A car,
for  instance,  is  only  valuable to someone who knows
how to drive it, or has someone around who can. People
without this capacity will not see much value in a car, it
will cost money for nothing. To Gandhi and Ruskin, the
most fundamental  capacity humans have is life itself.
Hence,  the  essence  of  economics  should  be  the
preservation and enhancement of life.
We must search for wealth not in the bowels of the
earth  but  in  the  hearts  of  men…  the  true  law  of
economics  is that  men should be maintained in the
best possible health, both of body and mind, and in
the highest honour (M. K. Gandhi, 1999a, p. 406).
Thus,  a  healthy  economy  is  one  that  empowers  and
uplifts people, and is centred around their well-being in
their broadest sense (Parel, 2008). 
Sarvodaya was created by Gandhi from the root sarva,
meaning  ‘everyone’  or  ‘all’,  and  ‘udaya’  -  uplift  or
betterment. Put together it means ‘the uplift  of all’,
or  in a  more wider used translation ‘the welfare of
all’.  As  the  title  of  his  paraphrased  translation  it
pointed  straight  at  one  of  the  most  fundamental
points  that  Gandhi  found  in  Ruskin’s  book  and
wholeheartedly  agreed  with,  an  opposition  to
utilitarianism. Contrary to the utilitarian notion of 'the
greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number',  sarvodaya
really means the welfare, uplift or benefit, of each and
every person (Richards, 1991).
Sarvodaya  stands  in  contrast  to  utilitarian  thinking
because  it  opposes  the  notion  that  the  good  of  the
minority can be sacrificed for that of the majority. On
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the  other  hand,  sarvodaya  does  not  imply  that  the
welfare of the group comes before that of the individual
either. Both have to be taken equally into account, the
individual and its  social  embeddedness are both vital
for human well-being.  However,  it  is understood that
the welfare of the group consists of the welfare of its
members.  As  Gandhi  summarized  one  of  Ruskin’s
tenets: “the good of the individual is contained in the
good of all” (M. K. Gandhi, 1927a, p. 157). Once again,
the relational view of humanity is stressed here. That
this also implies a firm connection between ends and
means becomes clear from the work of Glyn Richards
who writes: 
The utilitarian approach, if it had been applied to the
political  life of  India,  would have led to the forcible
ejection of the British on the grounds that the greatest
happiness  or  good of  the greatest  number  in  India,
namely the Indians themselves,  would have resulted
from  it.  Gandhi  could  not  countenance  such  an
approach  because  it  involved  rejecting  ahimsa  and
relinquishing sarvodaya (Richards, 1991, p. 45).
In  this  research  I  use  the  term  not  in  this  original
economic sense but as a wider notion, hinted at in the
final  part  of  the  quote  by  Glyn  Richards  above.
Sarvodaya then points to an attitude or a stance from
which  things  are  to  be  handled,  namely  from  an
attitude that is tuned to the welfare of all present in a
specific situation. 
One  particular  contemporary  practice  that  is  closely
connected with nonviolence and highlights the salient
aspects  of  sarvodaya  is  that  of  Restorative  Justice
(Johnstone & Van Ness, 2007; Sullivan & Tifft,  2006;
39
Van Ness,  2010).  Restorative  Justice  is  a  practise  of
addressing  crimes  in  a  way  that  does  not  seek
retribution  (an  equal  amount  of  harm  dealt  to  the
perpetrator through punishment),  but seeks to repair
as much as possible the damage that is done and the
re-integration of all parties (Wallis & Tudor, 2008), i.e.
with the uplift or well-being of all in mind. In different
terms: 
Restorative Justice aims to restore the well-being of
victims,  offenders  and  communities  damaged  by
crime,  and to  prevent  further  offending (Liebmann,
2007, p. 25).
That this is no simple matter is affirmed by Liebmann
when she writes: 
Even if  goods are returned or insurance claimed or
wounds healed, there are still likely to be emotional
scars for the victim. The hope is that, rather than aim
to  simply  restore  what  has  been  lost,  a  dialogue
between victim and offender can transform the crime
into something different,  so that the experience can
be a healing one for all concerned (Liebmann, 2007,
pp. 25–26).
However,  in  spite  of  these  difficulties,  Restorative
Justice is often proposed as a nonviolent way of dealing
with  crime.  I  cannot  deal  with  all  the  complex
discussions connected with Restorative Justice as they
exists, nor is it my aim to discuss the topic here in such
depth. I merely want to cite it as an example of a field
in  which  solving  difficult  circumstances  with  the
welfare of all (involved parties) in mind is central. The
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way  nonviolence  has  been  understood  in  this  study
implies  that  in  this  context  the  damage done  to  the
victim should certainly  not  be ignored.  It  does mean
that  a  deep  reflection  has  to  take  place  on  what
'welfare'  means for each of the involved parties.  And
furthermore, on how a situation in which the welfare of
all  is  fostered,  can be created.  This  dynamics makes
sarvodaya an integral part of nonviolence.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
These five elements, although here separately explored,
form a  coherent  and  dynamic  whole  that  constitutes
nonviolence.  It  is  not  enough  to  equate  nonviolence
with one of the elements. As I understand nonviolence,
each of  these  elements  have  to  be  present,  because
they  supplement  and  support  each  other.  The  five
elements together form a framework which can be used
as a tool  for  analyses as well  as a  starting point  for
formulating practice.
Nonviolence,  understood  in  this  five-fold  way,
implies a specific form of wielding power, for which I
use,  following  Kenneth  Boulding  (1990),  the  term
integrative power.  For Boulding, from the three basic
ways  of  wielding,  integrative  power  is  the  most
important in comparison to the other two; threat and
exchange power, which are often together paraphrased
as ‘the carrot and the stick’.  Integrative power is the
power  of  and  through  human  relationships.  It  is
connected  to  everything  that  establishes  a  relation
either  personal  or  in  the  form  of  institutions  or
organizations.  Of  course,  both  threat  and  exchange
power also make use of a relationship between parties,
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without  a  relationship  neither  a  threat  nor  a  reward
would have any bearing. Yet, the threat or reward are a
tool  through  which  a  relationship  is  influenced.
Integrative  power  does  away  away  with  this  'go-
between'  and  makes  use  of  the  relation  directly.  In
chapters 2 and 4 this concept is explored in-depth.
When we look at nonviolence as a praxis, we can also
divide  it  into  two  distinct  but  related  sections,
‘constructive  program’  (M.  K.  Gandhi,  1927b)  and
‘obstructive  program’  (Nagler,  2004).  Obstructive
program - the various forms of protest against and non-
cooperation  with  violence  and  injustice-  is  the  most
widely known part of nonviolence. 
The constructive side of nonviolence points to the
development  of  new  (social)  structures  that  embody
and support the nonviolent realities one strives for. On
the other hand, constructive activities can themselves
become  a  form  of  protest  when  the  creation  of
alternative  (parallel)  institutions  becomes  a  way  to
circumvent  those  that  are  deemed  violent  or
problematic.  In  a  way,  constructive  program aims at
structural  nonviolence.  Chapters  2  and  6  specifically
address the constructive side of nonviolence.
Therefore,  my  summarized  answer  to  the  main
research question 'what is contemporary nonviolence?'
is  that  contemporary  nonviolence  is  a  pro-active  and
substantial  mode  of  conduct,  of  which  the  universal
characteristics  are  satya,  ahimsa,  tapasya,
swadeshi/swaraj and sarvodaya, as explained above and
explored  in  more  detail  in  the  rest  of  this  book.
Together  they  amount  to  a  specific  form of  wielding
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power, here denoted with the term integrative power.
In addition, nonviolence has both an obstructive and a
constructive side, which both are expressions of these
five elements.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
I  think  it  is  important  to  continue  developing  theory
and  conducting  research  on  nonviolence  in  all  its
aspects. Even though there are many nonviolent efforts
going  on  around  the  world  today  (see  for  instance:
Chenoweth,  2011),  the  facts  and  narratives  of  these
efforts  seldom  reach  mainstream  news  or  research
agendas. Even in a field like Peace and Conflict studies,
the  focus  is  only  rarely  on  nonviolence.  Because
nonviolence  is  quite  invisible  as  a  distinctive
phenomenon on research agendas globally, it remains
in many respects quite poorly understood. I think that
the development of good theory on nonviolence in all its
aspects  is  a  pressing  need.  Such  theory  should
parsimoniously  convey  what  nonviolence  is.  It  should
be able to  explain occurring instances,  and it  should
help  to  identify  the  instances  when  they  occur.  It
should, furthermore, help us understand where to look
and what to look for (McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993) and
open  up  new  areas  of  research  and  can  serve  as  a
starting point for future practice. I have attempted to
contribute  to  this  with  this  research,  and  my
suggestions for further research include the following.
In a general sense I think it is important to come to a
more integrated understanding of nonviolence, both in
its  practices  and  strategies  as  well  as  in  its
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philosophical  underpinnings,  and  especially  on  their
relation to each other. Much of the research done into
nonviolence  has been done within specific  disciplines
and domains which has made it hard to come to shared
conclusions and to integrate the different findings into
a coherent theory. Quite likely, this contributes to the
fact  that  nonviolence  is  still  such  a  marginal  subject
(see also J. Johansen, 2007). My research is an attempt
to  come  to  such  a  more  integrated  understanding,
however, the five-fold model of nonviolence that I have
presented  here  should  itself  be  the  object  of  more
scrutiny. 
An integrated understanding of nonviolence would
make it easier to investigate beliefs, subject claims to
criticism and identify points of consensus (McCarthy &
Kruegler,  1993).  From  such  an  integrated
understanding,  research  could  be  more  coherently
structured. It could perhaps lead to the establishment
of nonviolence as a specific field of study, within which
different  sub-areas  can be identified,  without  loosing
the opportunity for proper research accumulation and
theory building.  This would also be beneficial  for the
development of further nonviolence practices.
An  integrated  perspective  of  nonviolence  would
make  it  easier  to  gain  insight  into  the  relevance  of
nonviolence  for  other  fields.  Above,  I  have described
the relevance of nonviolence for humanistic studies, but
linkages  with  other  fields  like  psychology,  political
theory,  economics  and  religious  studies  could  (and
should) be more rigorously explored.
From my own perspective, I would like to stress the
importance  of  further  developing  the  connection
between nonviolence and humanistic studies. My main
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suggestions  would  include  investigating  the  historic
relations  between  nonviolence  thinking  and  practice
and the work of key figures in (Dutch) Humanism, such
as Erasmus and, more contemporary, Jaap van Praag
(see  also  Goelst  Meijer,  2012;  Schuhmann  &  Goelst
Meijer, 2012), Bart de Ligt and others.
Furthermore,  resilience  (as  a  translation  of  the
Dutch  term  geestelijke  weerbaarheid,  which  more
emphasizes  the  inner,  mental  or  spiritual  aspects  of
resilience) has been an important research topic over
the  past  few  years  within  humanistic  studies  and
continues  to  be  relevant.  Nonviolence  provides
interesting notions for the ongoing study of this form of
resilience.
Likewise,  nonviolence  provides  a  salient  question
for the topic of ‘pluralism’, which has become the focus
of  the  humanistic  research  group  on  globalization
studies.  Nonviolence  deals  with  both  the  importance
and the problematic elements of pluralism, and does so
in  a  way  that  links  aspects  of  humanization  and
existential meaning. Although nonviolence, specifically
stressed  by  the  element  of  satya,  underscores  the
importance of diversity and complexity and of multiple
views  on  reality,  it  does  not  imply  relativism.
Epistemological  respect  for  diversity  can  only  be
created when there is a firm will to not harm others,
without  stepping over one's  own 'truths'.  In addition,
tapasya points to the willingness to ‘draw yourself to a
halt’. These elements exist in a tense relationship, yet
nonviolent practices provide clues as to how to make
them work together.
 I have stressed in the section on humanistic studies
above that nonviolence is an example of an approach
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that  links  issues  of  meaning  and  humanization.  It
provides  examples  of  ways  to  work  towards
humanization from an existential angle and, likewise, it
provides examples of the ‘humanization issues’ raised
by  attempts  to  answer  existential  questions.
Nonviolence  thus  could  provide  clues  for  the
development  of  a  humanistic  approach  to  conflict
handling. 
Lastly,  because  humanistic  studies  is  a  field  that
combines  academic  study  with  (the  exploration  and
development  of)  specific  practices,  it  would  be
interesting  to  see  how specific  nonviolence  practices
relate  to  humanistic  practices,  such  as  humanist
counselling or education, and if they could be relevant
for  each  other.  Specific  contemporary  nonviolent
practices  have  been  mentioned  in  this  study  like
'nonviolent  communication',  'nonviolent  resistance  to
violence  in  families'  and  'Restorative  Justice'.  The
relevance of these practices could be studied in relation
to,  for  instance,  humanist  prison  counselling,
humanistic education and organizational practices. All
these are, I think, important topics to explore further.
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CHAPTER 2 
Humanization and Development 
Constructive Program as Structural
Nonviolence?
Thanks to recent scientific developments the world has
shrunk to such an extent that the echo of an incident in one
part of the world vibrates in other parts with equal 
intensity. But at the same time increasing contact
between and dependence upon different peoples and cultures
has ironically widened the gap between the haves and have-
nots and has opened up innumerable avenues of friction and
distrust.
Razi Ahmad (1993)
HUMANIZATION12
The  background  for  this  article  is  the  academic
research at the University of Humanistic Studies in The
Netherlands, whose interdisciplinary research program
focusses on ‘meaning‘ and ‘humanization’. Humanistic
studies aims at understanding and fostering a good and
12 This  chapter  is  submitted  as:  Goelst  Meijer,  S.L.E.  van,  Humanization  and
Development:  Constructive  Program as Structural  Nonviolence? To the:   Journal  for
Peace and Justice Studies.
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meaningful  life  within  just  institutions  and  a
sustainable  global  society  for  all  (Kunneman,  2002).
Meaning, here, refers to existential meaning, connected
with  personal  answers  to  questions  like:  what  is  the
meaning  of  (my)  life?  What  makes  life  good  and
worthwhile? What does it mean to be human? It refers
to  a  personal  sense  of  connection  to  the  world,  that
one’s life is part of a larger context that transcends the
immediate here and now, has a purpose, a reason or
value (Smaling & Alma, 2010).
Humanization, the other cornerstone of humanistic
studies,  is  concerned  with  the  efforts  to  create  just
institutions  that  make  a  good  and  meaningful  life
possible:
specific  for  humanistic  studies  is  that  the  ways  in
which people  give  meaning to  their  life  is  critically
examined with regard to a just and solidary society.
On  the  other  hand  the  efforts  towards  a  humane
society are critically examined. An individual should
in  the  envisioned  society,  be  able  to  build  a
meaningful existence (Smaling & Alma, 2010, p. 12).13
Humanization  and  meaning  are  closely  connected.
Within  the  context  of  humanistic  studies,  it  is
understood that existential meaning is a vital aspect of
life for every human being. Here humanistic studies is
not  alone,  this  assumption  is  supported  by  other
disciplines such as religious studies and philosophy but
also psychology and medicine, although not always part
of  the  mainstream  discourse  (see  for  instance:
Antonovsky, 1996; Eriksson & Lindström, 2006).
13 Translation SvGM
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To  Victor  Frankl,  Austrian-American  psychiatrist  and
founder of ‘logotherapy’,  the ‘will  to meaning’,  is  the
force that sustains life (Frankl, 1963, 1969). Frustration
of this will to meaning leads to a marked loss of well-
being,  even  illness  and  death.  On  the  other  hand,
Frankl  describes  how  people  can  sustain  the  most
incredible hardships as long as life is  experienced as
meaningful. Frankl bases this conclusion on his work as
a  psychiatrist  and  on  his  experiences  in  the
concentration  camps  of  Nazi  Germany.  There,  he
observed that even though all inmates were suffering
from  physical  exhaustion,  diseases  and  extreme
psychological  stress,  some  managed  to  survive  while
others  died,  sometimes  even  from  minor  inflictions.
Frankl observed a clear link between having something
to live for and surviving. He stated that: 
There is nothing in the world, I venture to say, that
would so effectively help one to survive even the worst
conditions as the knowledge that there is a meaning in
one's life (Frankl, 1963, p. 109).
From  his  analyses  we  can  derive  the  notion  that
meaning  is  not  something  that  becomes  important
when all other problems in life are solved, rather that it
is a fundamental aspect of each and every human life.
In her inaugural lecture as professor at the University
of  Humanistic  Studies,  Hans  Alma  states  that  quite
often existential questions are seen as problematic, and
as stemming from some kind of life-crisis (Alma, 2005).
A crisis can damage the sense of coherence or control
that was hitherto experienced. This leads a person to
question  the  meaning  of  life.  Finding  an  answer  is
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necessary for normal life to take its course again. In
other  words,  the  existential  question  is  seen  as  a
problem that needs to be solved, and once solved the
need  for  existential  questions  is  removed.  Alma
disagrees with this idea and her views resonate with
those of Frankl. To Frankl, meaning is not something
that should be sought to repair a damaged life in order
to go back to the ‘daily goings on’, meaning should be
part of those ‘goings on’. Both assert that the will to
(Frankl) and the search for and experience of (Alma)
meaning are inherently part of being human. 
Recent empirical research into the role of meaning
in relation to well-being, supports this. For instance, a
study by Fry (2000), suggests that there is a positive
relationship between the experience of meaning in life
with  physical  and  mental  health  and  general
adaptation.  Fry  concludes  from her  study  that  a  felt
sense  of  existential  meaning  helps  to  “ameliorate
suffering,  pain  and  physical  distress”  (Fry,  2000,  p.
384), that  a  sense  of  meaning  gives  hope,  and  the
courage  to  cope  with  difficult  circumstances.  This  is
supported by Mascaro and Rosen (2005) who state that
because  humans  have  such  a  powerful  will  toward
meaning, existential meaning should be seen as a good
in  itself.  It  has  intrinsic  value,  not  just  utility  in  the
search for well-being.14 
If the experience of meaning is so pivotal to human
life, situations in which that experience is compromised
could be termed dehumanizing. Dehumanization, then,
comprises  not  only  deprivation,  marginalization  and
14 Frankl  takes  this  even  further  and  states  that  well-being  or  happiness  is  not
something one can strive for directly, but that it can only emerge as a ‘by-product’ of
the search for meaning (see: Frankl, 1963, p. 140).
52
suffering as such, but also the subsequent damage to
the possibilities for leading a meaningful life. To inhibit
a person’s  capacity to experience meaning is  then in
itself  a  form  of  dehumanization.  In  that  case
humanization  can  be  defined  as  the  creation  and
maintenance  of  (social)  circumstances  that  foster  a
meaningful life for all.
On the global level, international development is often
perceived  as  an  effort  towards  humanization,  an
attempt  to  create  global  circumstances  that  make  a
meaningful life possible for all. However, even though
contemporary  international  development  aid  has  a
history of over 60 years its efforts have not succeeded
to bring about humanization for all. On the contrary, it
seems that the development in some parts of the worlds
has come at the cost of dehumanization in other parts.
In the context of development studies, there have been
many  discussions  about  how  this  is  possible.  In  the
early  1990s some scholars  claimed that  international
development itself  was the problem. Such statements
were made by the ‘post-development’ school (Alloo et
al., 2007; Escobar, 1995, 1999; Jenkins, 2000; Luymes,
2006;  Rahnema  &  Bawtree,  1997;  Sachs,  2010;
Siemiatycki, 2005; Ziai, 2007b). Some went as far as to
call  development  enforced  modernization  and
economization  amounting  to  a  form  of  violence  or
dehumanization  (Ziai,  2007a).  Others  maintain  that,
although efforts of development might not have always
been  successful,  a  certain  level  of  economic
development and modernization is vital for creating a
peaceful society that fosters a meaningful life for all its
inhabitants.  In  the  next  section  I  will  explore
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international  development  as  efforts  towards
humanization. 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Although  some  trace  the  roots  of  international
development back to missionary work and colonialism
(Parfitt,  2002;  Thomas,  2000),  twentieth  century
development  efforts  have  always  been  closely
connected  to  the  ideal  of  modernization,  specifically
that put forth by Harry Truman in his inaugural speech
in  1948.  Cowen  and  Shenton  (1996)  show  that
development  can  actually  be  understood  in  two
different  ways.  The  first  is  that  of  modernization,
technological and economic development. The second is
the amelioration of problems caused by these processes
of modernization, globalization and industrialization. In
this stance, development is linked to the fight against
poverty and to the improvement of living conditions in
the Third World.15
Specifically  during  the  1950s  development  aid
became a  political  act,  linked  to  both  decolonization
and the stand-off between the eastern and the western
blocks.  Aid  became  a  tool  to  win  newly  emerging
independent  countries  over  to  the  communist  or
capitalist sphere of influence. Originally, the term Third
World designated those countries that did not want to
join either side and sought alternatives (a third way). 
15 Although I do realize that this term is problematic, I also realize that each term from
a range of terms with the same general meaning is in some way problematic. The terms
Third World,  Global  South and developing country each have their  own history and
semantic difficulties and are each prevalent in specific discourses. For this reason I have
chosen in this article to use the terms indiscriminately, as referring to those countries
that are mostly at the receiving end of (mainstream) development aid.
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In the late 1950s and ‘60s, multilateral institutions
and  the  governments  of  the  industrialized  countries
began to draw up development strategies for countries
receiving  aid,  and  focussed  on  economic  growth,
modernization  and  the  central  role  of  development
experts (Black, 2002). At the end of the 1960s, although
most development countries had managed to raise their
GDP at least 5%, it also became clear that the wealth
was  not  ‘trickling  down’.  The  idea  emerged  that
development  policies  needed  to  be  revised  and
diversified,  adapted more to  local  needs and become
more  accommodating  to  women,  minorities  and  the
poorest and most vulnerable in societies. By the 1970s
these ideas had given rise to many NGO’s, institutes,
researchers,  and  specialists  of  many  different
backgrounds  (Black,  2002).  This  multitude  of
organizations and theories notwithstanding, the desired
results  were  reached  only  in  a  few  instances
(Schuurman, 1993).
When  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  the  Soviet
Union  broke  apart,  the  overall  consensus  seemed  to
become that  modern capitalism was the path for all.
Yet,  a  growing body of  literature under  the name of
post-development,  began to offer a radical critique to
the theory and practice of international development as
modernization.  These theorists  argued that  what was
needed was an alternative to development itself (Ziai,
2007a). They believed that the modernist development
paradigm  that  has  permeated  society  is,  by  its  very
nature, unable to create real humanization; to foster a
meaningful life for all as described above. 
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POST – DEVELOPMENT
Post-development critique states that development is a
distinct creation connected to a political and economic
ideology  and  specific  social  theory.  Development
projects  have  a  strong  socially  constructed  aspect,
which  reflects  western  thought  and  interests.  Post-
development scholars like Escobar (1995, 1999), Esteva
(2010), Rahnema (2001; 1997), Sachs (2010) and Rist
(1997)  viewed  development  as  having  invented
underdevelopment.  Where  most  other  development
alternatives  were  construed  within  the  existing
framework  of  knowledge  and  power,  the  post-
development school  tried to analyse, deconstruct  and
criticize this discourse. 
Esteva argues that the term Development is a “very
powerful semantic constellation” (Esteva, 2010, p. 11),
because it refers to a natural process of growth. This
view of development as a linear and teleological path
entailed  the  creation  of  social  evolutionist  ideology,
whereby  ‘barbaric’  cultures  and  peoples  could  also
become  ‘civilized’  over  time.  This  resulted  in  a
problematic  hierarchy  of  nations  that  are  developed
and  thereby  advanced,  and  those  that  are
underdeveloped  and therefore  inferior.  But  it  is  only
from a certain angle that such could be said:
If one defined violent crime, racism, suicide, isolation,
alienation, environmental destruction and the like as
major indicators of a ‘bad’ or ‘underdeveloped’ society
the industrialized countries would hardly be at the top
of the ‘development’ scale (Ziai, 2007a, p. 8). 
Post-development  ideas  have  from  the  outset  been
heavily criticized in their own right. Some have claimed
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that  although  post-development  scholars  place
themselves outside the development discourse, they are
themselves  essentialist,  viewing  development  as  a
uniform enterprise  which  it  is  not  (see  for  instance:
Nederveen  Pieterse,  2010;  Parfitt,  2002;  Thomas,
2000).  They  state  that  the  complete  dismissal  of
development is unhelpful with regard to the problems
of  poverty  and  marginalization  that  are  a  reality  for
many. Yet, Ziai claims, this criticism notwithstanding,
some  elements  of  post-development  thinking  are  by
now widely accepted. The first is that the ‘traditional’
concept  of  development  is  indeed  Eurocentric,  the
western society as the norm and others as “imperfect
deviations”  (Ziai,  2007a,  p.  8).  The  second  is  that
development  is  connected  to  the  exercise  of  power.
Since development is always framed as positive social
change, whoever gets to define the utopian reference
point is in a position of power over those who should
achieve it  (Ziai,  2007b).  It  is these utopian reference
points  themselves  that  post-development  criticizes
(Rist, 1997). Furthermore, states Ziai:
Post-development  authors  have  convincingly
demonstrated that some measures undertaken in the
name of  ‘development’  had disastrous consequences
for those supposed to benefit. The violence they had to
suffer was directly  related to their  disempowerment
concerning  the  question  whether  they  wanted  this
‘development’  and  to  the  question  who  is  in  a
discursive position to define the common good and to
dictate what (and who) can be sacrificed to achieve it
(Ziai, 2007a, p. 9).
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For post-development scholars, this violence is inherent
in  modernization.  But  however  convincing  the
arguments of the post-development school are, they do
not offer an answer to the question how best to address
both the violence inherent in modernity, as well as all
the inequality, suffering and marginalization present in
the  world.  Post-development  thought  does  not  offer
many  concrete  suggestions  on  how  to  come  to
humanization. 
MODERNITY(IES) AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
Johan Galtung coined the term ‘structural violence’, to
point  towards  violence  and  dehumanization  that
happens through and is  inherent  in social  structures.
(Galtung, 1969). Structural violence is not directly and
deliberately  committed  by  individuals,  but  rather:
“shows  up  as  unequal  power  and  consequently  as
unequal  life chances”  (Galtung,  1969,  p.  171).  Social
structures  -  policies,  laws,  cultural  or  religious
institutions - can provide settings in which violence is
committed by simply complying with the structure. 
The classical theories of modernization, upon which
the concept of development is based, all assume that
modernity as it emerged in Europe should eventually be
established  globally  (Luymes,  2006;  Sachsenmaier,
Riedel,  &  Eisenstadt,  2002).  Development  has  been
construed as a form of power use by post-development
scholars  like  Escobar  (1995,  1999)  and  Ziai  (Ziai,
2007b).  They  see  development  as  enforced
modernization, favouring only one approach to the good
life,  which  hampers  those  who  do  not  lead  a
modernized  life  from deciding  over  their  own future
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and limits their autonomy (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997).
Since the utopian points of reference for development
are decided by those who give the aid, development has
become a way of ‘shaping the world’ according to the
parameters of those who have aid to give (Habermann
& Ziai, 2007).  It can be argued that the aid is given by
those  who  benefit  most  from  the  current  global
structures  and  thus  have  something  to  gain  from
keeping  those  structures  intact.  Post-development
criticizes  this  form of  power  wielding  over  the  third
world,  and  calls  for  the  (re-)empowerment  of
marginalized countries and groups. The question is how
this is possible, since those in power will be reluctant to
give it up, leaving very little room for change. To post-
development  thinkers  many instances of  development
are in fact forms of violence (Ziai, 2007a). 
The  paradigm  of  nonviolence  offers  a  critique  to
(enforced) modernization that is similar to that of post-
development. At the same time it offers suggestions for
humanization,  through  what  is  called  Constructive
Program.  It  also  offers  a  suggestion  on  how  to
understand  and counter  the  various  forms  of  ‘power
over’  that  are  found  problematic  by  the  post-
development school. In the following paragraphs I will
try to explain these concepts.
NONVIOLENCE
The roots of nonviolence as a method for social action
lie in the 19th century in the works of Thoreau, Tolstoy,
the British suffrage movement and others, culminating
in the work of Mohandas Gandhi, who for the first time
used mass organized nonviolence to create major social
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and political change (Barak, 2003).  His work directly
inspired  people  like  Martin  Luther  King,  Lanza  del
Vasto, Dom Helder Camara and even today functions as
a  jumping  off-point  for  many  individuals  or
organizations  that  use  a  nonviolent  approach.  Each
translates  Ghandi’s  concepts  to  their  own
circumstances,  expanding  and  elaborating  different
elements. This has led to the emergence of nonviolence
as a paradigm; a coherent set of ideas that provide a
framework for understanding (social) reality (Slattery,
2003).  When  analysing  this  paradigm,  five  basic
elements emerge, that form the core of contemporary
nonviolence:  satya,  ahimsa,  tapasya,  sarvodaya  and
swadeshi/swaraj.  These  Sanskrit  terms  were  re-
conceptualized by Gandhi in a new way that made them
applicable in contemporary society.  Today, as a result
of  contemporary  nonviolent  efforts  and  experience
gained  since  Gandhi’s  struggle,  their  meaning  has
expanded even more.16 The five elements together form
a framework which can be used as a tool for analyses
as well as a starting point for formulating practice. In
the  following  paragraph  I  will  explore  these  five
principles.
FIVE ELEMENTS
The first element is satya, meaning ‘truth’ in Sanskrit,
and for Gandhi the search for truth formed the essence
of his work (M. K. Gandhi, 1927a). To Gandhi, truth was
both universal as well as particular. He was convinced
that  there  was  such  a  thing  as  universal  truth,  yet
16 Not all nonviolent practitioners used these terms, but the principles can be found in 
all work on nonviolence.
60
people  could  only  understand  it  in  a  relative  sense.
Gandhi wanted people to examine each situation, to get
to understand what was at stake for all involved, so as
to arrive at a fuller  understanding of truth. Although
people should strive to understand the truth of every
situation,  one  can  never  claim  to  be  all-knowing.
Bilgrami  (2011a)  explains  how,  in  Gandhian thought,
truth  is  based  in  experience. We  can  experience
something to be true, yet someone else can come to an
opposite  conclusion  based  on  his  or  her  own
experiences.  These  truths  then  do  not  cancel  each
other  out,  both  experiences  being  real.  In  times  of
disagreement,  it  could  be  that  the  other  party  sees
something more of the truth than we do, even though
we are convinced that we are right. This does not mean
that we should instantly give up our own ideas about
the truth, it means that we allow for the possibility for
both  truths  to  exist.  This  would  make  satya an
extremely relative concept, were it not for the fact that
each  experience  still  has  universal  value.  The
experience of truth does not lead to a rule for everyone
to follow, but it does lead to a rule for oneself to follow.
Satya therefore implies that “we are dedicated to the
truth we perceive, to the truth we understand” (Thakar,
2005,  p.  20).  If  we  live  from  our  own  truth  as  we
understand it,  setting  an example,  we can share  our
truth  with  others  and  others  their  truth  with  us
(Bilgrami, 2011b; Thakar, 2005).
Ahimsa, literally meaning ‘the absence of the intention
to do harm’, implies nonviolence on the physical level,
but  also  through  words,  behaviour  and  thoughts
(Nagler,  2006).  Ahimsa came  to  mean  not  only
harmlessness in a negative sense, avoiding harm, but
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also  in  a  positive  sense,  as  addressing  ‘harm’  for
instance  through  social  service.  When  we  encounter
circumstances  in  which  we  or  others  experience
injustice and we do not venture to remedy the situation,
we  are  from  the  point  of  view  of  nonviolence  to  a
certain  extent  complicit.  Thus,  acting  without  the
intention to do harm, means addressing the problems
we encounter as best we can. 
Out of the five elements tapasya is usually the most
difficult  to  grasp,  certainly  from  a  western  point  of
view. Tapasya translates as both ‘heat’ and ‘suffering’.
The role of tapasya in nonviolence is threefold. First, it
implies the willingness to suffer instead of retaliating
when confronted with violence or injustice. This breaks
the cycle of violence. It is not the same as giving in. It
means addressing the violence by not participating in
the dynamic it calls for; fight, flight or freeze. Tapasya
then  becomes  an  agent  for  self-transformation.  An
example is  the  firm internal  struggle  to  overcome ill
will  to  the opponent  (Burrowes,  1996;  Pelton,  1974).
Tapasya also  points  towards  dedication  or  discipline.
Living  according  to  ‘truth’  might  require  discipline
which can amount to ‘suffering’. 
The fourth element of nonviolence is sarvodaya, or the
welfare of all. In a particular situation it would mean
the welfare of all involved in the situation. Solving any
form of injustice or conflict through nonviolence means
addressing the injustice, not the person committing it.
In  the  Christian  vocabulary  of  Martin  Luther  King;
‘condemning the sin, not the sinner’ (King, 2001). The
welfare  of  all  can,  for  instance,  not  be  served  if
punishment  for  an  injustice  causes  harm  in  its  own
right. Means and ends have to be in accordance. 
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The  fifth  element  is  that  of  swadeshi/swaraj.
Swadeshi means  self-reliance,  being  able  to  care  for
yourself,  act  independently.  In  a  political  sense
swadeshi implies  economic  self-reliance  and  having
your own institutions. For individuals it means to be as
self-sufficient  as  possible,  to  have  agency  and  self-
efficacy and create the circumstances that allow you to
do so. Swaraj means self-rule. This can refer to political
autonomy. But it also implies autonomy at the personal
level,  like  not  giving  in  to  impulses  or  habits  or
coercion  by  others  (tapasya),  not  violating  the
autonomy of others (ahimsa), being able to make your
own choices based on the truth as you understand it
(satya), with a view to the welfare of all (sarvodaya). It
is thus a relational concept of autonomy, meaning that
one’s  autonomy  can  only  exist  in  relation  to  that  of
others.17 Taken together these five elements form the
basis for a process of nonviolence.
PRINCIPLE AND STRATEGY
Nonviolence is often understood in two distinct ways:
as either a principle or as a strategy (Nagler, 2006). Of
the two, strategic nonviolence has been the most widely
studied. Strategic nonviolence points to nonviolence as
a  method  for  struggle,  which  can  be  applied  for  a
number of (strategic) reasons. Either because one does
not condone the use of violence on religious, ethical of
cultural  grounds  or  because  one  feels  nonviolence  is
17 To completely explore the concept of relational  autonomy here, would take too
long. For an excellent introduction to the concept see: (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000) and
for an in-depth exploration of its role in nonviolence see chapter 6 in this volume.
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simply the most sensible method.18 A thorough study of
strategic nonviolence and the various methods that can
be applied in its context has been done by Gene Sharp
(Sharp, 1973b). He refers to nonviolence as a way of
confronting the opponent’s power by performing a form
of  “political  Jiu-Jitsu”  (Sharp,  1973b,  pp.  451,  453),
using  various  forms  of  protest,  non-cooperation,  and
nonviolent intervention. What his study addresses only
to a limited extent, as is true for strategic nonviolence
in  general,  is  the  correspondence  between ends  and
means  and  the  importance  of  nonviolence  as  an
attitude. 
Nonviolence as an attitude, applied in all parts of
life,  is  what  is  referred  to  as  principled  nonviolence
(Nagler,  2006).  Someone  adhering  to  principled
nonviolence  would  use  the  various  strategic  methods
when engaged in conflict or struggle, but would in all
other  circumstances  also  try  to  apply  nonviolence.
Where  strategic  nonviolence  focuses  solely  on
behaviour,  principled  nonviolence  focuses  on
nonviolence as a way of being in the world (rooted in
the  fivefold  framework  outlined  above)  from  which
behaviour, but also thought, speech and understanding
of the world follow.
CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAME
When we look at nonviolence as a praxis, we can also
divide  it  into  two  distinct  but  related  sections,
‘constructive  program’  (M.  K.  Gandhi,  1927b)  and
‘obstructive  program’  (Nagler,  2004).  Obstructive
18 Possible reasons are that the opponent is much stronger, or that one cannot get the 
necessary weapons, or the use of violence would harm the public opinion on the cause.
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program - the various forms of protest against and non-
cooperation with violence and injustice- is most widely
known. Yet, for Gandhi, obstructive program was only
an aid to the constructive side (. Many have recognised,
like  Gandhi  did,  that  it  is  not  enough  to  get  rid  of
dehumanising  practices  without  creating  something
better to take its place: 
In cases where political revolutions have taken place
but the population is not organized to exercise self-
determination, the creation of a new society has been
extremely difficult.  In some cases,  the usurpation of
power by a new dictatorship has been the result; in
others,   there  has  been  political  regime  change
without  fundamental  social  or  economic
transformation (Sheehan, 2006, p. 5). 
Gandhi  created a program of  18 points,  all  of  which
were to contribute to the uplift of the country (M. K.
Gandhi,  1927b).  To  Gandhi,  constructive  programe
meant building the new society in the shell of the old
(Sheehan,  2006)  and  comprised  the  “construction  of
complete  independence  by  truthful  and  nonviolent
means” (A. Gandhi, 1997, p. 4) (. It aimed at building
self-confidence among the people and at the creation of
structures  that  would  satisfy  human  needs  in  a  just
manner. Robert Burrowes observes: 
the constructive program is (…) designed to facilitate
the development of new social structures that foster
political  participation,  cultural  diversity,  economic
self-reliance,  and  ecological  resilience.  (…),  if  new
types of structures are not being created to replace
the old, then even a successful nonviolent defence will
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merely deliver control of the old and inadequate state
structure to a new elite (Burrowes, 1996, p. 216).
Gandhi  was  adamant  that  the  subjugation  of  the
Indian people  by  the  British  was  partly  due  to  their
own, miss-perceived weakness and that it was by the
correction  of  this  perception  that  swadeshi and
subsequently swaraj would be possible. 
Given that Indians had contributed to their state of
dependence  and  subjugation,  Gandhi  reasoned  that
they  had  a  role  to  play  in  reclaiming  home  rule.
India’s  political  autonomy,  according  to  Gandhi,
depended on social  and cultural  reform (L.  Trivedi,
2007, p. 6).
Although  Gandhi’s  18-point  program  comprised
such  things  as  access  to  appropriate  education,
promotion  of  health  and  hygiene,  the  use  of  local
language, economic equality and the empowerment of
women,  the  main  focus  came  on  the  production  of
khadi,  or  homespun  cotton.  This  served  both  a  very
concrete, and a number of deeply symbolic, but no less
important goals. Before colonization the production of
cloth  had  been  a  major  village  industry  and  Indian
fabric  was  considered  one  of  the  best  in  the  world.
During colonial rule, it was one of the main products
the British took from India. Taking back the production
of cotton cloth both damaged British economic profits
and made affordable cloth once again available to all
Indians. Furthermore it showed that there was nothing
inferior  about  India’s  traditional  methods.  In  other
words,  constructive  programe was  aimed  at  creating
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swaraj and swadeshi at the personal level, so that those
could become a political reality as well. 
Gandhi  was  not  the  only  one  for  whom  a
constructive  program  was  crucial.  One  of  his
contemporaries,  Abdul  Ghaffar  Khan,  for  instance,
started  his  nonviolent  resistance  to  the  British
occupation  of  the  Northwest  Frontier  Province  by
opening  schools  for  the  local  population  (R.  C.
Johansen,  1997).19 Eventually,  this developed into the
organization Khudai Khidmatgars.20 
Shaped  in  the  image  of  an  army,  but  completely
dedicated  to  nonviolence  the  Khudai  Khidmatgars
were  committed  to  create  economic,  social  and
political change. The Khidmatgars worked completely
voluntary  dedicating  their  work  to  God,  their  oath
stating  that  ‘…I  am a  Servant  of  God,  and  as  God
needs no service, but serving his creation is serving
him, I promise to serve humanity in the name of God
(Easwaran, 1999, p. 111).
The  Khidmatgars  “opened  schools,  worked  on  local
development  projects,  promoted  hygiene  and
sanitation,  and maintained  order  at  public  meetings”
(R. C. Johansen, 1997, p. 59). Women were admitted to
their  ranks,  on an equal  standing with the men.  The
Khidmatgars:
 
did not simply vow to use non- violence in a crusade
to  oust  the  British.  (…)  Ghaffar  Khan  and  his  co-
workers  sought to help people win self-respect and
human dignity through human solidarity - a solidarity
19 This area is part of today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan
20 Kudhai Khidmatgars translates as Servants of God
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with  others  that  would  hinge  on  refusing  to  use
violence  against  another  person  (R.  C.  Johansen,
1997, p. 59). 
Like  Gandhi,  Khan  was  convinced  that  the  Pashtuns
themselves were to a large extent responsible for their
occupation. 21 Not that the British were not responsible,
on the contrary,  their treatment of the Pashtuns was
brutal and devastating. But Khan believed strongly that
the  blood  feuds  and  tribal  rivalry  that  was  such  an
intricate part of the Pashtun culture, would have to end
in order to create a healthy society. “He was convinced
that  the  pervasive  violence  of  his  society  was
responsible  for  its  inability  to  uplift  itself”  (R.  C.
Johansen, 1997, p. 58).
The  fact  that  Gandhi  and  Khan  both  understood  the
predicament  of  their  peoples  as  partly  their  own
responsibility  is  an  important,  though  perhaps
somewhat  problematic  aspect.  They  did  not  maintain
that in case of injustice it  is the responsibility of the
victim.  What  they  did  maintain  has  something  to  do
with their  view on power.  To Gandhi  and Khan (and
later  to  others  like  Martin  Luther  King  and  Vaclav
Havel)  the  powerlessness  of  their  peoples  is  a
perceived powerlessness.  They maintain that there is
another form of power that could be applied that is able
to  counter  the  power  that  perpetrators  have  over
victims.  They  understand  nonviolence  as  a  way  to
harness what Kenneth Boulding (1990) calls integrative
power.
21 Pashtuns are one of the largest ethnic groups in Afghanistan today.
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INTEGRATIVE POWER
Power is often related to our ability to make others do
what  we  want,  regardless  of  their  own  wishes  or
interests (M. Weber, 1991). In a more general sense,
Boulding  states  it  is  a  way  to  ‘get  things  done’. For
Boulding, from the three ‘faces’, or ways of wielding of
power,  integrative  power  is  the  most  important  in
comparison  to  the  other  two;  threat  and  exchange
power,  which  are often together  paraphrased as ‘the
carrot and the stick’. Integrative power is the power of
human relationships. It is connected to everything that
establishes a relationship either personal or in the form
of  institutions  or  organizations.  Love,  respect,
legitimacy  and  consent  are  all  expressions  of
integrative power. Although it is the power that is least
understood,  it  is  the kind of  power that underlies  all
other forms. In everyday life most forms of exercising
power consist of a combination of the three faces. But
there are certain emphases.  Exchange power is  most
prominently  present  in  anything  connected  to  the
economy,  but  also  to  everything  that  uses  incentives
(the  carrot)  to  get  things  done.  Yet,  for  instance,
legitimacy and trust, both forms of integrative power,
play a huge role  in  the  stock  exchange,  and without
regulations  and  the  penalties  to  back  them  up
production and trade cannot proceed. Threat power is
present in the military, but also in anything else that
uses some form of penalty to make things happen (the
stick). The military symbolizes threat power, but cannot
exist without exchange power in the form of money, nor
without  integrative power in  the form of  morale and
legitimacy.  Underlying all forms of power is integrative
power.  Systems  and  institutions  can  only  function  if
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people cooperate. Even in the staunchest dictatorships,
as soon as enough people stop cooperating, the system
collapses. 
Because all human beings exist within relationships,
integrative power is open to all, even to those who are
traditionally  assumed  to  have  no  power.  “It  is  this
definition  of  power,  as  a  process  that  occurs  in
relationships,  that  gives  us  the  possibility  of
empowerment" (Page & Czuba, 1999, p. 3). Boulding’s
analysis  explains  why nonviolence,  understood as the
wielding of integrative power, can function as both a
means to  resist  violence and a  means to  create new
systems. When looking for alternatives to development
the creation of new ‘development structures’  and the
withdrawal of participation from those who are deemed
problematic  is  a  step  in  that  direction.  In  the  next
section I will explore ‘constructive program’ as a way to
do so.
The  constructive  work  was  meant  to  evoke  this
integrative  power  in  people  who  saw  themselves  as
being at the mercy of threat and exchange power. Thus,
constructive  program  holds  keys  for  humanization
(creating just institutions that foster a meaningful life).
It is a way to make it possible for people to perceive
themselves as being able to wield power, even though
from a certain angle they could be viewed as powerless.
CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM AND MODERNIZATION
Inherent in constructive program, is a firm critique of
modernization  (A.  Gandhi,  1997;  Jahanbegloo,  2013;
Terchek,  1998).  Constructive  program  was  meant  to
address structural violence, in fact one could say it is
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an attempt at structural nonviolence. From the point of
view  of  nonviolence,  development  as  enforced
modernization is indeed a form of structural violence.
Not only because it disadvantages people who do not
lead a modern life, but also because it enforces a way of
life  that  favours  a  limited  amount  of  aspects  of  the
human  experience  (Jahanbegloo,  2013).  Khan  and
Gandhi emphasize traditional approaches in their work,
which  has  often  led  to  the  idea  that  they  are
traditionalists.  They  are  not.22 They  both  use  and
criticize  aspects  of  modernity  and  tradition  alike.
Furthermore  they  use  traditional  approaches  to  the
good  life  to  criticize  modernity,  because  modernity
hardly criticizes itself. Gandhi’s criticism of modernity
focuses  on  its  lack  of  restraints.  Gandhi  sees  the
essence of modernity as ‘taking charge of the world’,
whereas to him the essence of the good life is to take
charge of ourselves, so we are free to decide how we
want to be in the world (Terchek, 1998).
In  the  next  section  I  want  to  explore  two
‘alternative’ development approaches that each in their
own way de-link development from modernization and
embody  the  nonviolent  principles  outlined  above:
Endogenous development and Undeveloping the North.
NONVIOLENT DEVELOPMENT?
Concluding  from  the  analyses  above,  a  nonviolent
approach  to  development  would  resemble  a
constructive program, building institutions that harness
integrative power. It would be foremost based on local
visions  of  the  good  life,  giving  rise  to  a  diversity  of
22 For a more in-depth discussion on this matter see (Terchek, 1998) 
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development paths. From a nonviolent viewpoint, each
develops himself or his own society or community, with
a view towards the welfare of all. For this, it might be
necessary  to  restrain  certain  developments  of  one
group  or  person,  so  as  not  to  harm  or  marginalize
others.  Both  Undeveloping  the  North  (UtN)  and
Endogenous development (ED) fit within this aim.
UNDEVELOPING THE NORTH
BUKO  (Bundeskoordination  Internationalismus,  or
Federal Coordination of Internationalism) originated as
an overarching network of small German development
initiatives.  Over  the  years,  the  organization  grew
increasingly critical of the concept of development and
its  consequences.  In  their  search  for  ‘a  truly  global
perspective  on  liberation  and  emancipation’,  ’the
political  and  utopian  points  of  reference’  within  the
organization shifted (Habermann & Ziai, 2007). BUKO
focussed on formulating a new kind of internationalism,
in which the need and action for global change were
conceptualised from both the North and the South. 
In this, they not only intended to reject the aspects of
domination  in  modernity’s  promise  of  development,
but also investigated the extent to which people in the
north were complicit in it (Habermann & Ziai, 2007,
p. 215). 
The organization opened up to other groups, working
on  other  themes  related  to  social  justice  and  global
change, such as racism, feminism, immigration rights
and queer issues, which it saw as inherently connected.
To  the  participants  in  BUKO  the  implications  of  the
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rejection  of  development  went  beyond  development
itself. It was connected to the rejection of a hegemonic
model of understanding the world, in which a specific
mode of  behaviour  was  both  explicitly  and  implicitly
enforced (see Spehr, 1997). In this light, the dismissal
of development as done by the post-development school
was  not  enough,  because  it  still  implied  that:  “If
development was to be implemented in the South, and
it failed in the South, it is there that we should look for
alternatives” (Habermann & Ziai, 2007, p. 212). But, if
we  are  looking  for  a  truly  global  perspective  on
humanization,  opposition  and change should  not  only
come from those who are affected most negatively by
the current global situation. Those who benefit should
also  re-evaluate  the  current  situation  and  instigate
change.
Undeveloping the North refers strictly speaking not to
a  geographical  area,  but  to  a  social  order  and  a
system of domination which is based on the unequal
access  and  exploitation  of  labour  and  nature.  (…)
Undeveloping  means  disempowering  the  North,
pushing back asymmetrical access and domination in
all its dimensions, (…) in order to provide space for
autonomous ways of living (Habermann & Ziai, 2007,
p. 216). 
Christoph Spehr links UtN to autonomy, when he states
that  the  North has  to  be  restructured  so  that  it  can
become self-sufficient and does not have to lean heavily
on the resources of the south as it  does now (Spehr,
1996, 1997). Spehr explains that UtN is conceptualized
as  an  attempt  to  curb  those  structures  that  force
people(s)  to  give  up  their  labour  and  (natural)
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resources at every cost. This is something that happens
throughout  the  world,  regardless  of  the  location.
Indeed,  the  global  North  has  too  much  intervention
power vis-à-vis the global South. But UtN also involves
curbing  environmentally  destructive  practices  and
revaluing  locally  appropriate  techniques  and ways  of
life  (Spehr,  1996).  Likewise,  it  involves  curbing  the
global  sector,  both  through  divestment  as  well  as
individual  non-participation.  Buying  local  is  one
example of how this can be practised. Thirdly, UtN calls
for the reform of global labour and the de-privileging of
formal  work:  reducing  the  emphasis  on  formal  wage
labour.  This  would  imply  the  access  to  basic  social
security measures for all, loosening the compulsion to
‘sell  at  any  price’  as  well  as  rejecting  the  divide
between formal and informal labour and the division of
labour along gender lines. Fourthly, it involves radical
regional autonomy, re-establishing personal and local-
collective (instead of corporate) control of spaces and
social  relations  and  establishing  (agricultural)  co-
operations catering to local needs, instead of the world
market.  UtN  implies  taking  completely  different
viewpoints  seriously,  even  if  they  are  pre-modern  or
stem from a very specific cultural background. Likewise
it  implies  not  throwing  away  modern  or  technical
solutions simply because they are modern. 
UtN is not a call to return to a pre-modern lifestyle.
Nor is it a romantic ideal of pure, natural, and simple
living. Rather, it is a call to the reduction of coercion
and the enhancement of global autonomy. It radically
politicizes  subsistence  (Spehr,  1997).  Choosing  a
lifestyle  based  on  locally  available  resources  (both
natural and social) and devoid of coercion quite likely
74
means taking a step back in terms of available options
and luxuries. Such a step back becomes a political act
when taken with a view toward global development and
humanization. 
In other words Undeveloping the North is a radical
re-imagining  of  North-South  relations,  global
governance  and  global  economic  and  social
organization, that implies a radical restructuring of the
current  way  of  life,  especially  in  the  North.  Thus,  it
calls for a situation in which people(s) are not forced to
comply  with  one  specific  model  of  the  good  life  (in
moral, cultural, spiritual, economic and political sense),
but rather are free to find their own models. It is an
attempt at institutional diversity.
ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT
Another  approach that takes an alternative viewpoint
on  development  and  radically  criticizes  its  strong
emphasis  on  modernization  is  Endogenous
Development.  Endogenous (from within) Development
refers  to  an approach that  is  based on people’s  own
criteria  for  well-being  and  the  good  life  (Hiemstra,
2010). 
It is mainly, though not exclusively, based on locally
available resources, such as land, water, vegetation,
knowledge,  skills  and  competencies,  culture,
leadership  and  the  way  people  have  organized
themselves (Haverkort, 2007, p. 31). 
Although  ED  is  based  in  local  practices,  it  has  “an
openness  that  allows  for  the  integration  of  outside
knowledges and practices” (Röling, 2007, p. 101). The
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basis of ED thinking is to take the actual and specific
situations of a locality and work from there to come to
solutions  to  problems  or  to  open  up  new  roads  for
development. Extra-local inventions are not cast aside
necessarily, but are 
deconstructed  and  recomposed  to  suit  local
conditions,  perspectives  and  interests,  and  local
resources  thereby  become  the  conceptual  standard
against which the utility of the extra-local is evaluated
(Jenkins, 2000, p. 307).
The approach, therefore starts by looking inward to
discover,  recover,  or  invent  the  identity  of  the
territory,  from which resources  to  drive  and define
development can be generated (Ray, 1999, p. 259).
That  this  dynamic  between  intra-  and  extra  local
resources is important explains Gaston Remmers when
he observed that in a certain project: 
The contributions of  outsiders,  both with respect to
their  knowledge  (…)  ideological  convictions  and
different  background,  have  been  able  to  break
through  (…)  local  power  structures  and  stimulate
individual  profit  making.(…)  It  must  be  stressed,
however,  that endogenous development should also
be  understood  as  a  process  over  which  the  local
people have control (Remmers, 1994, pp. 148–9).
In other words, outside influences can lead to valuable
innovations  or  provide  new  perspectives  when  old
habits  have  become  counterproductive.  Yet,  the
decision  making  process  and  thus,  the  control  over
which outside interventions to incorporate should be in
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local hands. ED does not imply non-modernization, but
it  does  imply  controlled  and  selective  modernization
and it implies taking local and traditional practices as
seriously as modern ones.
ED rests on the assumption that all communities in
principle have the capacity for self-determination and
development.  Niels  Röling  states  that  ED  as  an
approach is especially important in terms of developing
self-confidence  and  creating  just  institutions  (Röling,
2007). It generates a firm idea of and being grounded
in one’s own potential, wishes and needs and of one’s
place in the world. 
That endogenous development is not only suitable
for countries ‘in the south’, proves the research done
by Van der Ploeg into ED initiatives in Europe (Ploeg &
Dijk,  1995;  Ploeg  &  Long,  1994). Here  also,  ED
developed  as  a  response  to  loss  of  local  traditions,
environmental  problems  as  a  result  of  industrial
farming and the felt loss of local cohesion.  European
farmers-organizations are trying to revive traditions or
prevent  local  and  sustainable  practices  from
disappearing.  The  specific  and  very  diverse  styles  of
farming  that  developed  over  centuries  to  cope  with
ecological and social particularities were systematically
eliminated  from  scientific  farming  (Haan  &  Ploeg,
1994; Roep & Bruin, 1994). Yes, modern farming has
led to greater yields and has, from that angle, been a
success. But the environmental and social “side effects”
(Roep  & Bruin,  1994,  p.  219)  are  severe  enough  to
rethink  the  approach.  Local  strategies  are  not  only
more  suitable  in  an  instrumental  sense  but  are  also
deeply  meaningful.  “Each  style  of  farming  reflects  a
specific  normative  perspective  on  farm  development
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(how  ‘good’  farming  practices  are  socially  defined)”
(Roep & Bruin,  1994, pp. 220–1).  Furthermore,  many
local  practices  (agricultural  or  other)  are  deeply
connected  to  cultural  and social  practices as  well  as
religious beliefs and views of one’s place and purpose
in life.
TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT?
Of these two approaches,  it  is most easy to construe
Endogenous  Development  as  an  example  of
constructive program. It offers a pro-active approach to
development that fits the local context, from within. ED
emphasizes satya since part of the process is a search
for which elements of both tradition and modernity are
best  suited  in  each  situation.  It  emphasizes
swadeshi/swaraj in  that  it  starts  from  peoples’  own
ideas  about  the  good  life  and  the  process  aims  to
empower  people  to  take  their  own development  into
their own hands, on their own terms. This itself leads to
social  changes,  and  is  a  way  to  harness  integrative
power.  It  is  perhaps  less  obvious  to  understand
Undeveloping the North as an example of constructive
program.  From  the  perspective  of  nonviolence  this
approach puts more emphasis on  tapasya,  asking the
global North to take a step back. But the approach also
calls for autonomy and self-sufficiency by emphasizing
that  the global  North should  be able to  take care of
itself.  The two approaches  together  change the  view
from development  as  something  that  happens  in  the
Third World to something that happens everywhere and
connect  the  development  of  one  county  to  that  of
another.  Thus,  a  global  vision  for  development  is
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created,  geared towards sarvodaya, the welfare of all.
For this to happen, a drastic reform of global structures
and institutions  is  necessary.  Local  self-sufficiency  is
something that can only be created pro-actively by the
people  of  the  locality.  Undeveloping  the  North  can
therefore not be understood as merely an obstructive
idea. It is also a constructive program aiming to build
those (global) structures that allow for the welfare of
all. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to look at nonviolence
as  a  method  towards  humanization  and  used  the
example of international development, to do so. From
the  background  of  humanistic  studies,  which  studies
existential  meaning  and humanization  I  have defined
humanization  as  efforts  towards  creating  social
circumstances  that  foster  a  meaningful  life  for  all.
International  development  is  often  seen  as  a
humanization effort, contributing to the improvement of
global socio-economic circumstances so the possibility
of  a  meaningful  life  can  come  within  reach  of  all.
Development, as it is understood today, has a history of
roughly 60 years and is rooted in modernity thinking.
Development was meant to make a modern life possible
around  the  globe.  Yet,  development  efforts  have  not
always been successful.  Specifically from the point of
view of post-development thinking, development is seen
as a process of enforced modernization. Such a process
has  been  conceptualised  as  a  form  of  structural
violence,  systematically  depriving  non-modernized
people(s) of the power to define their own ways of good
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living.  Therefore,  post-development  thinkers  are  not
satisfied with development alternatives which are just
different  ways  towards  the  same  goal.  They  want
alternatives  to  development,  that  can  conceptualise
processes of humanization from a more inclusive angle.
Although some of the insights of post-development have
made it into the mainstream development discussions,
true alternative ways towards humanization have not
emerged on a global scale. Even the post-development
school  itself  did  not  formulate  many  concrete
alternatives.
Modern nonviolence thinking is rooted in the work
of  Gandhi,  upon  which  others  have  since  elaborated
through  theory  and  action.  The  nonviolent  approach
rests on the search for truth (satya), the firm intention
not to commit harm (ahimsa), limiting oneself (tapasya)
so the well-being of all (sarvodaya) can emerge. Such a
process  is  firmly  connected  to  the  harnessing  of
integrative power, which is connected to autonomy and
self-reliance (swadeshi/swaraj). Like post-development,
nonviolence inherently criticizes modernity. Specifically
those aspects that exclude all other views of ‘the good’
and thus contribute to a diminishing diversity. From the
perspective  of  nonviolence,  constructive  program  is
way  to  combat  structural  violence.  Constructive
program comprises autonomous and pro-active ways to
create  new  institutions,  resting  on  the  principles  of
nonviolence,  that allow for a diversity of approaches to
the  good  life,  specifically  those  that  are  appropriate
within the local context. In a way, constructive program
aims at  structural  nonviolence.  How to envision such
practices  on  a  global  scale  can  be  seen  from  both
‘Endogenous  Development’  as  well  as  ‘Undeveloping
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the  North’,  both  of  which  embody  nonviolence
practices.  Neither  one  of  these  approaches  are
presented here as a panacea. They have been tried in
practice on a limited scale and each present their own
problems. Yet they offer a truly alternative vision for
conceptualising  global  processes  of  development  so
that they can become more humanizing.
The  scope  of  this  article  does  not  leave  enough
room to elaborate on all discussed concepts as in-depth
as  they  deserve,  leaving  quite  some  room  for
discussion.  Also,  further  studies  into  the  different
aspects of humanization, nonviolence and their relation
to  development  should  be  done.  Likewise,  study  into
the  implementation  and outcomes  of  approaches  like
‘Undeveloping  the  North’   and  ‘Endogenous
Development’, and how these relate to the theoretical
underpinnings  elaborated  above,  would  make  the
discussion  more nuanced.  Yet,  I  hope to  have shown
that  from  the  paradigm  of  nonviolence  it  becomes
possible to think about processes of humanization in a
way that is not exclusively tied to one understanding of
the good life,  and why this is  important from both a
humanistic and a global perspective.
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CHAPTER 3
The Power of the Truthful
Understanding Satya in Nonviolence Through the
Work of Gandhi and Havel
The logic of a story resembles the logic of games, a logic of
tension between what is known and not known, between rules
and chance, between the inevitable and the unforeseeable.
We never really know what will emerge from the
confrontation, what elements may yet enter into it, and how it
will end; it is never clear what potential qualities it will
arouse in a protagonist and what action he will be led to
perform by the action of his antagonist. For this reason alone,
mystery is a dimension of every story. What speaks to us
through a story is not a particular agent of truth; instead, the
story manifests the human world to us as an exhilarating
arena where many such agents come into contact with each
other. 
Václav Havel (1988)
INTRODUCTION23
Conflicting  global  narratives  on  good  or  right  living,
based on conflicting truth-claims, can and often do lead
to violence. We need not look far to find examples in
23 This chapter has been published as: Goelst Meijer, S.L.E. van (2015), The Power of
the Truthful: Understanding  Satya in Nonviolence Through the Work of Gandhi and
Havel in: The International Journal on World Peace., vol. XXXII, no. 2
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contemporary religious, ethnic or ideological conflicts
that confirm this. Yet, one of the central elements in the
practice of nonviolence is that of satya, a Sanskrit term
best translated as ‘truth’. In this article I will address
this  paradox  by  arguing  that  satya  points  to  a  very
specific  conception  of  truth,  which  I  will  explore  by
examining  satya  in  the  lives  and  work  of  both
Mohandas  Gandhi  and  Václav  Havel.  I  use  the  term
nonviolence  here not  only  to point  to the absence of
violence in solving problems, but as a coherent set of
ideas  and  practices  that  provide  a  framework  for
understanding (social) reality.
The  roots  of  contemporary  nonviolence  lie,  to  an
important  extent,  in  the  work  of  Mohandas  Gandhi.
Gandhi construed nonviolence, an ancient religious and
philosophical concept, into a new systematic and pro-
active  way  that  made  it  applicable  in  contemporary
society. He used it as a guiding principle in his own life
and as a method for waging struggle against injustice
and oppression. Since Gandhi, nonviolence has been a
method of addressing conflicts and injustices for both
large social movements, as well as for private people in
interpersonal conflicts. An example of this latter case is
the method of Nonviolent Communication, devised by
Marshall  Rosenberg  (Rosenberg,  2003,  2005).
Prominent  examples  of  nonviolent  social  movements
are the civil rights movement in the USA, the overthrow
of president Marcos in the Philippines of the 1980s and
the movement of Charter 77 in then Czechoslovakia, of
which Václav Havel was a distinguished member. Each
translates  Gandhi’s  concepts  to  their  own
circumstances,  expanding  and  amending  different
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aspects. This has led to the emergence of a nonviolence
paradigm (Nagler, 2004), in which five basic elements
appear: satya or ‘truth’, ahimsa or ‘the intention not to
harm’,  tapasya or  ‘self-suffering’,  sarvodaya or  ‘the
welfare of all’ and swadeshi/swaraj or ‘authenticity and
relational autonomy’. 
Each of  these  elements  is  a  complex and layered
notion  and each is  equally  important  in  a process  of
nonviolence. I will focus in this paper specifically on the
element satya, or truth. I denote these concepts here
with  the  Sanskrit  terms  originating  in  the  work  of
Gandhi,  because  I  believe  these  terms  are  able  to
adequately capture this complexity. I pose that satya as
a central element is present in each nonviolent process.
This does, however, not necessarily mean that the term
satya itself is used in all circumstances. Even so, it is
my claim that although in different contexts different
terms are used, they point to what in a general sense
can be called satya. To clarify this concept and its role
in nonviolence I will start by explaining the origin of the
term in the work of Gandhi and go on to compare this
with  the  work  of  Václav  Havel  and  his  intellectual
mentor  Jan  Patocka  who  both  focus  overtly  on  the
importance of ‘living in truth’. 
GANDHI’S TRUTH
Satya derives from the Sanskrit  root  sat meaning ‘to
be’. It refers both to truth in the sense of truthfulness
or  honesty,  and  to  truth  as  ‘that  which  exists’,  or
reality.  Gandhi’s  search for truth is  directed towards
understanding  reality  at  the  deepest  level  as well  as
living  in  accordance  with  that  understanding.  This
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‘search for truth’ formed the essence of his work. He
gave his socio-political struggles the name satyagraha,
meaning  truth-force,24 and  his  life  was  to  become  a
string  of  ‘experiments  with  truth’  (M.  K.  Gandhi,
1927a).  To Gandhi,  truth is both universal as well as
particular. He is convinced that there was an Ultimate
Truth,  but  is  equally  convinced  that  people  can only
understand it in a relative sense. What is more, one can
only find it in experience  (Chatterjee, 1986).
Although  Gandhi’s  thought  is  firmly  based  in  the
specific Hindu tradition of his native Gujarat, it is also
shaped  by  elements  of  other  religious  traditions  like
Jainism and Christianity, as well as secular and political
works of, among others, Ruskin and Thoreau (Bilgrami,
2011a). Gandhi refutes the idea that an understanding
of truth and reality can come from knowing dogmas or
religious or theoretical principles. Fundamental to his
ideas on truth is the Jain concept of  anekantavada or
“…the  many  sidedness  of  all  phenomena”  (Steger,
2006, p. 342). In explaining this position, Gandhi points
to  the  parable  of  the  blind  men  and  the  elephant.
Wanting  to  know what  an elephant  is  like,  the  blind
men gather  round  the  animal  and  each  examine  the
elephant  by  touching  it.  Every  man  comes  to  a
completely different conclusion as to what an elephant
is  like,  based  on the  part  it  was able  to  touch.  'The
Elephant  is  thin  and  squirmy'  says  the  one  who has
touched the tail; ‘it is solid and steady' concludes the
one who has touched the leg. None are wrong, since
each  has  felt  something  that  is  indeed  part  of  the
24 The word satyagraha was coined by Gandhi to denote his method for socio-political 
change. It consists of satya, truth, and agraha, to hold on to, or to firmly grasp. Literally
it means ‘to firmly hold on to truth’, but it is mostly translated with truth-force.
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elephant, but the complete elephant is all these parts
put together, and more. Gandhi’s satya is therefore not
(solely)  a  notion  that  departs  from  postulates  about
truth. Gandhi departs from the premise that each truth
“carries the conviction it does for those who experience
it, and not for others” (Bilgrami, 2011a, p. 96). We can
experience something to be true, yet others can come
to  an  opposite  conclusion  based  on  their  own
experiences.  These  truths  then  do  not  cancel  each
other out, both experiences being real, but they each
represent different facets of reality. Gandhi states:
It has been my experience that I am always true from
my point of view, and am often wrong from the point
of view of my honest critics. I know that we are both
right  from  our  respective  points  of  view.  (…)  The
seven  blind  men  who  gave  seven  different
descriptions of the elephant were all right from their
respective points of view, and wrong from the point of
view of one another,  and right and wrong from the
point of view of the man who knew the elephant (M.
K. Gandhi, 1999c, p. 410) 
Thus,  to  Gandhi  the  realization  that  our  truths  only
represent facets of the ultimate truth leads him to an
“epistemological respect for the view of others” (Koller,
2004, p. 88).
When we take this at face-value, it would follow that
satya is an extremely relative concept, almost a matter
of taste. Yet in all of Gandhi’s life and work it shows
that  he cares deeply  and that  his  convictions  are no
mere matter of taste. As said, to Gandhi satya has both
a  relative  and  a  universal  meaning.  Understanding
Ultimate Reality as plural Gandhi sees each particular
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experience  of  truth  as  representing  Universal  Truth.
Therefore each particular understanding of truth does
have universal value, since it represents something of
the human experience (Bilgrami, 2011a). Gandhi called
people to examine each situation, to get to understand
what was at stake for all involved, so as to arrive at a
fuller  understanding of truth.  Although people should
strive to understand the truth of every situation,  one
can never claim to be all-knowing. Therefore, in times
of disagreement, it could be that the other party sees
something more of the truth than we do, even though
we are convinced that we are right. This does not mean
that we should instantly give up our own ideas about
the truth; it means that we allow for the possibility for
both truths to exist.
Because Gandhi  denies the possibility for any one
person or group to hold absolute truth, he also denies
the ability for any one person or group to pass ultimate
judgement,  or to create dogmatic rules that everyone
should  follow  (Steger,  2006).  Therefore,  to  Gandhi,
satya  is  intertwined  with another  of  the  fundamental
principles  in  nonviolence:  ahimsa,  or  'the  absence  of
the intention to do harm' (Nagler, 2006). Harm, here
does not only point to the effects physical, emotional or
verbal violence, but is also the consequence of ill will,
of negative attitudes and criticisms against others. As I
will  explain  below,  Gandhi  does  not  mean  that  one
should uncritically agree with all other views, what he
does mean has to do with the way in which we act when
confronted with a conflicting truth claim.
 When  we  create  universal  principles  from  our  own
experiences it follows that others, who do not follow the
same principle are wrong and deserve our criticism and
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contempt. It is this attitude that to Gandhi lies at the
bases of violence. When confronted with an opposing
truth claim, we should not try to enforce our own view,
or coerce others into taking our stand. One cannot find
truth without practising ahimsa. In criticizing others we
place  ourselves  and  our  own  view  above  others.
Instead, according to Gandhi, truth can only be found
through the interaction of  competing views of  reality
and the integration of those competing visions into a
more  complex  notion  of  truth  (Cortright,  2008).
Similarly, Gandhi emphasizes the connection between
means  and ends,  which  he  sees  as  two sides  of  the
same  coin.  If  human  beings  cannot  have  absolute
knowledge, neither can they have a full conception of
the ‘ends’ of their actions. But the means they use to
get there are “certain and concrete” (Cortright, 2008,
p. 215). Our means should therefore reflect our ends
and that leaves ahimsa, acting with the intention not to
harm, as the only defendable means trough which truth
can be realized (Steger, 2006).
To Gandhi, satya is also about putting his own truth
at  the  service  of  others,  so  that  everyone  has  the
opportunity  to  develop a deeper  level  of  satya.  Each
particular  understanding  of  truth,  although  not  an
absolute, does have universal value since it represents
a part of  reality (Bilgrami,  2011a).  It  is here that he
makes the connection with the other understanding of
satya, that of honesty or truthfulness. Our experience of
truth cannot lead to a rule for everyone to follow, but it
does lead to a rule for oneself to follow: “the very idea
of principles (or doctrines)  is replaced by the idea of
exemplarity” (Bilgrami, 2011a, p. 118).  Satya therefore
implies that “we are dedicated to the truth we perceive,
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to the truth we understand” (Thakar, 2005, p. 20). If we
live from our own truth as we understand it, setting an
example, we can share our truth with others and other
truths become available to us. Since these truths are all
representations  of  Ultimate  Truth,  the  confrontation
with other views leads to a new experience, making a
deeper understanding of satya possible.
When  confronted  with  a  view  that  is  in  direct
opposition to our own, or which is perceived as wrong,
the only option is that of persuasion, not coercion. By
completely  and  honestly  acting  upon  the  truth  we
perceive, thus presenting a different reality, we might
persuade the other to change their view, or we might
change our  own.  The other option is  to  search for a
“mutually  satisfactory  and  agreed-upon  solution”
(Bondurant, 1965, p. 195). But this can only happen if
we  take  the  experience  and  the  truth  of  others  as
serious  as  those  of  ourselves.  Conflicts  are  thus  an
opportunity  to  come  to  a  higher,  more  complex
understanding  of  truth,  provided  they  are  dealt  with
nonviolently.  In  other  words,  to  Gandhi,  real  truth
emerges  in  the  ‘in-between’,  in  the  spaces  between
different experiences that are related.
TRUTH TELLING IN WESTERN DISCOURSE
A  lot  has  happened  in  the  theory  and  practice  of
nonviolence  since  Gandhi.  Although  the  direct
connection  with  the  eastern  traditions  and  their
understanding  of  truth  is  not  necessarily  present  in
each nonviolent process, the search for truth and living
up  to  it,  certainly  is.  Sometimes  it  is  phrased  as
‘speaking truth to power’. In the practice of Nonviolent
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Communication  it  takes  the  shape  of  looking  for  the
thoughts,  feelings  and  needs  we  have  and
communicating them honestly. 
To  investigate  how  this  concept  of  truth  in
nonviolence,  emerges  in  other  contexts  than  that  of
Gandhi, I will explore the life and work of playwright,
activist and former Czech president Václav Havel, who
speaks and writes about ‘living in truth’ in the context
of  a  totalitarian  regime.   Although  Havel  does  not
mention  Gandhi  in  his  writings,  their  ideas  show  a
remarkable resemblance. Like Gandhi, Havel’s aim is to
‘live in truth’, and like Gandhi the basis for this truth
lies for Havel in experience, pluriformity, responsibility
and selfless action. 
Havel finds a philosophical foundation for his ideas
in  the  work  of  Jan  Patocka  (Findlay,  2002).  Patocka,
phenomenological  philosopher,  student  of  bot
Heidegger and Husserl, was one of Havel’s intellectual
mentors  and  together  with  Jiří  Hájek,  Havel  and
Patocka became the spokespersons of the Czechoslovak
dissident movement around Charter 77. 
This movement gained its  name from the publicly
disseminated document, the Charter, in which a group
of  dissidents  demanded  that  the  Czechoslovak
government implemented the human rights it claimed
to grant its citizens by signing the Helsinki Accords.25 It
25 The  Helsinki  Declaration  on  Principles  Guiding  Relations  between  Participating
States, was the result of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held in
Finland in 1975. Most European countries, including most communist states as well as
Canada and the USA signed the declaration.  The signing states promised to respect
each other’s sovereignty, guarantee their citizen’s human rights, fundamental freedoms
and self-determination and to work towards international cooperation and the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Because the declaration did not have the status of a treaty, it
was not legally binding. It  did however become an important document for various
resistance groups, specifically in communist states, on the bases of which they claimed
the right to resist and speak out openly. 
91
eventually  became  one  things  the  Czechoslovak
dissident  movement  rallied  around.  The  charter  was
openly  signed,  eventually  by  hundreds  of  dissidents.
The  regime’s  response  to  the  publication  of  what  it
called an anti-state document was harsh. Most of the
early  signatories  were  arrested  and  spent  years  in
prison,  Jan  Patocka  died  as  a  result  of  the  police
interrogation (Findlay, 2002; Havel, 2011; Kohák, 1989;
Pirro, 2002).
Havel is very explicit about his philosophical debt to
Patocka  (Pirro,  2002),  stating  that  reading  Patocka’s
work at an early age had been “instrumental in shaping
his  life”  (Havel,  2011,  p.  xv)  and  that  Patocka’s
Socratic-style  lectures  and  seminars  had  been  an
important  inspiration  to  the  dissident  movement  in
communist Prague (Havel, 2011). One of the areas in
which Havel is inspired by Patocka is his understanding
of the resistance movement as a work of philosophy – in
– action (Popescu, 2012), resting on a commitment to
‘living in truth’.
To Patocka, philosophy is the labour of searching for
morality  and meaning in experience  (Popescu,  2012).
Practising  philosophy  leads  one  to  uncover  the  truth
about reality, specifically the reality of human existence
(Martínková, 2006). This in turn creates an imperative
to take up the responsibility to act in accordance with
that  truth  (Popescu,  2012).  Part  of  the  practice  of
philosophy is what Patocka denotes with the Platonic
term  ‘care  of  the  soul’,  the  activity  of  carefully
examining  reality,  through  the  practice  of  Socratic
questioning  (Chvatik  & Abrams,  2011;  Findlay,  2002,
2009; Martínková, 2006) to gain clarity about “what the
human being really is” (Martínková, 2006, p. 64). Once
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one engages with this  practice of  philosophy it  is  no
longer possible to simply accept any solid certainties
about reality: 
Nothing of the earlier life of acceptance remains in
peace; all the pillars of the community, traditions, and
myths, are equally shaken, as are all the answers that
once preceded questions, the modest yet secure and
soothing  meaning,  though  not  lost,  is  transformed
(Patočka, Dodd, & Kohák, 1996, pp. 39–40).
To  Patocka,  care  of  the  soul  does  not  only  mean
questioning  the  cosmological  or  natural  reality  of
human existence, but social reality as well.
it means questioning the forms and patterns that are
being transferred by society and which we have been
taking  for  granted.  It  means  reconsidering  various
alleged  truths  about  (…)  the  whole  moving  human
being in the world. It means a turn to authenticity –
living  from  what  I  am  and  trying  to  find  out  for
myself, without neglecting or hiding some unpleasant
and annoying aspects (Martínková, 2006, p. 64)
Living in truth thus also means accepting the painful
and problematic aspects of life, including one’s finitude.
In what Patocka has called a ‘naïve’ life it is possible to
hide  behind  false  certainties  and  so  to  overlook  the
problematic aspects. In a conscious life this overlooking
is  not  possible  one  must  face  up  to  the  truth  of
existence.  But,  says  Patocka,  by  becoming  aware,
transformation happens. Human reality:
is something that changes when we become conscious
of  it.  A  naive  and  a  conscious  situation  are  two
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different situations. Our reality is always situational,
so that if it is reflected on, it is already different by
the fact of our having reflected on it (Patocka as cited
in Findlay, 2002, p. 54). 
Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  Patocka’s  ideas  show  some
resemblance with the work of Foucault who has on a
number  of  occasions26 lectured  on  the  subject  of
parrhesia, or truth-telling as a moral and political virtue
(Foucault,  1983,  2010,  2011).  Both  Foucault  and
Patocka  look  to  Greek,  and  specifically  Platonic,
philosophy to ground their ideas on truth. At first sight,
Foucault’s  explanation  of  parrhesia  seems  to
completely overlap with Patocka’s ideas when he says: 
parrhesia is  a  verbal  activity  in  which  a  speaker
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks
his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty
to improve or help other people (as well as himself).
(…)  the  speaker  uses  his  freedom  and  chooses
frankness  instead  of  persuasion,  truth  instead  of
falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life
and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral
duty  instead  of  self-interest  and  moral  apathy
(Foucault, 1983, p. 5).
However,  looking  more  closely  at  Foucault’s
explanation,  some  important  differences  become
apparent that are significant, especially in the context
of  nonviolence.  Most  important  is  that  parrhesia  in
Foucault’s analysis is agonistic. Parrhesia has to be a
form of criticism towards he interlocutor, not towards
26 Foucault gave two series of lectures on parrhesia in Paris at the Collège de France in
January  –  March 1983 and in  February-  March 1984,  and one at  the University  of
California, Berkeley in October – November 1983.
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the self, which is why Foucault connects it to danger. It
is  only  parrhesia  if  the  parrhesiast (the  person  who
applies parrhesia) in some way runs the risk of being in
danger,  of losing something he values because of his
criticism (a friendship, a job, even his life).  And in this
sense,  Foucault  states  that  parrheisia  is  always
directed from below, from someone who deems himself
able  to speak the truth,   to above,  towards someone
who holds some form of  power to do damage to the
parrhesiast (Foucault, 1983, 2010, 2011).
In Patocka’s analysis, however, the other does not
take such a central place. For Patocka, living in truth is
done foremost for its own sake, because it makes life
meaningful and truly human. Insights into the essence
of human life compel one to take up the responsibility
to live accordingly. Instead of criticism, living in truth is
rather  a  form of  selfless  service.  That  such a  life  in
truth often amounts to a form of criticism because it
leads  one  to  criticize  existing  social  structures,  or
because  it  leads  one  to  step  outside  mainstream
notions,  and  that  such  a  life  is  often  indeed
uncomfortable  and  dangerous,  is  essentially  a
coincidence. 
Furthermore, for Patocka, direct criticism of others
is problematic because the practice of care of the soul
consists of an ongoing search for the essence of human
reality, an ever questioning attitude (Chvatik & Abrams,
2011;  Martínková,  2006;  Pirro,  2002).  In  this  sense,
Patocka’s ‘living in truth’ is closely related to Gandhi’s
views on satya, where Foucault’s parrhesia is this not
so  much  (see  also:  Steger,  2006).  Especially  the
necessity for criticism towards the other in parrhesia,
which, as we have seen in Gandhi’s work, goes against
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the  grain  of  ahimsa  and  anekantavada,  severs  this
connection. Gandhi replaces criticism with exemplarity,
whereby one’s insights  to truth compel one to act in
accordance  with  them,  but  do  not  compel  others.
Examples  of  others  might  lead  to  new  insights,  but
these  can’t  be  enforced.  Therefore,  not  all  kinds  of
truth-practices can,  in  the context  of  nonviolence,  be
denoted  with  the  term  satya.  To  gain  a  better
understanding  of  this  idea  of  exemplarity  in  a  very
concrete and practical sense, we can look at the work
of Václav Havel.
HAVEL’S STORY-LOGIC
One  of  the  important  ways  in  which  Havel  follows
Patocka is in the belief that introspection and giving an
account of that introspection through action is a way of
“both  doing  and  transcending  experience”  (Popescu,
2012, p. 10). Contrary to Patocka though, Havel is not
an  academic  philosopher  who  strives  to  create  a
coherent and consistent theory (Pirro, 2002), he speaks
primarily to ordinary people (Brooks, 2005). Havel is,
like Gandhi, an activist who is foremost concerned with
social  change  and  with  the  application  of  ideas  and
their practical effectiveness.  But his work is grounded
in  the  practice  of  philosophy,  of  introspection,  as
Patocka describes it  and to a certain extent  he turns
Patocka’s  abstract  philosophy  into a concrete  way of
resisting (Pirro, 2002; Tucker, 2000).
Havel  starts  his  long career  by  writing  plays,  his
philosophical and political essays follow later. Both his
essays and his  plays contain detailed analyses of  the
workings  of  the  totalitarian  system  and  the  way  it
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should or could be resisted. Havel’s life and work take
shape  in  the  context  of  the  communist
(post-)totalitarian  regime of  Czechoslovakia,  after  the
second  world  war.  It  is  this  regime  that  creates,
according  to  Havel,  a  situation  that  forces  all  its
citizens to live a lie.
This lie consists of the monolithic truth the regime
enforces,  denying  people  to  live  in  accordance  with
their  own  truths.  Following  Patocka,  and  resonating
Gandhi,  Havel sees this as a form of violence and he
proposes ‘living in truth’ as a way out. The regime also
uses  overt  violence  to  enforce  compliance  and  to
dispose of any possible threat. But what is much worse,
Havel says, is the constant dehumanization it inflicts on
every  individual  and  on  society  by  imposing  a
“monologically  premised  world  view  on  a  plurally
constituted reality” (Pirro, 2002, p. 231).
Havel illustrates this in his essay The Power of the
Powerless  (Havel,  2009).  There  he  depicts  a
greengrocer who puts the slogan 'Workers of the World
Unite!'  in  his  shop window,  between the carrots  and
onions.  This  poster  has  been  given  to  him  by  the
government.  He  puts  the  slogan  in  the  window  not
because he believes in it or because he thinks it has any
bearings on his vegetables. He hangs the slogan so he
is able to survive within the system, thus perpetuating
it. He is probably right, if he does not hang the slogan,
he would probably lose his  job. But by complying he
signals to all other citizens that this is the proper way
to behave, thus perpetuating the system. People, states
Havel,
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need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have
accepted their life with it and in it. For by this very
fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfil the system,
make the system, are the system (Havel, 2009, p. 15).
The regime, with its monolithic truth, needs people to
focus  on  their  own  survival  within the  system.  All
pervasive as it is, the system relies on compliance. It
cannot tolerate any views outside the ideology; it has
no  room  for  different  lived  experiences.  It  exist  for
nothing  else  than  its  own  perpetuation.  Were  the
greengrocer one day to stop behaving in the way that is
expected of him, and start acting in accordance with his
own  world-views,  experiences,  truths,  he  would  not
have  simply  committed  an  individual  offence,  but
something that has a much wider impact “by breaking
the rules of the game, he has disrupted the game as
such” (Havel, 2009, p. 21).
Havel, who writes not as a scholar but is most of all
an  author  and  playwright,  sees  this  in  the  frame  of
what he calls 'the logic of stories' (Havel, 2009). Havel
uses the term stories in a very specific way. To him, to
monolithic truth of the regime is not a story, in fact it is
the opposite. Stories, in the way Havel thinks of them,
are  not  depictions  of  unified  truths  but  present  an
arena  where  different  truths  and  logics  meet  and
interact. He states:
Every  story  begins  with  an  event.  This  event  -
understood  as  the  incursion  of  one  logic  into  the
world  of  another  logic  -  initiates  what  every  story
grows out of and draws nourishment from: situations,
relationships, conflict. The story has a logic of its own
as well, but it is the logic of a dialogue, an encounter,
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the  interaction  of  different  truths,  attitudes,  ideas,
(…) that is, of many autonomous, separate forces (…).
Obviously, the totalitarian system is in essence (and in
principle) directed against the story (Havel, 1988, p.
3).
The regime, says Havel aims for the destruction of the
story.  And  the  destruction  of  the  story,  is  the
destruction of the human instrument of knowledge and
self-reflection. Here, Patocka’s insights ring through. If
the  greengrocer  were  to  question  the  forms  and
patterns  that  are  transferred  by  the  regime,  and
reconsider  its  alleged truths,  he would transform his
life  from a  naïve to  a  conscious  one.  But  Havel  also
shows why this ideology and the option of  naivety is
alluring:
 
To  wandering  humankind  it  offers  an  immediately
available  home:  all  one  has  to  do is  accept  it,  and
suddenly  everything  becomes  clear  once  more,  life
takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered
questions,  anxiety,  and  loneliness  vanish  (Havel  as
cited in Brooks, 2005, p. 495).
The  ideology  presented  by  the  regime  offers  ready-
made  certainties  to  hold  on  to  and  provides  an
opportunity  to  ignore  all  life’s  problematic questions.
And so, living in truth is not for the faint of heart. 
Like  Gandhi,  Havel  points  to  accepting  the
consequences of one’s actions, as part of living in truth
and taking responsibility. Havel’s work emphasizes the
ability of seemingly impotent people to break through
this  all-pervasive  system  and  transform  society  by
taking  responsibility  for  their  individuality,  through
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speaking about and acting upon their personal truths
based  in  lived  experience  (Carey,  1992).  As  soon  as
people set out to discover their own truth and live in
accordance with it, they provide others with an option
to discover their own humanity in turn. To phrase it in
terms of  nonviolence:  by presenting  their  own truths
next  to  that  of  the  totalitarian  regime,  they  help  to
create a fuller picture of satya. 
The main aim of Havel’s writings is not to overthrow
the  regime  (although  his  work  has  ultimately
contributed a great deal to that result). The aim is to
create immediate changes in the daily lives of ordinary
people  so  that  they  might  recover  their  humanity
(Schell, 2003, p. 202). To Havel this humanity is found
in the ability of people to explore their own stories and
those of others,  to live in a world of multiplicity and
make  choices  based  on  their  own  understanding  of
truth and the perspectives of others, of the interactions
of different logics that arise in confrontations. 
 
CONSTRUCTIVITY
In  this  last  section  I  want  to  focus  on  the  wider
implications  of  everything  that  has  been  discussed
above and there  are two things  that  I  would  like  to
highlight.  One  is  the  connection  between  the
obstructive  and  the  constructive  side  of  nonviolence
and the second other, related thing is the interrelation
between  the  personal  and  the  political  sides  of
nonviolence.  
Both Gandhi and Havel stress that the personal and
the political, the individual and the public quest to live
in truth as intertwined. The personal search for one’s
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identity and truth are done in private, although such a
process  is  always  influenced  by  the  social  context.
Acting  upon  one’s  truth,  especially  in  the  form  of
exemplarity as I have described before, is a public act
and has social consequences. This is what Havel aims
to  do  through  his  writings.  Framed  in  narrative
terminology Havel’s work presents a counter-narrative
(Bamberg, 2004) against the monolithic narrative of the
regime, providing others with a more complex concept
of reality and thus the ability to live more truthful, both
socially  and  private.  Havel’s  example  of  the
greengrocer  makes  this  clear.  The  greengrocer  does
not just become a better, more sincere person himself
by refusing to hang a slogan in his shop that he does
not  believe  in,  he  also  contributes  to  a  fundamental
change  in  the  system.  So,  the  role  of  satya  in
nonviolence is  not  just  a  moral  imperative to  ‘live in
truth’, but a call to action, to participate in the creation
of social realities that are more nonviolent. 
It  is  important to note here that every nonviolent
effort  therefore  includes  both  an  obstructive  and  a
constructive  program.  Living  in  truth  as  Havel
describes can be an act of obstruction, disrupting the
workings of a monolithic system but it can also be an
act  of  construction,  part  of  the  creation  of  new
structures.  This  requires  of  course  an  individual
commitment.  However,  creating  a  more  nonviolent
society  requires  a  more  structural  approach as  well,
“transforming  the  thinking  'I'  into  an  acting  'we’”
(Pirro, 2002, p. 233).
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Constructive  program27  comprises  autonomous  and
pro-active ways to create new institutions,  resting on
the principles of  nonviolence,  and points to “building
the new society in the shell of the old” (Jahanbegloo,
2013,  p.  88)  and  the  “construction  of  complete
independence by truthful and nonviolent means” (M. K.
Gandhi, 1927b, p. 4)  Although the obstructive side of
nonviolence  is  most  discussed  and  perhaps  most
obvious, for Gandhi the obstructive program was only
an  aid  to  the  constructive  side  (Sheehan,  2006)
However, constructing nonviolent social institutions is
a long and tedious process and it is not something that
will  wield  immediate,  visible  results  and  is  often
neglected. Robert Burrowes observes:
if  new types of  structures  are not being created to
replace  the  old,  then  even  a  successful  nonviolent
defence  will  merely  deliver  control  of  the  old  and
inadequate state structure to a new elite (Burrowes,
1996, p. 216).
That this is the most difficult part, we can see reflected
also  in  the  case  of  former  Czechoslovakia.  Samizdat
writings, the creation of ‘floating universities’ and other
such “embryonic structures independent of the state”
(Uhl, 2009, p. 122) did lay a foundation for the creation
of a democratic Czechoslovakia. Havel’s writings had a
big influence on the re-emerging of civil society and the
public  life  (Larsen,  1994).  However,  these  embryonic
structures  were  not  developed  enough  and  Havel  as
president of the new, democratic Czechoslovakia was
ultimately unable to prevent the rise of new sentiments
27 
For an in-depth discussion on constructive program, and several examples see 
chapter 2 in this volume.
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and structures that curbed ‘living in truth’. The rise of
strong  nationalism,  even  tied-up  with  anti-semitism
(Larsen,  1994)  and  the  rushing  in  of  neo-liberal
economics  (ultimately  leading  to  the  split  of  Czech
Republic and Slovakia) are but two examples of how the
actual societal changes only paid lip service to Havel’s
(and Patocka’s) ideas. Joanne Sheehan describes this in
more general terms when she says that:
In cases where political revolutions have taken place
but the population is not organized to exercise self-
determination, the creation of a new society has been
extremely difficult.  In some cases, the usurpation of
power by a new dictatorship has been the result; in
others,   there  has  been  political  regime  change
without  fundamental  social  or  economic
transformation (Sheehan, 2006, p. 5).
Yet, this does not in any way devalues the attempts of
Havel or the general conclusion that satya, and ‘living
in truth’  is  a fundamental aspect of nonviolence. The
importance of the obstructive side has been discussed
above.  The  constructive  side  needs  to  gain  far  more
importance, even centre stage as Gandhi also realized
in the practice of  nonviolence.  But the two sides are
fundamentally connected and the same principles apply
for both. Robert Pirro summarizes: 
What ought to result  (…) is a community  of  people
better  able  to mediate  personal  interest  and public
good  in  both  their  thinking  and  their  actions.  The
experience  on  which  this  political  outcome  of  well-
adjusted citizenship hinges is a state of contemplative
contact with existence. And if not everyone chooses or
is  able  to achieve this  state,   then those who have
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must be counted on to convey its politically relevant
lessons in a (…) convincing manner (Pirro,  2002, p.
253).
SATYA IN NONVIOLENCE
Conflicting  global  narratives,  based  on  conflicting
truth-claims can and often do lead to violence. Yet, as I
have tried to show in this article the notion of truth is
also central in nonviolence. However, in the context of
nonviolence truth is understood in a very specific way,
which  I  have  denoted  here  with  the  Sanskrit  term
satya, taken from the work of Mohandas Gandhi. The
role  of  satya  in  the  work  of  Gandhi  has  often  been
discussed,  but  mostly  as  a  very  context  specific  and
culturally defined notion. But as I have tried to point
out  in  this  article  this  element  of  satya  can  also  be
found in the work of other groups and individuals that
engage with nonviolence, although they might not use
that  specific  term  and  that  it  is  in  fact  a  central
element. These different practices in different context
expand and amending our understanding of the role of
satya  in  nonviolence.  The  work  of  Václav  Havel
provides a clear example of the specific use of truth in
nonviolence, from a western context.
Although he does not  use the term, Havel’s  work
shows that satya demands that we see the world as an
arena  where  different  truths  meet  and  interact,
something that he denotes with ‘the logic of stories’.
Satya then, does not point to a monolithic conception of
truth. Gandhi has pointed out how satya is rooted in an
understanding of reality as plural (anekantavada). It is
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therefore  impossible  for  one  individual  or  group  to
(claim to) represent the complete truth.
Following  Patocka,  Havel’s  ‘living  in  truth’  shows
how  the  search  for  our  own  truth  and  living  in
accordance  with  it  is  a  way  of  preserving  our  own
humanity, but also a way of helping others find theirs.
Patocka,  Havel  and  Gandhi  all  show  that  the
enforcement  of  one  truth  over  another  amounts  to  a
form of violence and dehumanization, in Havel’s term
the destruction of the story. But they also provide us
with ways to prevent and resist such violence, and aim
for re-humanization. 
Satya represents  the constant strive to come to a
fuller,  more  complex  picture  of  truth,  based  in  lived
experience. Conflicting visions of truth each represent
facets of (human) reality. This leads to the connection
with  ahimsa, or acting with the intention not to harm.
The  confrontation  with  other  truth  claims  and
perspectives  on  good  living  provides  us  with  the
opportunity  to  develop  new  and  more  complex
conceptions  and  visions  of  reality,  of  different
strategies of being in the world, of new forms of good
living,  both  personal  and  social.  Havel’s  work  also
shows that this is not an easy road to travel and that
there are plenty of  reasons  not  to embark on it,  the
costs  can  be  great.  Patocka’s  death  as  a  result  of
speaking out through the Charter 77 has on a number
of occasions been compared to the death of Socrates
(Chvatik  &  Abrams,  2011)  and  although  Havel’s  life
eventually took a different turn, his living in truth led
him  to  imprisonment,  censorship  and  harassment.
Choosing  for  survival  within  the  system  is  an
understandable  choice.  However,  in  the  context  of
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nonviolence  it  is  precisely  through  giving  up  this
understandable  option  that  a  new  form  of  power  is
gained. The work of both Gandhi and Havel shows us
something of how this mechanism works. I believe that
in a globalizing world in which people are in an ever
increasing  manner  confronted  with  conflicting  global
narratives on good living,  the insights  of  Gandhi  and
Havel are crucial.
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CHAPTER 4
For the love of all
 Ahimsa in Nonviolence and Radical Ecology
There is a difference here between proactive nonharming and
“doing nothing.” 
Irina Aristarkhova (2012)
INTRODUCTION28
Our world is experiencing an ever growing ecological
crisis,  which  makes  it  necessary  for  humanity  to
reshape the way it  is  dealing with  the  planet.  Grave
challenges for the future of humanity and the earth as a
whole  have  emerged  as  a  result  of  ecological  and
economical  conduct  over  the  past  few  centuries.
According  to  some,  the  environmental  crisis  is
intertwined  with  other  crises  (financial,  social,
political), which has led both scholars and activists to
call for a fundamental change in the global paradigm.
Where socio-political change is concerned, part of this
paradigm  change  has  been  attempted  through
nonviolence. Pioneered as a method in the early 20th
century by Mohandas Gandhi for addressing injustice,
28 This chapter is submitted as: Goelst Meijer, S.L.E. van, For the Love of All: Ahimsa in 
Nonviolence and Radical Ecology, to: Environmental Philosophy.
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it  has since been taken up by many more individuals
and  organisations  around  the  world.  Nonviolence
practices  and  notions  can  also  be  found  in  certain
streams of ecology. One central element in the method
of nonviolence is ahimsa, ‘the absence of the intention
to do harm’. In this article I will explore both ahimsa
and  radical  ecology,  to  both  explain  the  role  and
significance of ahimsa in nonviolence and to see if and
how the two notions can clarify and supplement each
other. 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, concern
for  the  state  of  the  environment  has  grown
exponentially. Humanity is increasingly confronted with
the growing negative ecological effects of its actions.
Various  forms of  pollution  have  proved  very  hard  to
clean up (Conway & Pretty, 2013; Metcalfe & Derwent,
2005;  Meuser,  2010;  Whitacre,  2007),  and  the
depletion  of  resources  (Kröger,  2013),  loss  of
biodiversity  (Dronamraju,  2008;  Naeem,  Bunker,  &
Hector,  2009;  O’Riordan  &  Stoll-Kleemann,  2002),
global warming, climate change and rising ocean levels
(Maslin, 2004; Metcalfe & Derwent, 2005; Scott-Cato &
Hillier,  2010;  Shiva,  2008)  can’t  reasonably  be
overlooked anymore. This has led to the emergence of
many  global  environmental  organizations  (Curran,
2006;  Haigh,  2002;  Merchant,  2005;  Shiva,  1988;  L.
Williams, Roberts, & McIntosh, 2011), the emergence
of  green  political  parties  throughout  the  world
(Bomberg,  1998;  Goodin,  2013)  and  multilateral
initiatives  to  take  action.  But  the  views  on  how to
address these  problems vary widely  (Bomberg,  1998;
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Goodin,  2013;  Rogelj  et  al.,  2010;  Wulfhorst  &
Haugestad, 2006; Zimmerman, 1997). 
In  the  view  of  some,  solving  environmental
problems is seen as incompatible with solving human
social problems, of which there are also many (Tanner
& Horn-Phathanothai,  2014).  Solving global  problems
then  becomes  a  choice  between  addressing  social
issues (famine, war, diseases) or ecological problems.
However,  in  other  views both  kinds  of  problems  are
seen as deeply interrelated and is it argued that real
solutions can only be created through a comprehensive
global paradigm shift in which humanity transforms the
way  it  deals  with  the  planet  and  all  its  inhabitants
(Bronner,  2002;  Merchant,  2005;  Zimmerman,  1997).
Radical Ecology is one stream of thought that takes the
latter view. 
The term ‘Radical Ecology’ might conjure up images
of activists chained to oil platforms, settling themselves
in tree tops to save the redwoods or committing nightly
break-ins  into  laboratories  to  free  the  guinea  pigs.
Although  some  activists  and  organizations  like  Earth
First!,  Greenpeace  or  the  Dutch  Milieudefensie
(Environmental  Defence)  certainly  place  themselves
within the scope of Radical Ecology, my focus here is
on  radical  ecological  thinking and  the  philosophical
framework it provides  (Zimmerman, 1997). 
Radical  Ecology  is  premised  on  the  idea  that  a
fundamental transformation is needed in order to deal
with  the  current  ecological  crisis  (Birkeland,  1993;
Merchant,  2005).  This  transformation  concerns  the
relationship  between  the  human  and  the  non-human
world,  and  in  addition,  humanity’s  relationship  with
itself (Birkeland, 1993). The term ‘radical’ points to the
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desire for a paradigm shift that changes “the cultural
and  institutional  infrastructure  -  our  frameworks  of
thinking, relating, and acting” (Birkeland, 1993, p. 15).
It  can be argued that in  western thinking radical
ecological thought started in earnest with the advent of
Deep Ecology, though earlier traces can be found for
instance  in  the  work  of  Thoreau  (Thoreau,  2004;
Thoreau  &  Moldenhauer,  2004a,  2004b),  Emerson
(Emerson,  2009) and Aldo Leopold (Knight  & Riedel,
2002;  Leopold,  1970;  Lorbiecki,  2011).  In addition to
Deep Ecology,  radical  ecological  thinking is  informed
by  Ecofeminism  (Birkeland,  1993;  Gaard,  1993;
Ruether,  2005;  Twine,  2001)  and  Social  Ecology
(Bookchin,  1982;  Pepper,  1993)  and  also  by  certain
religious  views  (Abdul-Matin,  2010;  Ruether,  2005;
Setia, 2007). What unifies these streams of thought is a
sense that a radically different way of seeing, valuing
and relating to the natural environment is necessary in
order to turn the current ecological crisis around.
A  very  similar  paradigm  shift,  that  calls  for  a
transformation  of  humanity’s  relationship  with  itself
and its place in the world is deemed necessary from the
perspective  of  nonviolence  (Nagler,  2004).  I  use  the
term nonviolence here not only to point to the absence
of violence in solving problems, but as a coherent set of
ideas  and  practices  that  provide  a  framework  for
understanding  (social)  reality.  This  nonviolence
paradigm mostly focusses on socio-political change, but
its visions for alternative ways of relating, of organizing
and of being in the world have profound implications
for  our  ways  of  dealing  with  the  environment
(Moolakkattu, 2010; Sasikala, 2012).
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The  roots  of  contemporary  nonviolence  lie,  to  an
important extent, in the work of Mohandas Gandhi, who
construed  nonviolence,  an  ancient  religious  and
philosophical concept, into a new systematic and pro-
active way that made it applicable in modern society.
When we look at this paradigm, we can see five basic
elements  emerge  that  together  form  the  core  of
nonviolence:  satya or  ‘truth-seeking’,  ahimsa or  ‘the
intention  not  to  harm’,  tapasya or  ‘self-suffering’,
sarvodaya or ‘the welfare of all’ and swadeshi/swaraj or
‘authenticity and autonomy’. Each of these elements is
a  complex  and  layered  notion  and  each  is  equally
important  in  nonviolence.  I  will  focus  in  this  paper
specifically on ahimsa. 
I will  argue here that ahimsa consists  of a conscious
change in the way we relate to ‘the other’ and deal with
'otherness'. Ahimsa denotes an attitude towards others
in  which  we  make  every  effort  not  to  harm  their
chances of ‘being’, their dignity and chances for self-
development.  Whereas in nonviolence thinking this is
usually (though not solely) understood in a social way,
in Radical Ecology a very similar attitude is developed
in  relation  to  the  natural  world.  Radical  Ecological
thinking  can  help  to  clarify  the  fundamental  shift
towards  'the  other'  that  ahimsa  represents.  On  the
other hand, Radical Ecology is  sometimes accused of
taking a misanthropic stance (Zimmerman, 1997). The
notion of ahimsa points to an attitude of non-harming
towards the other, but one that is fundamentally bound
up  with  an  attitude  of  non-harming  towards  oneself,
because  it  departs  from  a  relational  view  of  reality.
Thus, ahimsa shows that such a misanthropic stance is
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ultimately counterproductive in the search for a way of
living that allows room for all different ways of 'being'.
To explore this point further I will start with a general
overview of Radical Ecology in the next section, after
which  I  will  explore  the  notion  of  ahimsa  and,
ultimately, what they mean in relation to each other.
RADICAL ECOLOGY
As  mentioned  above,  it  can  be  argued  that  Radical
Ecology started, at least in a western context with Deep
Ecology,  rooted  in  the  environmental  thinking  of
Norwegian  philosopher  Arne  Næss  (2005c;  2008).  In
addition, Ecofeminism and Social Ecology, which both
to a certain extent consist of a critique to Deep Ecology
have a major role in radical ecological thinking. In this
section I will explore these three thought streams more
in depth to see how they constitute Radical Ecology as
a movement that searches for radically different way of
seeing, valuing and relating to the natural environment.
Deep  Ecology  emerges  in  Arne  Næss‘s  work  in
contrast to ‘shallow ecology’. The shallow approach to
ecology  consist  according  to  Næss  of  an  attempt  to
solve environmental problems through  legal, technical
and  institutional  solutions  that  focus  on  short  term
results and do not question the core values of modern
industrial society (Besthorn, 2012; Haigh, 2002; Lane,
2006;  Merchant,  2005).  Furthermore,  in  shallow
approaches,  environmental  degradation  is  seen  as
problematic only as far as it has an impact on human
well-being  (Besthorn,  2012).  Instead,  in  Næss’s
thinking  the  focus  is  on  the  relationships  between
humans and the ecological systems of which they are
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part, and rests on the idea that each element in these
ecological systems has intrinsic value: 
The  well-being  and  flourishing  of  human  and
nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (…).
These values are independent of the usefulness of the
nonhuman  world  for  human  purposes  (Næss,
Rothenberg, & Næss, 1989, p. 29). 
His idea of intrinsic value is rooted in the notion that all
beings  are  deeply  and  interdependently  related,  and
are all part of a greater whole. This interrelatedness is
understood here in a very specific way. Neil Evernden
explains:  
To the  western  mind,  interrelated  implies  a  causal
connectedness. Things are interrelated if a change in
one affects  the other.  So to  say  that  all  things  are
interrelated simply implies that if we wish to develop
our  "resources,"  we  must  find  some  technological
means  to  defuse  the  interaction.  (…)  But  what  is
actually involved is a genuine intermingling of parts
of  the  ecosystem.  There  are  no  discrete  entities
(Evernden, 1996, p. 16).
Because  all  beings,  including  humans,  are  seen  as
integrated parts of a bigger whole, their worth cannot
be reduced to  a  function  of  another’s  well-being.  All
have intrinsic worth and the ‘right’ to flourish as they
are.  Therefore,  humans,  like  all  other  beings,  should
live in a way that does not harm other’s chances for
well-being  and  self-development  (Besthorn,  2012).
Næss dismisses  the  idea  of  a  hierarchy  in  which
humans have the right to control or dominate nature
and use it  as they  see fit.  Doing  so would harm the
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integrity  of  other  life  forms  and  thus  the  ecological
system of  which humans  also are a part.  This  would
also amount to harm to humans themselves (Besthorn,
2012). Thus, Deep Ecology is concerned with creating
‘ecological  justice’,  a situation in which all  life  forms
are  able  to  flourish  in  their  own  ways.  For  this  to
happen, according to  Næss, we need to make a shift
from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric view of the
world (Drengson & Devall, 2010). To Næss, this begins
with the shift from a concept of a personal self to that
of an ecological self (Haigh, 2002). As can be seen from
Evernden’s  quote  above,  if  one  takes  genuine
interrelatedness as a starting point, one has to give up,
at least to a certain extent the idea of separateness. To
Næss this implies giving up the idea of a separate self
and  replacing  it  with  an  ecological  concept  of  self
(Devall, 2001) in which:
human beings (…)will cease to think of themselves as
being discrete individuals and will see themselves as
parts of  an all-encompassing ecological  whole.  Only
then, humans will recognize that the conservation of
the world is the conservation of themselves, and they
will  participate  fully  in  this  conservation  without
reservation or sense of painful duty. The task of "self-
realizing"  is  not  a  challenge  to  cultivate  the  moral
integrity to think of others but rather to conceive of
the world so broadly that we see ourselves as a part
of everything (Lane, 2006, p. 77).  
The critique of both Ecofeminism and Social Ecology on
Deep  Ecology  thinking  is,  among  other  things,  that
Deep Ecology in its search for an ecocentric worldview,
too easily takes humanity as a unified whole and that
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the attitude of this whole is often cast as unanimously
anti-ecological.  Both  Social  Ecology  and Ecofeminism
see a lack of political awareness and critique in Deep
Ecology’s  thinking.   Bothe  Ecofeminism  and  Social
Ecology  point  to  a  deep  seated  link  between  the
rationale  of  domination  and exploitation  of  the  earth
and that of groups of  humans by other  groups.  They
insist  that the much needed transformation to curtail
the ecological crisis will not simply arrive by changing
our (ecological) consciousness, but that humanity needs
to  work  at  restructuring  its  internal  attitudes  and
institutions.
Ecofeminism agrees with the Deep Ecology stance
that  most  ecological  problems  today  stem  from  the
“atomistic,  hierarchical  and  dualistic”  (Zimmerman,
1997, p. 277) way of operating of modernity. However,
Ecofeminism does not see anthropocentrism as the root
cause  of  the  problem,  but  rather  androcentrism  or
patriarchy.  Ecofeminism sees patriarchy as a “logic of
domination”  (Zimmerman,  1997,  p.  2)  that  not  only
views maleness and rationality as superior and opposed
to femininity and emotionality, but also values culture
over nature. This leads to the domination of women, but
also  to  the  domination  of  non-human  life.  Because
nature is linked to the feminine, like women it has to be
tamed, ordered and brought under control. What needs
to happen to change the environmental  crisis  around
according to Ecofeminism is a dismantling of patriarchy
(Zimmerman, 1997).
Ecofeminists are also concerned that the ‘expanding
self’  concept  of  Deep  Ecology  glosses  over  the
importance of diversity and particularity (Gaard, 1993,
1997). 
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Identification  and  holism  neglect  difference.  The
whole,  such  as  a  rainforest  or  planet  Earth  itself,
contains not only magnificent trees, birds, and other
life  forms,  but  trash,  sewage,  and  clear-cut
landscapes.  Both  identity  and  difference  are
necessary to a new ecological philosophy and ethics
(Merchant, 2005, p. 111). 
Ecofeminists  don’t  see a need for an ever expanding
concept of self that identifies with everything, but for
highly specific identifications “such as love for a local
landscape”  (Merchant,  2005,  p.  111).  Ecofeminists
worry that the idea of the ever expanding self brings
egotistical motivations in through the back door. When
humanity realizes that harming nature is harming the
self,  “Rational  Man will  then presumably  change His
ways”  (Gaard,  1993,  p.  29).  Ecofeminism  instead
stresses  the  importance  of  emotional  and  spiritual
engagement  with  the  natural  world,  from  which  a
deeply  felt  concern  and genuine  care  for  ‘the  other’
might arise. So, it is not so much concern for the self,
however expanded it might be, but genuine concern for
the  other,  in  all  its  otherness  that  is  key  in
Ecofeminism. 
The  third  important  source  for  radical  ecological
thinking  is  Social  Ecology.  Formulated  by  Murray
Bookchin  (1982)  as  a  socio-ecological  critique  to
modern  society,  Social  Ecology  views  the  ecological
crisis as the outcome of authoritarian social structures
in  general,  in  which  the  inferior  is  forced  to  behave
according to the rules of the superior and in which it is
normal  and  acceptable  that  the  superior  uses  the
inferior for its own good. Social Ecology disagrees with
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Ecofeminism that all such structures of domination are
connected  with  patriarchy.  Instead,   environmental
destruction  rests  on  the  perceived  split  between
humans and nature, which itself is a result of distorted
social  relations  in  which  elites  control  and  use  the
masses for their own needs: 
We  must  re-examine  the  cleavages  that  separated
humanity  from  nature,  and  the  splits  within  the
human  community  that  originally  produced  this
cleavage (Bookchin, 1982, p. 42).
Like Deep Ecology, Social Ecology sees human beings
as  fundamentally  natural  beings  whose  well-being  is
“inextricably  bound-up  with  the  well-being  of  the
natural  world”  (Zimmerman,  1997,  p.  2).  But,  unlike
Deep Ecology, the transformation envisioned by Social
Ecologists is foremost social. Whereas Deep Ecology is
not  really  concerned  with  the  relations  between
humans and looks only towards the transformation of
the relations between humans and nature, the key for
Social Ecology lies in the creation of a counter-culture
that is socially and economically egalitarian and truly
democratic and participative. However, from the Deep
Ecology  perspective  comes  the  critique  that  more
egalitarian social relations do not necessarily lead to a
more egalitarian relationship with nature.
Radical  Ecology  as  a  whole  has  absorbed  the
viewpoints  and  mutual  critiques  of  these  different
streams. It is thus not a unified stream of thought that
works from or towards a fixed ideology. Rather, it is a
way  of  thinking  that  searches  within  a  certain
‘bandwidth’  how  a  radical  transformation  of  human
'being in the world' can be brought about, that would
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allow humans and non-human beings both to flourish.
From  the  perspective  of  Radical  Ecology  such
flourishing  can  only  happen  if  we  focus  on  the
ecological, or interrelated nature of life, without losing
sight of the particular needs of all species. In that sense
it is a form of Deep Ecology, that is not satisfied with
finding  (shallow)  legal,  technical  and  institutional
solutions  to  the  ecological  crisis.  Radical  Ecology
stresses the need for a  change in consciousness,  but
also  for  the  need  of  a  transformation  of  humanity’s
concrete  ways  of  acting  and  understanding  itself.  In
this  area,  Radical  Ecology runs  the risk  of  becoming
misanthropic,  when  it  points  to  an  understanding  of
humanity  solely  as  the  destructor  of  the  planet  for
instance. It is here that the concept of  ahimsa as it is
understood  in  nonviolence  thinking,  might  have
something  to  offer.  In  the  following  sections  I  will
explore  this  notion  of  ahimsa  and  the  way  it  has
developed in nonviolence thinking and practice.
AHIMSA 
The Sanskrit word ahimsa represents an ancient Hindu,
Jain and Buddhist concept. The word is a negation of
himsa, often translated with harm or violence, which is
derived  from  the  root  han; to  strike,  slay  or  kill
(Bondurant, 1965; Chapple, 1987). It is thought that the
word  himsa  is  a  desiderative,  meaning  the  desire to
hurt29 (Bondurant,  1965;  Phillips,  2013).  Ahimsa then
29 
Stephen Phillips explains: “The desiderative form is also used for will and intention,
thus  “will  to  X,”  and  ahimsa  intention  not  to  harm,  i.e.,  nonharmfulness.  (…)  the
etymological  lesson  is  that  the  word  connotes  an  attitude  of  personal  policy.
Nonharmfulness is an attitude one adopts, or tries to adopt. The idea suggests a rule, or
set of rules, governing effort and action” (Phillips, 2013, p. 285). 
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means  'the  absence  of  the  desire  to  harm'  (Chapple,
1987; Vajpeyi, 2012). 
The  notion  of  ahimsa  can  be  found,  although  in
different forms, in all the Indian renouncer-traditions30
(Chapple,  1998),  where it  is  understood  as  a holistic
concept that rests on the identification of oneself with
all others (Kumar, 2004; Shastri & Shastri, 1998). The
Vedic (Hindu) tradition provides a theoretical basis for
this  view,  stating  that  everything  in  the  universe  is
“interconnected,  interrelated  and  interdependent”
(Shastri  & Shastri,  1998,  p.  70).  The  yogic  tradition
takes  ahimsa  as  one  of  the  central  virtues  and
renounces  the  slaughter  of  animals  for  sacrificial
reasons  or  food.  Over  time,  the  understanding  of
ahimsa  evolved  to  also  include  non-harm  through
speech  and  thought  (Bondurant,  1965;  Shastri  &
Shastri, 1998). 
Although in the classical  texts  of  Buddhism the term
ahimsa  is  mentioned  only  sporadically  (Chinchore,
2005)   refraining  from harm is  one  of  the  religion’s
central precepts. In most Buddhist traditions ahimsa is
connected  to  the  development  of  the  ‘right’  mental
states31 and the attempt to become free of those mental
states  that  lead  to  violent  behaviour;  any  form  of
enmity.  Buddhism  stresses  the  importance  of
intentionality  in  ahimsa.32 Causing  harm  is  morally
wrong if caused intentionally, but unintentional harm is
30 
Buddhism, Jainism and Yoga. 
31 One  of  the core  concepts  in  Buddhism  is  'the  Eightfold  Path',  consisting  of  the
cultivation of right view, right intention, right speech, right action right livelihood, right
effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.
32 
See the comments by Stephen Phillips above, note 29.
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often  not  seen  as  himsa  (Chinchore,  2005;  Keown,
2005). 
For the Jains ahimsa is the central focus of religion
and  life  (Chapple,  1993),  in  a  radical  and
comprehensive  way.  Ahimsa  is  extended  to  all  living
beings, but where in the Buddhist tradition the focus is
on the intention and on mental states, Jainism looks at
action.  They  also  extend  the  meaning  of  ahimsa  to
include the prevention and reparation of harm (Koller,
2004).  Jainism  recognizes  that  complete  ahimsa  is
impossible in life, but Jain monks attempt to practice
ahimsa in all actions. For lay people, the emphasis is on
“minimizing  harm and  choosing  positive  actions  that
have benign effects” (Rankin, 2013, p. 154). In all these
traditions  ahimsa  points  to  an  attitude  of  refraining
from  hurting  others,  including  non-human  life  forms
and to a world-view in which all life is interrelated. 
GANDHI’S AHIMSA
In the west,  the term ahimsa is perhaps most widely
known in relation to Gandhi and his nonviolent social
change.  For  Gandhi  ahimsa  was  indeed  one  of  the
fundamental  aspects  of  his  practice.  Though  Gandhi
himself  was  a  devout  Hindu,  both  Buddhism  and
especially Jainism have influenced his commitment to
ahimsa  (Ansbro,  2000;  Bilgrami,  2011a).  Influenced
also by his Christian schooling, his studies in London
and his life in South-Africa, Gandhi’s political thinking
is  highly  original.  It  blends  aspects  of  diverse  world
religions  with  political  theory  and  ideas  of
contemporary  secular  thinkers  like  Thoreau,  Tolstoy,
and  Ruskin  (M.  K.  Gandhi,  1996).  He  expands  the
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meaning of traditional Indian concepts and uses them
in new socio-political  way.  In  the  case  of  ahimsa  he
converts this ancient moral principle into a principle of
action that can be used as a force in the world to create
social  change.  To  the  ancient  principle  of  non-harm,
Gandhi adds the dimension of active love or good will
(Ansbro, 2000). 
In its negative form, it means not injuring any living
being, whether by body or mind. I may not therefore
hurt the person of any wrong-doer, or bear any ill will
to him and so cause him mental suffering. (...) In its
positive  form,  ahimsa  means  the  largest  love,  the
greatest charity. If I am a follower of ahimsa, I must
love my  enemy.  I  must  apply  the  same rule  to  the
wrong-doer who is my enemy or a stranger to me, as I
would  to  my  wrong-doing  father  or  son   (M.  K.
Gandhi, 1999b, p. 252). 
He is  adamant  that  ahimsa should  be applied in  the
same way to everyone, not just to those who love us.
Gandhi understands ahimsa also to mean the rejection
of ‘inner violence’ or ‘violence of the spirit:
Ahimsa is not  the crude thing it  has been made to
appear. Not to hurt any living thing is no doubt a part
of ahimsa. But it is its least expression. The principle
of  ahimsa is  not  to  hurt  by  evil  thought,  by  undue
haste, by lying, by hatred, by wishing ill of anybody. It
is also violated by holding on to what the world needs
(M. K. Gandhi, 1945, p. 6). 
Although  Gandhi  is  convinced  that  we  should  not
harbour ill will or hatred against anyone, people should
not cease to hate practices and systems of oppression
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or exclusion. He recognized that his practice of ahimsa
could not allow for a toleration of structural violence,33
or violence and injustice in general. 
Just  like  in  the  ancient  religious  traditions  that
generated  ahimsa,  Gandhi’s  views  rest  on  an
understanding of all life as interrelated. In this view the
well-being or suffering of one affects all others (Joseph,
2012).  Therefore,  ahimsa  can  never  be  construed  as
passivity. Resisting injustice should be done as an act of
ahimsa towards oneself and to the perpetrators. Their
unjust  behaviour  harms  their  own  humanity  just  as
much  as  it  harms  others.  Tolerating  injustice  or
violence actually amounts to two forms of himsa to both
victim  and  perpetrator,  who  would  be  allowed  to
continue  harming  themselves  by  harming  others.
Ahimsa  thus  required  actively  opposing  systems  of
injustice and: “the pitting of one's whole soul against
the will of the tyrant” (Ansbro, 2000, p. 5).
To Gandhi, ahimsa is closely related to another of
the central aspects of nonviolence:  that of  satya34,  or
truth-  seeking.  In Gandhi’s  life and work ahimsa and
satya  are  the  core  concepts.  To  him,  nonviolence  is
essentially  a  quest  to  understand  the  deepest  truth
about  reality,  and to  find ways to  live  in  accordance
with  that  truth.  He  is  convinced  that  there  was  an
Ultimate  Truth,  but  is  equally  convinced  that  people
could only understand it in a relative sense. People can
only come to know something about the truth of reality
through their experience. But because people have very
different experiences in life, their views on truth will
33 See  for  an  explanation  of  this  term  both  Galtung  (1996)  and  chapter  2  in  this
volume. 
34 See for an in-depth explanation of satya chapter 3 in this volume.
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also differ vastly. These truths then do not cancel each
other out, because all the experiences are equally real.
They  each  represent  different  facets  of  reality.  This
leads Gandhi  to have an “epistemological  respect  for
the views of others” (Koller, 2004, p. 88). Confronted
with views of reality that are completely opposed to our
own, we have no choice but to take them seriously, as
representations of reality. This does not mean we have
to  part  with  our  own  views,  after  all  these  also
represent Ultimate Reality. It does mean that we have
to look for ways of action that can respect both truths
and  that  we  remain  open  to  the  possibility  that  our
confrontation with the view of the other,  which is an
experience, might lead us to change our mind (or the
other might change his mind when confronted with our
truth).35 This adds another dimension to the idea that
we are all interrelated:
This  understanding  encompasses  the  insight  that
other beings are not “other” to themselves; that they
are themselves just as much as we are ourselves. It is
this insight that enables us to see the “other” on its
own terms, from its own side, rather than as merely
the “other”, that is opposed to us. And this ability to
see the other person as not merely the “other”, but as
identical to our own self (…) operationalizes ahimsa
(Koller, 2004, pp. 86–7).
As Koller explains, ahimsa implies meeting the other on
his/her  own  terms,  without  stepping  over  your  own
terms.  The  operationalization  of  ahimsa  lies  in  the
realisation  that  others  are  not  identical  to  us  in  the
35 For a more in-depth exploration of satya and its role in nonviolence see chapter 3 in
this volume.
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sense that they are the same, but in the sense that they
live in the world on their own terms and have their own
way of being, like we do. Ahimsa points to the active
attempt to create a situation in which each can fully
live. 
AHIMSA AS AN ELEMENT OF NONVIOLENCE AFTER GANDHI 
Although the word ahimsa has a specific background in
Indian philosophy and religion,  Gandhi  expanded and
slightly  altered the meaning of this ancient term and
used  it  as  an  active  element  in  the  practice  of
nonviolence. That this element has always been deemed
vital  by  those  who  engage  with  nonviolence  even
though  they  might  not  approach  it  from  a  Hindu,
Buddhist or Jain perspective, can be seen for instance
from  the  work  of  Abdul  Ghaffar  Khan36 (Bondurant,
1965;  Easwaran,  1999;  R.  C.  Johansen,  1997)  and
Martin Luther King (M. L. King, 2010a, 2010b). 
Khan  was  a  Muslim  activist  in  what  is  today  the
border region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Starting out
by building schools and setting up projects to improve
hygienic conditions in his native area, he moved on to
political activism. Kahn founded an organization known
as the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God). Shaped
in  the  image  of  an  army  the  Khidmatgars  struggled
nonviolently to improve social conditions in the region
and  eventually  for  independence  from  Britain  (R.  C.
Johansen,  1997).  To  the  Pashtun  people,  the  word
ahimsa had little to no meaning. Invoking the Islamic
36 
For a more in-depth discussion of Ghaffar khan and his work see chaper 2 in this 
volume.
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concept of  sabr (patience, endurance) and referring to
a Qur’an verse stating that one should
 
respond to evil  with what is  good, and your enemy
will  become  like  a  close  and  affectionate  friend
(Qur’an verse 41:34 as quoted in: Halverson, 2012).
For Khan the emphasis was addressing the harm that
was inherent in the social conditions in his native area,
both  those  inherent  in  Pashtun  culture  and  those
inflicted  by  the  British.  The  Kudhai  Khidmatgars
worked both towards social uplift for all and towards a
diminishing of the violent tribal practices such as blood
feuds.
A few decades later, Martin Luther King translated
Gandhi’s ideas to the American (Christian) context and
equated  ahimsa  with  agape.  Agape  refers  to  one  of
three  forms of  love  that  are  discerned  in  the  Greek
philosophical  tradition and is  translated by King as a
form  of  active  good-will  or  benevolence  towards  all
living  beings  (Atack,  2012).  King  uses  the  notion  of
active love in a very specific sense: 
In speaking of love at this point, we are not referring
to some sentimental or affectionate emotion. It would
be nonsense to urge men to love their oppressors in
an affectionate sense. Love in this connection means
understanding,  redemptive  goodwill  (M.  L.  King,
2010a, p. 92).
King’s redemptive love is a disinterested kind of love in
the sense that it is love for others for their sake, not for
the  benefits  that  the  relation  brings  to  oneself.
Therefore, one should not distinguish between friends
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or enemies but aim at preserving, restoring or creating
a sense of community (M. L. King, 2010a), something
that King often referred to as the creation of a 'beloved
community'  (M.  L.  King,  2010b).  King  resonates
Gandhi’s  notion  that  all  life  is  interrelated.  In  one
instance King explains his idea by citing from a letter
by novelist James Baldwin:
The really terrible thing, old buddy, is that you must
accept  them.  And  I  mean  that  very  seriously.  You
must  accept  them and  accept  them  with  love.  For
these innocent people have no other hope. They are,
in effect, still trapped in a history which they do not
understand; and until they understand it, they cannot
be released from it. They have had to believe for many
years, and for innumerable reasons,  that black men
are  inferior  to  white  men.  Many  of  them,  indeed,
know better, but, as you will discover, people find it
very difficult to act on what they know. To act is to be
committed, and to be committed is to be in danger. In
this  case,  the danger,  in  the  minds  of  most  white
Americans,  is  the  loss  of  their  identity...  But  these
men are your brothers—your lost, younger brothers.
And if  the word integration means anything,  this is
what  it  means:  that  we,  with  love,  shall  force  our
brothers  to  see  themselves  as  they  are,  to  cease
fleeing from reality and begin to change it (Baldwin,
1963, pp. 23–4).
From  this  description  it  becomes  understandable
how ahimsa works as an element of transformation in a
process of nonviolence. Ahimsa refers to the removal of
the  intention to  harm.  Inadvertently  causing  harm
would  not  constitute  himsa,  yet,  the  intention  itself
would. Gandhi, King, Khan and others, have shown that
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ahimsa  means  changing  one’s  attitude  towards  the
other and see him not as a separate 'other' but as part
of a shared constellation of relations. In such a shared
constellation  of  relations  committing  ‘harm’  towards
one of the elements (another person) becomes harm to
oneself  because  it  damages  the  shared  network  of
which the self is part. 
RELATING TO THE OTHER
Thus,  ahimsa  is  that  element  in  a  process  of
nonviolence which calls us to make a qualitative shift in
our relationship to others. Ahimsa points to an internal
process of re-framing in which one attempts to discover
and transform any feelings of enmity and actions that
might  cause  harm,  and  to  cultivate  goodwill  and
disinterested love towards all others, regardless of the
attitude  the  other  takes  towards  you.  The  active
nonviolence  of  Gandhi,  Khan  and  King  is  mainly
directed at  social  change and in the  context  of  their
work this ‘other‘ points to other humans, adversaries.
The term ahimsa is seldom mentioned, however, when
we look at the paradigm shift towards the natural world
proposed by Radical Ecology something very similar is
at  stake;  amounting  to  “saying  “yes”  to  all  living
beings” (Aristarkhova, 2012, p. 637). 
Radical  Ecology  strives  towards  a  world  that  is
sustainable and both ecologically and socially just, by
critically examining the current attitude that underlies
our socio-economic,  political  and cultural  institutions,
and by working towards transformation. It is thus not
only  concerned  with  environmental  conservation,  but
also with the creation of alternative forms of economic,
129
political and social organization. Although the different
streams  in  radical  ecological  thinking  each  lay  a
different emphasis and sometimes conflict over specific
viewpoints,  Radical  Ecology  as  a  whole  calls  for  a
fundamental transformation of our attitude towards the
other,  but  here  ‘other’  emphatically  includes  non-
human species, nature and the cosmos in general. 
The  shift  in  attitude  that  is  proposed  by  Radical
Ecology is not in the first place related to dealing with
an  antagonistic  other  (although  nature  is  sometimes
cast that way in western thinking), but with an 'other'
that is a different life form. However, in both cases the
other has a different outlook on life, and different needs
for flourishing that might conflict with our own. 
The overlap in thinking between Radical Ecology and
nonviolence  is  not  entirely  surprising.  Years  before
Arne Næss formally started his work on Deep Ecology,
he made an extensive study of Gandhi’s  work (Næss,
2005b).  In  his  later  writings  on  Deep  Ecology  Næss
often  mentioned  his  indebtedness  to  Gandhi  in  his
thinking on ecology (Næss, 2005a; Næss et al., 2008; T.
Weber,  1999)  and  has  even  stated  that  his  work  on
Deep Ecology is really an outgrowth of his thinking on
Gandhi  and  Spinoza  and  his  experiences  in  the
mountains  of  Norway  (Devall  &  Sessions,  1985;  T.
Weber, 1999). Gandhi’s influence is especially visible in
Næss’s  ideas  on  self-development  (T.  Weber,  1999;
Zimmerman, 1997). It led Næss to conclude that true
self-development could only happen in relation to the
self-development of all  other beings, and that (social)
action to create circumstances that foster development
for all, including all oher species, is an integral part of
this process (Zimmerman, 1997). 
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Ecofeminists  have  criticized  Naess’  ideas  on  an
expanding self, because it would lead one to overlook
profound differences between individual people, groups
or  species,  and stepping  over  the “otherness”  of  the
other. 
As  Koller  has  explained,  seeing  the  other  as
connected to oneself  does not point to understanding
the  other  as  the  same,  thereby  overlooking  its
otherness. Rather, it points to the realisation that the
other is “not 'other' to itself”  (Koller, 2004, p. 86) and
is identical to us in that sense. It points to the attempt
to  see  the  other,  as  much  as  possible,  “on  its  own
terms” (idem.).  Given the influence of Næss’ thinking
on Radical Ecology it  is not surprising that Gandhian
elements can be found there. What is rather surprising
is that  Gandhi  or  his  ideas are so seldom mentioned
either in Deep Ecology or in Radical Ecology in general
(T. Weber, 1999).
As I have explained above, the notion of ahimsa in
its  ancient  form,  especially  in  the  context  of  Jainism
was extended towards all  living beings (Aristarkhova,
2012;  Chapple,  1998;  Kumar,  2004;  Long,  2009).
Although Gandhi himself certainly extended ahimsa to
include  all  living  beings  (M.  K.  Gandhi,  1945),  he
referred to ahimsa mostly in the context of his social
struggle. Gandhi adapted ahimsa from a philosophical
notion that he found to be too “negative and passive”
(Parekh, 2001, p. 46) and widened it with ideas from
other religions and secular thinkers that were “activist
and  socially  oriented”  (idem.).  Blended  they  “yielded
the novel idea of an active and positive but detached
and non-emotive love” (idem.). When nonviolence was
used in other contexts, for instance by Khan and King,
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the element of ahimsa (although not always mentioned
by that name) was infused with new notions, such as
the Muslim concept of sabr and the Christian notion of
agape.
I think it is necessary to revive ahimsa’s ancient roots
and  broaden  its  understanding  once  more  in  the
direction of other living beings and nature as a whole.
Radical Ecology shows us, through its internal debates
that social and ecological issues are so intertwined that
in our globalized twenty-first century world they can’t
be taken as separate issues any more (Merchant, 2005).
The  concept  of  ahimsa,  as  developed  through
nonviolent practices and thinking can give clues how to
approach these crises in a way that does justice to the
interrelatedness of the problems. 
Radical ecological movements are often accused of,
and sometimes indeed take, a misanthropic stance. The
notion  of  ahimsa  points  out  that  such  a  stance  is
ultimately  unproductive.  Ahimsa  points  to  the
realisation that the lives of humans and the lives of non-
human species are intertwined and that harm to one
ultimately  amounts  to  harm  of  all.  This  means  that
ecological problems can’t be reasonably solved in a way
that  leaves  no  space  for  humans  to  flourish.  On  the
other  hand,  concrete  changes  in  the  way  humanity
views itself and acts on the planet is necessary for the
natural  world  to  flourish  likewise.  Attitudes  in  which
humanity as a whole, or specific human groups are, for
whatever reason, perceived as superior and therefore
entitled  to  more  resources  or  chances  for  self-
development are likewise unhelpful.  Such attitudes of
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superiority  and  entitlement  exist  in  similar  ways
towards different social groups and to nature.
Ahimsa denotes an attitude towards others in which
we  make  every  effort  not  to  harm  their  chances  of
‘being’, their dignity and chances for self-development,
by consciously changing the way we relate to them, and
by actively cultivating an attitude that helps others to
flourish. The cultivation of such an attitude is no simple
task  as  Gandhi,  Khan,  King  and  Radical  Ecological
thinkers have equally shown. But from the perspective
of  nonviolence  it  is  the  only  way  to  come  to  the
fundamental changes that radical ecology is calling for.
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CHAPTER 5
The Nonviolent Sacrifice
The Role Of Tapasya In Nonviolence
non-violence, combined with the acceptance of suffering, can
move a conflict beyond mutually exclusive antagonism to a shared
sense of responsibility for resolving the conflict.
Ian Atack (2012)
INTRODUCTION 37
According to René Girard, one of the leading thinkers on
the role of sacrifice in human society, violence lies at “the
foundation of the world” as we know it (Girard, 1987). His
theory holds that violence is part of the dynamic of human
communities because human beings are mimetic creatures.
Mimesis, according to Girard, is the unconscious imitation
of  desires  in  which  everyone  is  engaged,  which  leads
people to desire the things their important others desire.
37 
 This chapter article appears as: Goelst Meijer, S.L.E. van: The Nonviolent Sacrifice: The 
Role of Tapasya in Nonviolence. in: Korte, A.M., Poorthuis, M & Duyndam, J.: Sacrifice 
Revisited: Community, Ritual, Identiy, Leiden: Brill,  (forthcoming).
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Because  people  desire  the  same  things  as  the  people
around them, this eventually leads to intense rivalry. This
predicament  would  create  complete  social  chaos,  a
situation of all against all were it not for a periodic release
of  tension  in  the  form  of  violence  against  a  scapegoat.
Blaming a scapegoat for the tension and the violence in the
group  unites  its  members  against  a  common  enemy.  A
sacrifice, then, is a ritualized form of ousting a scapegoat. 
In  his  narrative  on  the  Kapsiki  people  in  Sacrifice
Revisited,  Walter  van  Beek  (forthcoming)  shows  that
sacrifice  can  enhance  the  sense  of  community  and
belonging.  Tensions  and  problems  seem  to  be  reduced
through  such  a  ritual.  According  to  Girard,  this  can  be
explained because the sacrifice is a ritualized reminder of
how previous inter-group violence was reduced by ousting
the  scapegoat.  Furthermore,  it  allows  for  an  accepted
amount  of  violence  to  take  place,  in  a  confined  setting,
which in turn helps to prevent large amounts of violence
from  erupting  within  the  community.  Thus,  sacrifice,
community,  and  violence  (and  temporary  peace)  are
necessarily connected.
That this connection between sacrifice and violence is
only  one  possible  view  on  sacrifice  Kathryn  McClymond
shows  in  her  book  Beyond  Sacred  Violence  (2008).  She
advances that although violence often is a part of sacrifice,
the two are not interchangeable. Because sacrifice, as Van
Beek  suggests  as  well,  plays  such  an  important  role  in
bringing communities together, she urges us to consider a
broader  understanding  of  sacrifice.  Violence  against  a
scapegoat is only one (and as McClymond states: limited)
way in which sacrifice can serve to create unity. 
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 It is noteworthy, in my view, that nonviolence thinkers,
practitioners,  and  movements  often  use  the  image  of
sacrifice. Moreover, in the context of nonviolence thinking
sacrifice  is  also  connected  to  the  strengthening  of
communities.  However,  it  is  not  connected  to  the use of
violence. The question I will try to answer in this article is:
how can we understand the concept and role of sacrifice in
a process of nonviolence? 
In the following paragraphs, I will first briefly introduce
tapasya,  the  term  used  here  to  denote  the  element  of
sacrifice  and  the  acceptance  of  suffering  present  in  all
nonviolent practices. I will then explore Girard’s ideas on
mimesis and sacrifice. I will go on to explore an alternative
reading of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Bible text that,
according to Girard, is chiefly responsible for the creation
of  a  sacrificial  understanding  of  the  Gospels.  However,
Eugene  Webb  suggests  that  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews
points  to  a  different  understanding  of  sacrifice,  tied  to
nonviolence.  By  looking  at  Webb’s  interpretation  of
Hebrews,  and  comparing  his  notion  of  sacrifice  to  the
writings of major nonviolent actors in modern history, we
might  gain  some  insight  into  the  role  of  sacrifice  in
nonviolence thinking. I will show that tapasya points to a
non-sacrificial  (in  Girardian  terms)  understanding  of
sacrifice. In the last sections, I will explain this difference
and draw on the popular uprising against the dictatorship
in the Philippines in the 1980s as a practical example.
NONVIOLENCE
The roots of nonviolence as a way toward (social) change
lie in the work of Mohandas Gandhi, who was the first to
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use mass organized nonviolence to significantly  alter  the
socio-political  reality  of  his  age.  His  understanding  of
nonviolence  included not  merely  the  absence  of  violence
but  also  what  was  to  take  its  place.  He  understood
nonviolence as a concrete tool that could be used to create
change, a tool for which he used the term  satyagraha or
truth-force.  Gandhi  construed  nonviolence  in  a  new,
systematic and pro-active way that made it  applicable to
modern  society.  His  work  directly  inspired  others  like
Martin  Luther  King,  Lanza  del  Vasto  and  Dom  Helder
Camara (see for instance: Alland & Alland, 2001; Ansbro,
2000; Bruns, 2006; Câmara, 1971; Lanza del Vasto, 1974;
G. Williams, 2008) and still functions as a jumping-off point
for many others, individuals or organizations that want to
work with nonviolence. They take up Ghandi’s concepts and
translate them to their own circumstances, expanding and
elaborating on different elements. When looking closely at
these  theories  and practices  of  nonviolence  from around
the world, five core elements emerge that together create a
dynamic framework. These five elements, in their Sanskrit
terms originating from Gandhi’s work, are: satya, or 'truth-
seeking',  ahimsa or  ‘the  absence  of  the  intention  to  do
harm’,  sarvodaya meaning  ‘the  welfare  of  all’,
swadeshi/swaraj which points to autonomy, and tapasya or
self-suffering.  These  are  ancient  religious  terms,
reconceptualised  by  Gandhi  in  a  way  that  made  them
suitable  for  socio-political  action.  As  said  above,  their
meaning  has  expanded  even  more  through  the  work  of
subsequent nonviolence scholars and practitioners.38 Each
38
 Not all nonviolence movements or practitioners use these terms, but the principles that
they represent can be found in all works on nonviolence.
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of these elements is a complex and layered notion and in
this article I cannot do justice to all of them. My focus here
is on the element of tapasya.
TAPASYA
Out  of  the  five  core  elements  of  nonviolence  tapasya  is
perhaps the most difficult to come to terms with, certainly
in a Western context. Its most common translation in the
context  of  nonviolence:  self-suffering,  brings to  mind the
idea  that  nonviolence  involves  accepting  the  violence  or
wrong-doings of the other without responding to them. This
interpretation  is  linked  to  another  common
misinterpretation,  that  of  nonviolence  as  passivity  and
acquiescence  in  the  face  of  conflict  or  injustice  (Roedel,
2007).  In  this  paragraph,  I  will  try  to  show  how  both
tapasya  and  nonviolence  in  general  point  to  something
completely different. 
The Sanskrit term tapasya literally means ‘produced by
heat’,  and  goes  back  to  the  root  tapas meaning  heat,
suffering, or austerity. Kathryn McClymond writes that the
term is already found in the Rig Veda, one of the oldest
Hindu texts, and its meaning evolved from pointing to the
heat of the ritual sacrificial fire to being associated with the
‘inner heat’ of asceticism.
… devotional practices that are understood to generate a
kind of spiritual heat are, in effect, replicating one of the
activities performed in traditional sacrifice: heating, which
is, of course, simultaneously destructive and constructive.
In  traditional  sacrifice  a  distinct  material  substance  is
heated  on  an  outdoor  altar.  In  devotional  practices  an
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internalized,  subtle  substance  is  heated  by  devotional
practices within the body (McClymond, 2008, pp. 156–7).
Thus, tapasya refers to ‘that which is produced by the inner
heat of austerity or suffering’. Over the centuries the term
has  also  come  to  mean  ‘the  undertaking  of  personal
discipline’ and is also translated as self-control, (spiritual)
effort, tolerance, or transformation (see for instance: Adele,
2009).
TAPASYA IN NONVIOLENCE
In Gandhi’s  work, tapasya is one of  the key aspects of a
nonviolent  process.  Nonviolence  is  to  Gandhi  a  spiritual
quest as much as a socio-political one. In fact, he does not
view  those  two  realms  as  truly  separate.  The  quest  for
truth, which he sees as the essence of his work, is a quest
for  God  or  Ultimate  Reality.  His  goal  is  to  attain
enlightenment (M. K. Gandhi, 1927a). But, Gandhi realizes,
such  an  internal  quest  for  truth  is  meaningless  without
living up to it in the public realm. 
Because self-purification is an essential element in the
attainment of enlightenment in the Hindu tradition, Gandhi
takes  a  vow  of  asceticism  which  forms  the  base  of  his
tapasya.39 However,  in  the  course  of  his  lifetime,  his
understanding  of  this  vow  changes.  From  the  vow  of
celibacy  and  abstinence  of  an  earnest  spiritual  seeker,
Gandhi comes to regard it as a mode of conduct that has
important socio-political implications. Likewise, in a more
general sense, his understanding of tapasya changes from a
39
  This vow is called Brahmacharya in the Hindu tradition and is a vow to lead a life of
religious seeking and includes restrictions on diet, conduct and possessions.
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purely  personal  process  of  purification  to  an  essential
element in a nonviolent process of social change.
In  his  writings,  Gandhi  uses  the  term  tapasya  in
different ways, even though it always contains elements of
its  original  meaning  of  purification  through  internal
suffering, and of sacrifice and transformation. He subverts
the ‘reasonable’  idea of  eliminating suffering for oneself,
and throughout his writings provides different motivations
for doing so.  One of the motivations is that it  can easily
become  an  excuse  for  using  violence.  If  eliminating
suffering  from  one’s  life  is  a  reasonable  motivation  for
doing things, it can become a reason to inflict suffering on
others. Tapasya is thus a way of directing attention away
from the self. 
Furthermore,  Gandhi  uses  tapasya  to  refer  to  the
process of overcoming fear, specifically the fear of suffering
and death, and to the cultivation of self-discipline (Groves,
2000). He wants practitioners of nonviolence to give up the
habit  to  ‘fight  or  flight’,  and  to  commit  themselves  to
nonviolent behaviour under all circumstances, while staying
put in the situation and addressing the conflict or injustice
at hand. Part of that process is the firm internal struggle to
overcome ill will against the opponent, and even taking this
one step further by cultivating love for the adversary. This
is  a  moral  standpoint,  but  it  also  has  a  very  practical
aspect. The willingness to suffer instead of retaliating when
being  confronted  with  violence  or  injustice  is  the  only
attitude that breaks a cycle of violence. Justice can only be
won,  so  states  Gandhi,  by  a  love  that  does  not  impose
suffering on the (unjust) other.
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Related  to  this  is  the  understanding  of  tapasya  as  a
means to ‘penetrate the heart’  of  those to whom we are
appealing.  Gandhi  uses  tapasya  as  a  tool  to  make  the
suffering visible by undergoing it openly. Gandhi wants to
demonstrate that the injustices people face are afflicted on
them by other humans. By making this visible, it becomes
clear that because it is perpetrated by other people it can
also be corrected, the injustice can be stopped (Tercheck,
2011). But for that to happen, the injustice first has to be
acknowledged.  He argues that appealing to reason alone
sometimes is not enough to get the message across. Visible
“suffering”, he argues, “opened the eyes of understanding”
(Steger, 2006, p. 344). 
As Gandhi  sees it,  tapasya is a complex and dynamic
element.  Separately,  suffering  and  love  are  not  enough.
Simply loving your opponent without an attempt at change
is impotent. Suffering by itself has very little value, and if
accompanied  by  hatred  and  anger  would  even  be
counterproductive (Parekh, 2001). Combined they instigate
action and change. One has to actively engage in tapasya
and be willing to suffer for one’s goal, refusing to comply
with  untruth  and  accepting  the  consequences  (Brown &
Parel,  2011).  Thus,  tapasya  is  a  medium  of  change  and
transformation of oneself, the opponent, and the situation
at large. 
The concepts of sacrifice and suffering are also central to
the work of Martin Luther King, who was deeply inspired
by Gandhi, but in a much more psychological way (Groves,
2000).  King  describes  his  nonviolent  philosophy  in  his
article  An  Experiment  in  Love  (M.  L.  King,  1990).  Like
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Gandhi, he stresses the importance of accepting suffering
and  giving  up  all  inclinations  to  self-preservation  as  the
essence of nonviolence:
that  [which]  characterizes  nonviolent  resistance  is  a
willingness  to  accept  suffering  without  retaliation,  to
accept  blows  from the  opponent  without  striking  back.
“Rivers  of  blood  may  have  to  flow  before  we  gain  our
freedom,  but  it  must  be our  blood”,  Gandhi  said to  his
countrymen.  The nonviolent resister is  willing to accept
violence if necessary, but never to inflict it. He does not
seek to doge jail. If going to jail is necessary, he enters it
as “a bridegroom enters the bride’s chamber (M. L. King,
1990, p. 18)
 
According to King, nonviolent resistance led people to self-
respect, courage, and inner strength (Groves, 2000), which
he  called  the  emergence  of  a  new  kind  of  power.  King
wrote:
Humanity  is  waiting  for  something  other  than  blind
imitation of the past. If we want truly to advance a step
further (…) we must begin to turn mankind away from the
long and desolate night of violence. May it not be that the
new man the world needs is a nonviolent man? (…) This
not only will make us new men, but will give us a new kind
of power (…). It will be power infused by love and justice
(M. L. King, 2001, p. 332)
How can we understand this ‘new kind of power’ as a social
and  psychological  reality?  Here  I  turn  to  Kenneth
Boulding’s  analysis  of  power,  in  which  he  distinguishes
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integrative power as the kind of  power both Gandhi  and
King talk about.
INTEGRATIVE POWER
Power is sometimes related to the ability to make others do
what we want (M. Weber, 1991). In a more general sense,
peace scholar Kenneth Boulding states, it is the ability to
“get  things  done”  (Boulding,  1990,  p.  15).  According  to
Boulding, power can be exercised in three different ways,
depending on the consequences. These three ways he calls
the ‘faces’ of power. First he discerns threat power, which
can be paraphrased as: “You do something I want or I’ll do
something  you  don’t  want”  (Boulding,  1999,  p.  10).  It
underlies all forms of punishment and retaliation. 
The  second  form  of  power  is  exchange power,  the
power to produce and trade. This is paraphrased as: “Give
me something I want and I’ll give you something you want”
(Nagler,  2004,  p.  29).  Together  the  first  and the  second
form are often called ‘the carrot and the stick’. The third
kind of power is called integrative power. It is the power to
create relationships and bring people together. Integrative
power  can  be  summarized  as:  “I’m  going  to  do  what  I
believe is right, something authentic, and we will end up
closer” (Nagler, 2004, p. 29). For Boulding (1990, 1999),
from  the  three  ‘faces’  or  ways  of  wielding  power,
integrative power is the most important. Integrative power
is  the  power  of  human  relationships.  It  is  connected  to
everything  that  establishes  a  relationship  either  on  a
personal  level  or  in  the  form  of  institutions  or
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organizations. Love, respect, legitimacy and consent are all
expressions of integrative power. 
In everyday life most forms of exercising power consist
of  a  combination  of  the  three  faces.  But  there  is  a
difference in emphasis in various areas. Exchange power is
most  prominently  present  in  anything  connected  to  the
economy,  but  also  to  anything  in  which  incentives  (the
carrot) are used to get things done. Yet also legitimacy and
trust, both forms of integrative power, play a huge role in
the  stock  exchange,  and  without  regulations  and  the
penalties  to  back  them  up  production  and  trade  cannot
proceed. Threat power is present not only in the military
but wherever some form of penalty is used to make things
happen (the stick).  The military symbolizes threat power,
but  cannot  exist  without  exchange power in  the form of
money, nor without integrative power in the form of morale
and legitimacy. Underlying all forms of power is integrative
power. Systems and institutions can only function if people
cooperate. Even in the most rigid dictatorship, as soon as
enough people stop cooperating, the system collapses. 
Since  all  human  beings  exist  within  relationships,
integrative  power  is  open  to  all,  even  to  those  who  are
traditionally assumed to have no power. “It is this definition
of  power,  as  a  process  that  occurs  in  relationships,  that
gives us the possibility of empowerment” (Page & Czuba,
1999).  Both  Gandhi  and  King  asserted  that  the  kind  of
power  used  in  processes  of  nonviolence  can  emerge  by
being authentic and truthful and by going through the inner
process of shifting our sense of personhood away from our
self and giving up our inclination to enhance or preserve
our own interests.
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For a better  understanding  of  these  ideas,  it  may be
worthwhile  to  look  more  in-depth  at  the  views  of  René
Girard, who connects sacrifice to violence. Furthermore, we
may examine the work of Eugene Webb, who provides an
alternative reading of some of Girard’s sources,  one that
points more towards nonviolence.
RENÉ GIRARD: MIMETIC DESIRE
René Girard is one of the leading thinkers on the role of
violence  and  sacrifice  in  human  society.  His  theory  of
mimetic desire describes how and why humanity is locked
in  an  on-going  cycle  of  violence,  even  though  we  find
(temporary)  ways to  limit  violence to a minimum. Girard
claims that violence lies at the “foundation of the world” as
we know it (Girard, 1987). At the heart of Girard’s theory is
the  concept  of  mimetic  desire.  Simply  put,  it  is  the
unconscious  tendency  present  in  all  human  beings  to
imitate  the  desires  of  significant  others.  In  other  words,
people  desire  things  because  important  people  around
them (models) desire them. This leads to conflict because
the model becomes a rival with whom we have to compete,
or so it seems, for the object of our desire. Because mimesis
happens in every person, these conflicts can become so all-
pervasive  in  communities  that  they  destroy  the  societal
structure if they are not restrained in time.
Girard states that our deepest desire is actually not for
objects – our deepest desire is to be (J. G. Williams, 1996,
p.  227). Ultimately,  we  are  not  really  interested  in  the
actual object that our models desire, but in their ‘being’, or
as Oughourlian (2010) puts it, in their autonomy, or sense
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of self. Powerful others make us feel they know ‘how to be’,
and  that  the  things  they  desire  support  them  in  their
‘being’.  People  desire  what  important  others  desire,
because they feel those things will in turn support them in
their own ‘being’ (Roedel, 2010; J. G. Williams, 1996). They
do not realize that the desires of the model are mimetic as
well, tied to the desires of yet another model. 
Early in their evolution, human beings discovered that if
rising tensions and violence are diverted and laid upon a
victim,  they  are  relieved  in  the  rest  of  the  group.  This
process of victimization is called scapegoating. A person or
a group, appearing to be vulnerable for some reason, gets
blamed  for  the  tensions  and  violence  that  exists  in  the
community (J. G. Williams, 1996). Then, through the same
process  of  mimesis,  the  blame  and  hatred  against  this
scapegoat become shared feelings within the community.
Former rivals become new allies by ‘ganging up’  against
the  common  enemy.  The  scapegoat  is  driven  out  of  the
community, defeated or marginalized. His or her well-being
is sacrificed to preserve the well-being of the group. This
leads to a temporary relief from the violence and animosity,
but  since  nothing  has  really  changed  (people  remain
mimetic beings) the process is bound to repeat itself in the
future. Imperative in this process is that the people who as
a group sacrifice the scapegoat are ignorant of what they
are doing. For the mechanism to work it is necessary that
the group is convinced that the victim is rightfully blamed.
This, however, makes anyone a potential scapegoat at some
point. Because ousting the scapegoat is only a temporary
solution, somewhere in the future a new victim will (have
to) be found to once more release the tension. 
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Societies have found different ways of dealing with this
threat, for instance through laws, but also through ritual
sacrifice.  Such a ritual,  in  which not a  real  victim but  a
substitute  is  sacrificed,  serves,  according to  Girard,  as a
reminder of the actual moment of scapegoating. It reminds
the audience of both the initial violence and the peace that
came after the scapegoat was sacrificed. Furthermore, such
a ritual serves as a temporary outlet for the violence in the
group,  in  a  contained  setting.  But  these  systems  of
restraint,  in turn, help to keep the scapegoat mechanism
hidden and thus contribute to the necessary continuation of
sacrifice.  Whenever  the  system  suffers  from  stress,  or
collapses, real violence may once more flare up, leading to
real victims. What might work to end this cycle of violence,
in  Girard’s  vision,  is  the  public  discovery  and
understanding of the scapegoat mechanism. Understanding
the  mechanism  and  its  consequences  would  provide
humanity with a rational choice to act differently.
JESUS’ SACRIFICE
According  to  Girard,  the  Jewish  prophetic  tradition  was
evolving  towards  the  discovery  and  disclosure  of  the
scapegoat mechanism (Girard, 1987).  The life of  Jesus of
Nazareth, in his view, is the culmination of that process.
Girard  states  that  the  death  of  Jesus  on  the  cross  was
meant to lay bare the mimetic process by providing a public
example,  and  not  as  a  sacrifice  to  appease  God  (as
interpreted in  modern Christianity)  (Girard,  1986).  Jesus’
innocence is so very obvious that when he is picked as a
scapegoat, “violence reveals its own game” (Girard, 1987,
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p.  205).  However,  as  Girard  states,  the  revelation  was
“more than its  recipients could bear” (Webb, 2005, p. 1)
and,  in  time,  the  Gospels  were  being  interpreted  in  a
sacrificial way. This helped to create a Christian tradition
that revolved mostly around the sacrifice of Jesus who died
on the cross to wash away the sins of the world. And so,
instead of uncovering the scapegoat mechanism for society
at large and instigating a paradigm shift, the narrative of
Jesus, interpreted in a sacrificial way, actually helps to keep
the process hidden. Girard sees the Epistle to the Hebrews
as the main biblical text in which this misinterpretation was
made. Because of this misinterpretation, even in our society
today  processes  of  scapegoating  and  sacrifice  and  the
violence that accompanies them can be found everywhere.
This sacrificial  violence is  tied, according to Girard,  to a
form of self-preservation in which the violence is laid on the
other, a scapegoat, to get rid of it in our own society.
Interestingly enough, Eugene Webb, emeritus professor
of  International  Studies  and Comparative Religion  at  the
University  of  Washington,  has  a  very  different
interpretation  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  and claims
Girard  has  made  an  oversight  (Webb,  2005).  In  fact,  in
Webb’s interpretation,  the sacrifice in Hebrews points  to
nonviolence.
THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS
The Epistle to the Hebrews, a Bible text consisting of an
anonymous, early Christian homily, depicts a community of
believers in the middle of a hostile environment (Attridge,
2012). The text’s aim is to affirm and inspire the faith of the
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community  in  difficult  times  and  motivate  the  people  to
remain steadfast (Attridge, 2012; Richardson, 2012). It is
the only  book in  the New Testament  in  which sacrificial
imagery takes such a central place, and the text is often
interpreted in a literal way, as pointing to the necessity of
sacrificial  offerings  (Gelardini,  2005).  Eugene  Webb
suggests  that  Girard  correctly  states  that  the  traditional
reading of Hebrews is sacrificial. But, according to Webb,
Girard himself makes the same mistake. Instead, the text
should  be  read  metaphorically.  Not  the  author  of  the
Epistle to the Hebrews misunderstood the story of Jesus but
the medieval interpreters of the text. Webb states that in
fact the author of Hebrews urged his intended audience to
live a nonviolent life, and that the metaphors would have
been well understood at the time (Webb, 2005).40 
To  show  the  metaphoric  meaning  of  the  sacrifice  in
Hebrews,  Webb  starts  by  re-interpreting  some  key
elements of the text. The first is the image of Jesus as the
son of God. In the Jewish community of the first century,
Webb claims, referring to someone as the son of God did
not necessarily mean that this person was seen as divine. It
referred to either a person who was living in accordance
with the laws of God or a calling upon people to do so. In
that latter sense it was also used for the people of Israel as
a  whole.  It  was  a  call  upon  the  Israelites  to  live
righteously.41 
40 In recent years  René Girard has himself  come to a similar  insight  and mentions in  an
interview that his conclusions on the Epistle to the Hebrews, based on the sacrificial language
alone, has been a misinterpretation. See: (Adams & Girard, 1993). See also: Hardin (1992).
41 For a comprehensive outline of the Semitic use of the term “son of God” and its use in the
Hebrew Bible and among the early Christians, see S. Herbert Bess (1965). 
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To say in the first century Jewish milieu that Jesus was
‘son of God’ was to say that he truly fulfilled the calling of
Israel to live in sonship to God (Webb, 2005, p. 4). 
Webb’s claim is substantiated by other scholars, who note
that  in  the  Semitic  context  of  the  Hebrew Bible  ‘son’  is
often  used  to  denote  close  affiliation,  not  just  literal
sonship. 
In  Semitic  usage  “sonship”  is  a  conception  somewhat
loosely employed to denote moral rather than physical or
metaphysical relationship. Thus “sons of Belial” (Jg 19:22
etc.) are wicked men, not descendants of Belial; and in the
NT  the  “children  of  the  bride  chamber”  are  wedding
guests. So a “son of God” is a man, or even a people, who
reflect the character of God (Hastings, 2005, p. 143). 
Also, the term ‘son of God’ seems to indicate metaphorically
leaders and rulers, ‘the first among their people’, who were
thought to be exemplary and who based their authority in
God  (Aherne,  1912).  Likewise,  Webb  states,  we  should
regard the image of sacrifice in Hebrews in a metaphorical
way. Hebrews does not portray Jesus as fulfilling a sacrifice
of atonement,  to appease God or to mitigate the mimetic
violence.  Jesus  is  not  portrayed  as  fighting  for  his  own
survival  but  as  choosing  to  lay  bare  the  scapegoat
mechanism by undergoing it, so that others might see it for
what it is. The sacrifice consists in the surrender of his own
well-being. But this is not to say that he sacrificed himself
in the traditional (Girardian) sense.
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Raymund  Schwager,  a  theologian  and  Girardian
scholar, supports this view (Schwager, 1999).42 He states
that  the  author  of  Hebrews  uses  the  notion  of  sacrifice
metaphorically  and  is  thus  able,  “through  a  massive
hermeneutical reinterpretation” (Schwager, 1999, p. 183),
to give it a completely new meaning. Jesus answers the call
to  live  in  sonship  by  not  fighting  his  opponents  and  by
suffering the crucifixion willingly. He sees his opponents as
people  who  do  not  really  know what  they  are  doing.  In
Girardian  terms,  they  act  under  the  influence  of  the
mimetic  process and,  like most  people,  are not aware of
that. Jesus is aware of it and thus he is able to see them as
victims along with him. 
He himself [Jesus] was a victim insofar as he was killed
and  they  were  victims  in  killing,  insofar  as  they  were
under the spell of an external power. For him, then, killing
was an act done both to him and to them, even if in very
differing ways (Schwager, 1999, p. 187). 
Thus,  Jesus  stands  no  longer  in  opposition  to  his
antagonists.  He sides with all  the victims of the mimetic
mechanism  and  undergoes  the  scapegoat  mechanism
together with them. From that angle, the division between
perpetrator and victim of violence ceases to exist. Through
this action Jesus transforms the passivity that is inherent in
the mimetic process. “Suffering which is affirmed becomes
a new form of activity” (Schwager, 1999, p. 187). This inner
transformation  is  what  the  author  of  the  Epistle  to  the
42 Based on Schwagers theory, Poong-In Lee (2011) comes to the conclusion that not only is a
non-sacrificial readig of Hebrews possible, in fact it is one of the Bible texts that to a large 
extent supports Girard's theories.
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Hebrews metaphorically calls a sacrifice. Schwager points
out that this is not a simple act of self-destruction. Jesus
complies with the actions of his antagonists, but not with
their motives. “Jesus' judges and his executioners wanted
to punish a criminal; he himself on the other hand wanted
to give himself (…) for the many” (Schwager, 1999, p. 187).
TAPASYA AS NON-SACRIFICIAL SACRIFICE
In  their  writings  on  nonviolence,  both  Gandhi  and  King
speak of the role of sacrifice and the dedication of one’s life
to  the  well-being  of  all,  rather  than  adhering  to  self-
preservation at the expense of the other, something Girard
himself  calls  “unanimity  minus  one”  (1979,  p.  259).  The
sacrifice that tapasya refers to is the creation of a situation
in which the humanity of all people can rise to the surface.
Schwager’s  example  of  Jesus’  identification  with  his
opponents  points  in  this  direction  (Schwager,  1999).  By
regarding  them not  as  opponents,  but  as  fellow victims,
their humanity is stressed and rivalry is diminished. Roedel
adds to this:
Within  mimetic  theory,  this  requirement  of  absolute
nonviolence, renouncing vengeance and even self-defence,
derives from an understanding of violence as arising from
rivalries that the parties involved are unable to recognize.
It  denies  the  commonly  held  distinction  between  self-
defence  and  the  violence  that  one  initiates,  because  it
holds that both are the product of rivalries in which all
parties are responsible (Roedel, 2010, p. 2). 
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Moreover,  Gandhi  and  King  assert  that  such  a  shift  in
personhood, away from the self, leads to the emergence of
a different kind of power or force, which can be harnessed
to  achieve  tremendous  results.  Both  Gandhi  and  King
understand nonviolence as essentially the wielding of this
force,  which  Boulding  calls  integrative  power  (Boulding,
1990). To Gandhi and King, nonviolence is concerned with
both the (internal) process of bringing out this power and
the (external) process of implementing it. 
From this concept of integrative power we can come to
an understanding of why sacrificing the self is not the same
as self-sacrifice. It is a transformative process that rests on
a profound understanding of the self as relational, in which
hurting another person ultimately means hurting the self,
and vice versa, since self  and other are intertwined. The
intentional  aspect  of  tapasya then  becomes  clear.  It
indicates  a  sacrifice  of  the  'separated'  self  with  the
intention  to  benefit  'the  whole'  (sarvodaya)43.  Sacrificing
the self is a transformative process that leads to and rests
on integrative power and includes a conception of the self
as relational. The shift of focus is not towards self-negation,
but  rather  towards  relationship.  A  sacrifice  of  the  self,
made with the intention to benefit 'the whole' with an aim
to intensify the relation between the whole and the self is
completely different from self-sacrifice.
Girard posits that it is possible to interpret the Gospels
in  either  a  sacrificial  or  non-sacrificial  way.  In  a  similar
vein, I propose there can be a non-sacrificial way of looking
at  the  concept  of  sacrifice  itself.  According  to  Eugene
43 For a more in-depth discussion of the term sarvodaya and its use and role in nonviolence
see chapter 1 in this book.
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Webb,  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  should  be  read  as  a
metaphor. The sacrifice that is mentioned in the text does
not point to a literal sacrifice in the Girardian sense, but to
the sacrifice of ‘self’, which happens through a process of
(self-)transformation. I suggest that tapasya in nonviolence,
which invokes sacrificial imagery, refers to precisely such a
non-sacrificial sacrifice.
Although  neither  Gandhi  nor  King  use  any  of  the
Girardian terms, the role of tapasya or self-suffering they
describe is  to expose  the working of  violence  in  specific
situations  so  that  a  transformation  becomes  possible
(Roedel, 2008). For this, as Gandhi has pointed out, reason
alone  is  not  enough.  For  the  mechanism  to  become
consciously understood it has to be made clearly visible. To
become  free  from  the  imprisonment  of  the  mimetic
mechanism, one needs to develop insight into its structure
and to be willing to give up all the ‘normal’ comforts that it
brings,  among  which  are  a  sense  of  power,  a  sense  of
‘fitting  in’,  and  a  sense  of  being  protected  from intense
vulnerability. Giving up ‘normalcy’ can certainly feel like a
sacrifice, and this is what tapasya refers to (Hudson, 2001).
Girard  himself  remains  sceptical  about  the  practical
realities of a nonviolent society, but he states that it could
only  emerge  when  people  continuously  refuse  to  act  in
accordance  with  it:  “Only  the  unconditional  and,  if
necessary,  unilateral  renunciation  of  violence can put  an
end  to  [mimetic  rivalry]”  (Girard,  1987,  p.  197).  He
continues  to  state  that  “it  means  the  complete  and
definitive elimination of every form of vengeance and every
form of reprisal in relations between men (Girard, 1987, p.
197).  I  maintain  that  the  practice  of  nonviolence  is  an
155
attempt at the first and that tapaysa points to the second
statement.
How  then  can  we  translate  the  above  into  concrete
notions for the study and practice of nonviolence today? To
answer  that  question  it  might  be  helpful  to  look  at  a
practical example of a nonviolent movement in which this
dynamics has played a central role.
ALAY DANGAL
One of the problems nonviolence thinkers and practitioners
are facing is the absence of a positive term for nonviolence
as a practice and an attitude. There is no term in use today
that captures the wielding of integrative power as well as
the attitude of serving the whole rather than preserving the
self.  This  means  that  in  many  instances  practitioners  of
nonviolence have come up with their own terms to describe
their efforts. During the people’s uprising in the Philippines
against the regime of president Marcos in the 1980s, the
term  of  choice  was  alay  dangal,  Tagalog  for  'to  offer
dignity'.44 The nonviolent struggle of the Philippine people,
aided  by  the  International  Fellowship  of  Reconciliation
(IFOR)  and grassroots  organizations  tied  to  the  Catholic
Church, came to rest on the practice of offering dignity.45
According to the movement’s  organizers,  the Catholic
teachings held that human dignity was given to each and
every individual and was unalterable and inextinguishable.
44
 Tagalog is one of the main languages spoken in the Philippines.
45
 CORD-Mindanao, AKKAPKA and NAMFRE among others. For more information see Zunes
(1999).
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In  the  contemporary  situation  of  dictatorship  and
oppression,  however,  this  dignity  of  the  people  was
ignored.  Inspired  by  the  work  of  both  Gandhi  and King,
which rests on a relational worldview in which one’s dignity
is tied up with that of all others, the organizers felt this also
meant  the  oppressors  ignored  and diminished  their  own
dignity.  In other words, the Philippine community was in
need  of  the  restoration  of  its  dignity.  Restoring  dignity
through offering it to every person would become the way
to resist. 
The movement itself was one form of offering dignity,
embodying  the  refusal  to  live  under  undignified
circumstances  any  longer.  The  practice  of  alay  dangal
involved  the  willingness  of  the  protesters  to  suffer  the
retaliations of the regime, forgoing their own safety, fear
and anger. It also meant that the resisters kept addressing
the soldiers, who were sent to contain and beat down the
protests,  as  individuals  instead  of  representatives  of  the
military.  In  other  words,  they  addressed  them  not  as
opponents  but  as  fellow  humans.  The  resisters  offered
gestures  of  friendship,  such  as  the  sharing  of  food,  and
refused  to  resort  to  any form of  humiliation,  violence  or
degradation.  Eventually,  this  led many soldiers  to  desert
and  join  the  uprising,  unwilling  as  they  were  to  answer
dignity  with  violence  and  humiliation.  Desertions
subsequently escalated to such an extent that the Marcos
regime fled the country (see for instance: Sasaran, 2006). 
This dynamic of dignity and humiliation forms the core
of the work of Evelin Lindner,  the Founding President of
Human  Dignity  and  Humiliation  Studies.46 In  her  view,
46 
See also: www.humiliationstudies.org
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humiliation  is  the  essence  of  violence,  dignity  being  its
opposite.  Perhaps  surprisingly,  Lindner  ties  dignity  to
humility  and maintains that they are very closely  related
and, moreover, that humility and dignity provide healing for
humiliation and violence.
While  humiliation  is  painful,  a  closely  related  word,
namely  humility,  points  at  healing,  particularly  in  a
normative  context  that  is  defined  by  human  rights.
Inclusive and shared humility, embedded in relationships
of  mutual  respectful  connection,  can  heal  wounds  of
humiliation  and  prevent  future  mayhem.  Arrogant
dominators need to be met with respect and not subjected
to  humiliation—they  need  to  be  humbled  into  adopting
shared humility and mutual recognition of equal dignity.
Victims who feel humiliated, do not undo this humiliation
by  brutal  arrogation of  superiority  over  their  perceived
humiliators, but by inviting everybody into mutuality, into
connecting  in  shared,  wise  humility  (Lindner,  2006,  p.
173). 
Humility  is  not  the  same  as  self-humiliation.  Rather,  it
points to a secure sense of self, self-dignity, and so being
able to draw the focus away from the self. By consciously
‘offering’ dignity to everyone around (even to those whom
we  might  feel  do  not  deserve  it),  we  cut  through  the
vertical  conceptions  of  humanity  that  are  so  intertwined
with  mechanisms  of  violence  and  scapegoating.  We
sacrifice  our  self-preserving  tendencies,  our  habitual
patterns  tied  to  our  fears  of  being  too  vulnerable  and
powerless.  As  Girard showed,  these  tendencies  run deep
and the risk of being vulnerable is real, but letting go of
them leads to a transformation in the direction of a truer
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sense of autonomy, another way of ‘being’ and a different
kind of power. This dynamic of sacrificing the self for the
shared dignity of all people, bringing integrative power to
the  surface,  is  captured  in  alay  dangal,  that  is  to  say,
creating an example of nonviolence as a life stance in which
tapasya, an attitude of humility, sacrificing the desire-self
and offering dignity (and the study of how to do this) are
central. 
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CHAPTER 6
Interdependent Independence
Swadeshi/Swaraj as Relational Autonomy in
Nonviolence
For those who wish to change themselves and thereby
change the world, neither thought nor action poses a
problem. 
M. Paranjape (2009)
INTRODUCTION47 
With this  article  I  aim to  show the  specific  function
swadeshi/swaraj has in a process of nonviolence. It is
often  assumed  that  the  pursuance  for  swaraj
(autonomy)  through  swadeshi  (self-sufficiency)  was
specific for the Indian struggle for independence,  led
by Gandhi (see for instance: Gonsalves, 2010, 2012). In
this article I will try to show why I disagree with this
assumption.  I  will  argue  that  swadeshi  and  swaraj
combined, are a necessary element in nonviolence, no
47 
 This chapter is submitted as: Goelst Meijer, S.L.E. van, Interdependent 
Independence: Swadeshi/Swaraj as Relational Autonomy in Nonviolence, to: Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.
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matter which context it is practised in. Together, I will
argue, the terms point to a specific form of autonomy.
In this article I will try to show what this specific form
of autonomy implies in nonviolence. In addition, I aim
to show in this article that, although nonviolence as a
tool for change is often seen as something that is useful
only at the socio-political level, it can also be used for
creating  change  at  the  interpersonal  level  and  that
although  swadeshi/swaraj  takes  on  a  different  shape
there, the essential process is still the same. To do so I
will  examine  Nonviolent  Resistance  (NVR),  a  method
for  working  with  troubled  adolescents  developed  by
Israeli  psychologist  Haim Omer  (2004,  2011).  In  his
method,  the  element  of  swadeshi/swaraj  plays  a
significant role.
It is important to note that I use the term nonviolence
here not to point to the absence of violence, but rather
to a substantial method for creating change.
The  development  of  nonviolence  from  a  religious
and philosophical notion towards a method for change
started in the 19th century with the works of Thoreau,
Tolstoy,  Marshall  and Day  and others  (Barak,  2003),
culminating in the work of Mohandas Gandhi, who for
the  first  time  used  mass  organized  nonviolence  to
create large-scale social  and political  change,  first  in
South Africa and later in India. Gandhi based himself
on religious teachings from various traditions as well as
on the work of (near) contemporary thinkers. However,
for  Gandhi  nonviolence  never  lost  its  religious  and
philosophical  roots.  According  to  him,  outer  change
rested on inner change and nonviolence was both a way
of life as well as a tool towards humanization.
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Gandhi’s work has been an inspiration and jumping-
off point for many nonviolence movements in the world.
From  the  Civil  Rights  movement  in  the  U.S.  led  by
Martin Luther King, to the Philippine uprising against
General Marcos, the Polish Solidaridad movement led
by  Lech  Walenza  and  many  more  (see  for  instance:
Ansbro, 2000; Zunes et al., 1999).
Each  nonviolent  movement,  individual  or
organization  took  up  Gandhi’s  concepts  directly  or
indirectly,   and  translated  them  to  their  own
circumstances,  expanding  and  elaborating  different
elements. This has led to the emergence of a nonviolent
paradigm  that  constitutes  a  coherent  set  of  values,
assumptions  practices  and  ideas  about  reality.  Thus,
nonviolence is not just a method for social struggle, but
also an integrated way of 'being in the world'. 
Analysing  this  nonviolence  paradigm,  I  find  five
central  elements:  Satya  (truth  seeking),  ahimsa  (the
absence  of  the  intention  to  harm),  tapasya  (self-
suffering),  sarvodaya  (the  welfare  of  all) and
swadeshi/swaraj  (relational  autonomy).  These  five
elements,  in  their  Sanskrit  terms  originating  from
Gandhi’s  work,  together  form  a  dynamic  framework,
that forms the core of contemporary nonviolence. This
does not mean that each individual or group working
with nonviolence necessarily uses all these terms, but it
does  mean  that  the  elements  themselves  are  always
present.  Each  of  these  elements  is  a  complex  and
layered notion and in this article I cannot do justice to
all  of  them.  My  focus  here  is  on  the  element  of
swadeshi/swaraj.
In  the  following  sections  I  will  first  clarify  the
concepts  swadeshi  and  swaraj  independently,  by
163
tracing  the  history  and  different  uses  of  the  terms.
Then, I will explain why I take them together as one of
the fundamental elements in nonviolence by comparing
them  to  a  similar  notion  that  in  recent  years  has
developed in a western context: relational autonomy. I
will  then explore Haim Omer’s method of  Nonviolent
Resistance to further investigate the specific function of
swadeshi/swaraj in contemporary nonviolence.
SWADESHI 
In its  most  literal  sense  swadeshi  means  'from one’s
own'  (swa-)  'country'  (-deshi),  though  the  most
commonly used direct translation is self-reliance (Cox,
2007).  The  term  is  also  often  used  in  an  economic
sense, for instance in relation to Gandhian economics48
(Joseph & Mahodaya, 2011), where it points to the use
and consumption of products of local origin (Dasgupta,
1996) but also to the “value in indigenous-ness” (Cox,
2007, p. 112).
In the Indian struggle  for  independence  the term
was first used in the Bengal49 anti-partition movement
(L. Trivedi, 2007). This movement started as a reaction
to the decision of the British colonial regime to split the
region, which was the most important centre of Indian
nationalism  at  that  moment,  in  two  parts.  Although
officially the measure was said to be for administrative
48 A school of economic thought based on the principles for socio-economic justice as
expounded by Gandhi, connected with the ideas of some of the thinkers that Gandhi
drew inspiration  from,  like  Henri  David  Thoreau  and  John Ruskin.  In  the European
context Ernst Friederich Schumacher (1993) is one of the most well-known thinkers in
this field.
49 Bengal is an Indian state, of which Calcutta is the capital. However, ethnically and
culturally the region Bengal also includes what is today Bangladesh.
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reasons, it was clear to many that it was an attempt to
curb Bengal nationalism (Sartori, 2003). The Swadeshi
Movement  (1903-1908)  that  erupted  in  protest
consisted  of  a  boycott  of  British  goods.  Because
Britain’s colonisation of India was mostly economically
motivated  it  made  sense  to  rebel  economically.
Historically,  cotton  fabrics  were  one  of  India’s  most
famous  products  and  played  a  big  part  in  its
colonization (L. Trivedi, 2007). In the early eighteenth
century  Britain  exported  large  amounts  of  Indian
fabrics to Europe and other parts of Asia. The profits of
this  trade  helped  to  finance  the  British
industrialization,  which  eventually  made  it  more
profitable  to  export  only  raw  cotton  from  India  and
weave  the  fabrics  in  British  factories.  In  the  early
nineteenth century the flow of products was reversed
and Lancashire had become the world’s textile centre
instead of India (Gonsalves, 2010). British-made textiles
from Indian cotton, machine-woven and much cheaper,
were  exported  to  India,  effectively  destroying  the
indigenous  Indian  textile  market.  Boycotting  British
fabrics, therefore, became one of the focal points of the
first Swadeshi Movement.
The second Swadeshi Movement, led by Gandhi (1920
onwards),  draws  inspiration  from  the  previous
movement,  but  has  a  much  broader  aim.  As  is  his
custom, Gandhi expands on the original meaning of the
term and infuses it with spiritual, psychological, ethical
and  practical  meanings  that  make  it  applicable  in
various circumstances (Cox, 2007).
Although  it  becomes  much  more  than  just  an
economic concept  (Bondurant,  1965; Dasgupta,  1996;
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Pandharipande, 2011; L. Trivedi, 2007), the economic
element  remains  important  in  Gandhi’s  use  of
swadeshi.  His  Swadeshi  Movement  is  part  of  the
struggle for independence (swaraj, which I will discuss
below),  and  Gandhi  is  convinced  that  true
independence can’t come about, if India is not able to
care for  itself  economically.  But,  in  Gandhi’s  opinion
economic self-sufficiency is not to be understood only at
the national level. In fact, for Gandhi, self-sufficiency on
the national level is not possible without self-sufficiency
at  the  community  and  individual  level.  Therefore,
Gandhi emphasizes the constructive side of swadeshi,
much more than the first Swadeshi Movement. In the
second movement cotton also takes a central place, but
Gandhi  focuses  more  on  the  production  and  use  of
Khadi, hand spun and hand woven cotton, than only on
the boycott of British-made cloth.
The obstructive side,  the various forms of  protest
against  and  non-cooperation  with  violence  and
injustice, is clearly present in a boycott. But Gandhi is
adamant  that  each  nonviolent  effort  should  have  a
constructive  element  as  well,  which  is  perhaps  even
more important than the obstructive (A. Gandhi, 1997;
M. K. Gandhi, 1927b; Nagler, 2004). Gandhi is sure that
it is not enough to get rid of problematic practices or
institutions, without creating something better to take
its  place.  And  so,  he  comes  up  with  a  Constructive
program  that  should  lead  to  the  “…construction  of
complete  independence  by  truthful  and  nonviolent
means”  (M.  K.  Gandhi,  1927b,  p.  4).  Gandhi’s
constructive program consists of 18 specific points that
should  contribute  to  the  uplift  of  the  country  (M.  K.
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Gandhi, 1927b) and the spinning of khadi takes centre
stage.
The destruction of India’s village industry has led to
mass  unemployment  and  mass  poverty.  In  Gandhi’s
view, in a country with such a large (rural) population
this problem can’t  be solved though industrialization.
The revival  of  the village industries  is  the only thing
that  will  bring  real  economic  independence.  Because
cotton spinning had been practised by Indian villagers
for ages it  is  not  hard to revive the skill.  It  requires
minimal  investment,  most  of  the  tools  can  be  easily
hand-made and spinning can be taken up or left at any
moment,  making it  well  suited as a part-time activity
(Dasgupta, 1996). The urban population should buy and
wear  the  khadi,  instead  of  foreign or  machine  made
cloth, as a form of service to the rural population and
as a way to  show “solidarity  and equality” (Mattaini,
2013, p. 139). It is the moral duty of those with money,
to  spend  it  in  such  a  way  that  the  their  fellow
countrymen will benefit from it.
In a broader sense, the call to buy and use khadi
also expresses the need for swadeshi (self-sufficiency)
on the community level. This is connected to Gandhi’s
ideas about the roots of Indian colonization. Gandhi is
convinced  that  he  Indian  population  has  played  an
important role in its own predicament: 
The English have not taken India; we have given it to
them. They are not in India because of their strength,
but  because  we  keep  them (...).  They  came to  our
country originally for purposes of trade (…). They had
not the slightest intention at the time of establishing a
kingdom. Who assisted the company’s officers? Who
was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who bought
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their goods? History testifies that we did all this (M.
K. Gandhi, 1998, p. 35).
And therefore, it is up to the Indian people themselves
to reclaim home rule,  by instigating their  own social
and cultural reform. 
Thus, home spinning became not only an economic
activity but also a psychological  and political process
(Bondurant,  1965).  In  a  psychological  sense,  making
khadi,  (and swadeshi  in  general),  helped to reinstate
Indian  products  and  indian-ness,  as  something  to  be
proud  of  instead  of  something  that  was  inferior.
Furthermore,  it  demonstrated  in  a  tangible  way that
India could very well provide for itself. By focussing on
producing and using khadi, Indians would liberate both
themselves as well as each other from the notion that
they were dependent on the British for their well-being,
and so Gandhi declared that: “The very thing that was a
cause of our slavery [cotton] will open the door to our
freedom” (M. K. Gandhi, 1999d, p. 383).
By extension, swadeshi on the community level also
meant neighbourliness (Dasgupta, 1996; Joseph, 2012;
Ramakrishnan,  2013;  T.  Weber,  2007).  In  this
explanation  swadeshi  “restricts  us  to  the  use  and
service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion
of the more remote” (M. K. Gandhi, 1999b, p. 159). The
word ‘service’  is  especially  important  here.  Swadeshi
points  not  only  to  the  use  of  local  resources  or
neighbourliness for economic and ethical reasons, but
as  a  form  of  service  directed  at  strengthening  the
community.  Self-sufficiency  is  thus  not  to  be
understood  as  an  individualistic  focus  on  satisfying
one’s own needs, but as taking responsibility for life in
one's immediate surroundings. By ensuring that one’s
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immediate  surroundings  are  functioning  well  a
fundament  is  created upon which the well-fare of  all
(sarvodaya,  another  of  the  five  central  elements  of
nonviolence) can rest. 
But  swadeshi  does  not  imply  an  uncritical
acceptance  of  anything  local.  Rather,  it  means  the
critical examination of the context,  the local customs,
products,  and attitudes,  and amend them where they
are found unsatisfactory. In Gandhi’s words: 
This is the use of my immediate religious surrounding.
If I find it defective, I should serve it by purging it of
its defects” (M. K. Gandhi, 1999b, p. 159).
In  a  broader  sense,  swadeshi  points  to  “the
understanding of contexts from within and from below”
(Gonsalves,  2010,  p.  124)  and  to  understanding  “the
value  and  importance  of  place-specific  knowledge”
(Cox, 2007, p. 109).
With swadeshi, and with khadi in particular, Gandhi
strives  to  “empower,  unite  and  liberate  his  people”
(Gonsalves,  2010,  p.  XIX).  Just  as  a  self-sufficient
country  rests  on  self-sufficient  communities,  so  does
community swadeshi rest on swadeshi on the individual
level.  For  instance,  in  the  context  of  the  nonviolent
movement towards independence it means that: 
everyone,  every  individual  participant  in  the
movement  was  responsible  for  his  own  process  of
nonviolence  he/she  had  to  confront  the  enemies
within: his own fear, his hatred for the opposing party
and his temptation for an armed rebellion (Gonsalves,
2010, p. 79).
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And  so,  swadeshi  points  to  activities  that  create  the
foundations  of  autonomy and independence,  and is  a
form  of  empowerment,  of  ensuring  that  autonomous
acting can take place.
SWARAJ
To Gandhi,  swadeshi  is  fundamentally  bound up with
swaraj or 'self-' (swa) 'rule' (raj) (Pandharipande, 2011).
Hind Swaraj (M. K. Gandhi, 1998) is the title of one of
Gandhi’s central works in which he explains his vision
for Indian independence (Cox, 2007; M. K. Gandhi  &
Parel,  1997;  Mehta,  2011).  Just  as  swadeshi  means
much  more  than  economic  self-sufficiency,  swaraj
means  much  more  than  political  independence.  It
points to sovereignty, but more importantly to the inner
freedom and self-determination of the individual and its
communities  (Pradhan, 2012).  Where swadeshi  points
to  empowerment;  to  creating  the  conditions  for
independence,  swaraj  points  to  actual  autonomy  and
self-rule (Jahanbegloo, 2013)
National  independence  is  not  real  swaraj  to  Gandhi.
Swaraj  rests  on  self-control,  responsibility  for  one’s
actions and their consequences (M. K. Gandhi & Parel,
1997), and like swadeshi, swaraj is a relational concept.
Peter Cox explains:
Understanding  the  self  as  fundamentally
contextualised  and  relational,  it  [swadeshi/swaraj]
inevitably  conveys  restraint,  and  the  demands  of
understanding and working within limits. Freedom is
not defined by lack of restraint but by an ability to
operate within the bounds of  possibility and proper
order of mutual interdependence (Cox, 2007, p. 115).
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Because Gandhi  is concerned with the actual lives of
common  people  (Bondurant,  1965).  for  him  the
personal  is  political  and  vice  versa.  Swadeshi  and
swaraj serve as a bridge between the two (Paranjape,
2008).  Gandhi’s  emphasis  in  the  whole  process  of
becoming  autonomous  is  on  local  reforms  and
“individual  effort”  (Bondurant,  1965,  p.  180).  In  a
process  of  swadeshi  we  engage  ourselves  with  our
immediate situation. We have to figure out what’s going
on, how we can address problems, which resources we
have,  how those need to be adapted, what we might
need from others or what others might need from us.
Focussing  thus  on  our  own  situation  and  acting
accordingly, is swaraj. Because the terms swadeshi and
swaraj  are  so  closely  related  and  can  be  said  to
represent  'two  sides  of  the  same  coin',  I  use  them
jointly to denote one element of nonviolence. 
Swadeshi/swaraj  expresses  the  conviction  that  true
liberation  or  freedom  can  only  be  developed  from
within. Within the country, within the community and
most fundamentally within the individual (Cox, 2007) It
might be helpful to use the image of concentric circles.
From  the  perspective  of  swadeshi/swaraj  each
individual is to govern himself, and become an active
member of a community that in turn is self-governing
(Jahanbegloo,  2013).   Neighbourliness  is  emphasized,
so that communal self-governing becomes possible. The
community  itself  should  then  apply  those  same
principles towards its surrounding communities, which
should each also be as self-sufficient and self-ruling as
possible.  Localities  should  work  together  in  regions,
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regions  in  states  and  states  within  the  nation.
Ultimately,  nations  should  work  together  globally.
Thus,  true  independence  is  conceptualised  as
interdependence, with an emphasis on mutual service. 
Peter  Gonsalves  (2012)  claims  that  swadeshi  and
swaraj  are  very  specific  to  the  Indian  independence
struggle. In his view the swadeshi movement addresses
the specific roots and problematic aspects of Britain’s
occupation  of  India.   Its  focus  on  economic
independence for the masses, for instance in the form
of khadi,  and more generally  in the form of  building
viable institutions to ensure independence are, in his
view,  specific  for  the  context  of  colonised  India.  He
states  that  nonviolence  is  practised  in  other
circumstances without aiming for swadeshi or swaraj. I
disagree with this view. Although I do agree that khadi
and  certain  other  specific  aspects  of  Gandhi’s
constructive  program  (such  as  the  removal  of
untouchability)  are  highly  specific  for  the  Indian
context, I would argue that both swadeshi and swaraj,
as  general  principles  and  understood  in  their  wider
implications  are  not.  In  fact,  I  argue  that  they  are
fundamental elements of nonviolence no matter which
context it is practised in. This, I will explore in the next
sections
RELATIONALITY
Put  together  swadeshi  and swaraj  point  to a form of
autonomy.  However,  this  is  not  autonomy  in  the
traditional  sense,  with  which  it  is  often  compared
(Prabhu, 2008).  Rather, as Cox summarizes 
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autonomy  is  not  license  but  freedom  in  relation.
Autonomy  should  therefore  be  read  not  as  an
isolationist and exclusive self-identification formed by
the  erection  of  exclusive  barriers,  but  as  the
overcoming of heteronomy (Cox, 2007, p. 115).
In  the  traditional  liberal  understanding,  the  Kantian
view  that  autonomy  is  a  defining  characteristic  of
rational  and free moral  agents  (Mackenzie  & Stoljar,
2000)  and  is  a  property  of  the  individual  will,  rings
through. A person is autonomous in as far as she can
exercise  her  will  without  being  influenced  by  the
“desires, inclinations, or the orders of others” (Russell
& Tokatlian, 2003, p. 3).  Complete autonomy, though
desirable, is seldom possible in everyday life (Rossler,
2002). It is even less possible for those people (often
women) whose everyday lives are highly shaped by the
desires, and needs of others, for instance through their
roles as primary care givers.50 
Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  in  feminist  thinking  the
concept of  relational autonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar,
2000) developed, as a critique of this traditional liberal
understanding  (Christman,  2004).  It  is  used  to
conceptualise a different form of  autonomy that does
justice  to  the  emphasis  feminist  thinking  lies  on  the
relationality of life and reality, and of the self. 
Where in the liberalist understanding of autonomy the
self is defined as 'individual' in the sense of 'separate',
in  relational  autonomy  the  self  is  understood  as
constituted by social ties (Christman, 2009).
50 
This understanding of autonomy, leading to the (empirical) conclusion, f.i. by 
Lawrence Kohlberg, that women are therefore generally less capable of developing 
complete moral maturity, is profoundly problematized by Carol Gilligan (1993).
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Relational  autonomy  departs  from  the  premise  that
people  are  essentially  social  beings,  whose  identities
develop within relations (Sherwin & Winsby, 2011), and
who’s  autonomy  is  likewise  developed  within,
constrained and complicated by but also made possible
through relationships. 
“Relational autonomy” is the label that has been given
to an alternative conception of what it means to be a
free,  self-governing  agent  who  is  also  socially
constituted and who possibly defines her basic value
commitments in terms of interpersonal relations and
mutual dependencies (Christman, 2004, p. 143)
Such a view of autonomy would do justice to relations
of dependence and interdependence (such as relations
of care and mutual support), communal identifications
and  “the  dynamics  of  the  physical  body”  (Barvosa-
Carter, 2007, p. 1) that are fundamental to human life
(Christman,  2004).  It  also  holds  that  the  support  of
others is necessary for the exercise of autonomy.
there  is  a  social  component  built  in  to  the  very
meaning  of  autonomy.  That  is,  the  subject-centred
activities  of  reflecting,  planning,  choosing,  and
deciding that enter into self-determination are social
activities in both a subjective and an objective sense.
Subjectively,  material  for  reflection  is  built  on  the
foundation of a shared past and future expectations
that involve others'  participation (Donchin,  2000,  p.
239). 
Autonomy is seen in this view as a process of finding a
personal balance within constantly changing relations,
a search for a “contextually sensitive decision making
174
processes”  (Cox,  2007,  p.  114).  Autonomy is not just
what helps us to remain an individual in the midst of
relations,  but  is  the  process  of  being  an  individual
because  of  them.  In  the  relational  view of  autonomy
people  can  only  develop  autonomy  through  social
interaction (Friedman, 2013), in a context of meaning,
values  and  reflective  practices  that  are  always
constituted by and through relations. To take this one
step further, we can say that the practice of autonomy
itself is thus a social practice. Not only are we formed
by  social  relations,  our  (autonomous)  dealings  within
them help to form others as well as the larger social
fabric.  Both  of  the  latter  again  have  bearing  upon
ourselves (Friedman, 2013).51 Thus, our autonomy and
our use of it is connected to the nature of the social
context.  This  context  can impede autonomous  action,
but is at the same time both the means through which
and the field in which autonomy is enacted (Mackenzie
& Stoljar,  2000).  Then,  it  becomes crucial to analyse
the  effect  and  role  of  norms,  values,  institutions,
attitudes and beliefs to see how they help or hinder the
(capacity for) autonomy development for each person
(Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000) and to act in a way that
helps to  increase the capacity  for  autonomous action
for each. 
Swadeshi/swaraj points to such a form of autonomy
in which becoming fully human, fully oneself does not
rest  on  freeing  oneself  from  relations  and  their
influence (Prabhu, 2008), but to cultivating autonomy
and  cultivating  the  circumstances  that  enable
51 
In my article on the role of satya (truth telling) in nonviolence, chapter 3 in this 
book, I explain how, in a similar vein, for Gandhi and Havel 'living in truth' is not just an 
individual choice that has bearing on one’s personal life but also a social and political 
act that increases options for others and helps to shape (change) social reality. 
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autonomy. I will try to clarify this further, in the next
section, by looking at a specific practice.
NVR 
Often,  nonviolence  practices  are  thought  of  in  the
context  of  social  movements  working  for  civil  or
political change, or in the context of individual change
and development  (see  for  instance:  Easwaran,  2011).
However,  in  recent  years  some  nonviolent  practices
have been developed, that focus on the interpersonal
level. As becomes clear from the outline of relational
autonomy,  the interpersonal  is  an important  locus  of
swadeshi/swaraj. 
One of those practises, that has been gaining quite
some  attention  is  Nonviolent  Communication  (NVC)
devised  by  Marshall  Rosenberg  (Rosenberg,  2003,
2005). Put briefly, NVC is a method that teaches people
to stop making habitual responses to the demands of
others,  or  to  conflicts,  based  only  on  personal  value
judgements. Instead people learn to make independent
responses based on actual engagement with the other
and his or her needs as well as on their own needs in
the  situation  (Mayton,  2009;  Rosenberg,  2003).
According to Rosenberg, and to many people who apply
the method in their life and work, this technique helps
to “diffuse [sic.] a potentially violent situation and can
precipitate  nonviolent  behavior  when  interpersonal
conflicts occur” (Mayton, 2009, p. 241). 
While  only  a  small  volume  of  research  literature
exists  on  this  method,  NVC  is  applied  today  in  a
growing number of fields, including health care (Sears,
2010),  education  (see  for  instance:  Burleson  et  al.,
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2012)  the  justice  system  (Nash,  2007)  conflict
resolution (Dickinson, 1998; Lasater & Lasater, 2009)
and many more.
Another,  lesser  known practice  that  is  none  the  less
making headway and is showing promising results,  is
the training model devised by Israeli psychologist Haim
Omer (2004, 2011) for parents of children that exhibit
violent  or  (self-)destructive  behaviour.  This  training,
called Nonviolent Resistance (NVR) by Omer, aims to
help  parents  cope  with  and  change  the  problematic
behaviour  of  their  child.  Omer  positions  his  method
emphatically  within  the  nonviolence  paradigm,
referring  to  Gandhi  (1927a),  King  (2001),  Sharp
(1973a, 1973b, 1973c) and others (see Omer, 2004) as
having laid the ground stones upon which this training
is built.
The point of the NVR training is to equip parents (or
other care takers) with both concrete responses to the
violence,  as  well  as  with  a  general  sense  of
empowerment during troubling family circumstances. It
rests on what Omer calls ‘New Authority’ (NA) (Omer,
2011).  When  confronted  with  extreme  behaviour  of
their  child,  parents  usually  find  that  they  have  no
effective way to respond.  Quite often parents end up in
a  struggle  for  control  over  the  household  with  their
child. They are mostly not willing to use violence, but
find that their ordinary ways of dealing with their child
and establishing authority fail. This then leads parents
to  feel  utterly  helpless  and  these  feelings  of
helplessness increase the risk that they eventually do
become violent themselves or respond extremely harsh
to  the  child’s  behaviour,  thereby  escalating  the
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situation (Omer, 2004). This then leaves parents with a
sense  of  failure  and  brings  on  more  feelings  of
helplessness.  Another common response of parents is
submission. They give in to the demands of the child so
as to try and preserve an atmosphere of normalcy and
peace  in  the  family.  Especially  if  there  are  other
children in the family, parents go to great lengths to try
and  preserve  some  sense  of  regular  family  life.
Submission of the parents then increases demands by
the child. Both kind of responses (which in many cases
happen  side  by  side)  establish  their  own  spiral  of
escalation. The NVR method attempts to break through
these cycles.
The method is aimed at helping parents overcome
their  feelings of  helplessness by providing them with
responses  that  neither  give  in  nor  lash  out,  but  do
provide resistance to the violence of the child (Omer,
2004,  2011;  Rodenburg,  Breugem,  &  Tempe,  2010;
Weinblatt & Omer, 2008). Omer tries to outline a new
way  of  exercising  authority,  firmly  rooted  in
nonviolence.  Instead  of  attempting  to  control  the
behaviour of the child, NA rests on the assumption that
parents can only control themselves. Where traditional
forms of  authority  are  often  based  on  hierarchy  and
distance,  NA  is  based  on  “presence  and  proximity”
(Omer, 2011, p. 4). 
Even though Omer’s method is meant to be used in a
family context NVR deliberately applies a terminology
of  struggle,  resistance  and  power.  Parents  need  to
resist  the  violent  behaviour  of  the  child,  and restore
their  own  power  in  the  household.  This  terminology
sometimes makes parents or therapists hesitant to use
the  method,  because  it  seems  that  the  child  is
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presented  as  the  (sole)  perpetrator  and  its  voice  is
insufficiently  heard  (Newman  &  Nolas,  2008).
However, the term power is used in a very particular
way in NVR. The aim of the method is not to overcome,
subdue or control the child, but rather to reinstall the
parents  (and  subsequently  also  the  child’s)  sense  of
self-worth and personal power.52 The idea is to protect
both  the  child  as  well  as  the  parents  from  the
destructive effects of the violence and lead everyone in
the  family  to  a  constructive  way  of  responding  to
occurring situations and to each other.
The responses of the NVR method are based on a
firm  commitment  to  nonviolence.  In  the  training
parents pledge to refrain from using violence (a given
for  most  parents),  but  also  from  humiliating  or
derogating speech. Instead of applying punishment, the
parents  learn  to  contrast  the  aggression  with  a
different kind of response (Jakob, 2011, p. 8), and Omer
states that: 
Opting for nonviolent resistance means acting so that
the  perpetuation  of  oppression  and  violence  is
gradually made impossible (Omer, 2004, pp. 7–8).
In the training parents are presented with a number of
concrete  actions  to  take  when  violence  or  high-risk
behaviour  occurs.  Many of  these are directly  derived
from  methods  used  in  nonviolent  social  action.  The
most  important  ones  are  sit-ins,  telephone  rounds,
tailing and forms of strike.53 Parents are also asked to
break the silence and “lift the veil of secrecy”(Weinblatt
52 This different way of wielding power can be seen as an instance of integrative power
as described by Kenneth Boulding (Boulding, 1990, 1999). For an in-depth discussion on
this notion see chapters 2 and 5 in this book.
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& Omer, 2008, p. 78) about the violence. They should
call  on  their  own  social  network  and  inform  other
people  in  the  child’s  life,  such  as  teachers,  family
members and other parents, of their situation and the
decision  to  apply  NVR and ask  them to  support  the
process. 
Complete openness is also applied towards the child
(Rodenburg  et  al.,  2010).  Parents  inform  the  child
about their intentions to stop the violence and to use
NVR,  and  about  which  steps  are  taken  and  why.
Parents are encouraged to continuously perform acts of
reconciliation  and respect  towards the child  (without
surrendering).  In  a  way,  parents  are  asked  to  seek
cooperation  with  the child  to  end  the violence.  Even
though the child might not be willing to cooperate, the
parents  must  emphasize  and  maintain  the  positive
aspects of the relationship. Through this,  the parents
convey the message that “we are your parents and we
are in your life and will not let you go” (Omer, 2004,
2011;  Rodenburg  et  al.,  2010;  Weinblatt  &  Omer,
2008). 
Just as with nonviolence in the socio-political realm,
NVR  relies  on  personal  interposition,  contact  and
persistent  presence,  in  this  case  parental  presence
(Omer et al., 2008). Parental presence refers not only
to general or psychological presence in the child’s life,
but  also  the  physical  presence  of  the  parent  at  the
moment  or  the  place  when  the  child  is  showing  the
problematic  behaviour.  The  parent  goes  in  person to
the  location  where  the  child  uses  drugs  or  alcohol,
interposes  himself  when  the  child  is  violent  towards
53
 The specific techniques and steps of the method can be found in the Handbook of
Nonviolent Resistance that is a separate section in (Omer, 2004).
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someone  else,  and  constantly  resist  unwanted
behaviour. During a sit-in, for example: 
the  parents  enter  the  child’s  room,  sit  down,  and
announce to the child  that they will  stay there and
wait  for  the  child’s  proposal  to  avoid  the  problem
behavior  that  triggered  the  sit-in.  The  parents  are
instructed  to  remain  quiet,  strictly  avoiding
arguments and provocations. The sit-in lasts up to 1
hr [sic] (unless an acceptable proposal is made by the
child).  The  therapist  prepares  the  parents  to
withstand the various reactions that the child might
evince without escalating. The sit-in thus serves also
as a valuable training ground for the parents in the
prevention of escalation. The sit-in is envisaged not as
a punishment, but as a means of manifesting parental
presence  and  increasing  the  parents’  capacity  of
resisting without escalating (Weinblatt & Omer, 2008,
p. 80). 
The  method  is  a  form  of  constructive,  rather  than
obstructive resistance (Omer et al., 2008). It is aimed at
actively creating a new situation and new relationships
in the household. The claim of NVR is that by focussing
on  changing  parent’s  reactions  to  the  violence,  the
behaviour of the child will gradually change, because
the desired effect, (power and control in the household)
is  no longer  reached (Omer,  2004).  This  might  seem
overly idealistic, but the method is receiving growing
international  acclaim  and  being  implemented,
researched  and  further  developed  to  be  used  in
different  contexts  (see  for  instance:  Avraham-
Krehwinkel  & Aldridge,  2010;  Lebowitz  et  al.,  2012;
Omer et al., 2008).
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SWADESHI/SWARAJ IN NONVIOLENCE
Omer’s  NVR  clearly  highlights  the  way  in  which
swadeshi/swaraj  plays  a  role  in  nonviolence.  The
primary  goal  of  NVR  is  to  establish  a  change  of
behaviour in the parents, rather than the child. Parents
have  to  give  up  the  idea  that  they  can  control  the
behaviour  of  their  child,  but  they  might  be  able  to
influence  the  child  through  a  change  in  their  own
actions.  This  shift  in  focus  reduces  parental
helplessness, because parents are no longer burdened
by the notion that they are responsible for changing the
child. 
Acceptance of the limits of control is reflected (…) in
the  substantial  difference  between  punishment  and
resistance. Punishment is an attempt at control. This
is particularly obvious in the psychological concept of
negative (or positive) reinforcement. (…)The situation
differs when a parent or teacher  resists  undesirable
behavior  by  the  child  (…).  The  difference  between
resistance and punishment is not just semantic. The
attention of the authority figure displaying resistance
is  focused  on  conveying  a  clear  and  determined
stance, whereas meting out punishment focuses solely
on results (Omer, 2011, p. 16) 
The  new  behaviour  rests  on  increasing  parental
presence,  preventing  escalations,  implementing  and
persevering in nonviolent responses and measures and
creating openness toward and gaining support from the
surrounding network (Jakob, 2011). 
The  NVR  training  teaches  parents  to  assume
responsibility  for  their  own  part  in  the  escalation
process. This is not the same as laying the blame for
the child’s behaviour with the parents. The question is
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not  one  of  blame,  but  one  of  response  toward  the
behaviour and responsibility for one’s actions. And so,
NVR is to a large extent concerned with empowerment
and creating circumstances in which parents (and by
extension also the child) are free to act autonomously
rather than be swept away by each other’s responses,
and  it  is  precisely  this  that  is  conveyed  by
swadeshi/swaraj.
Feminist thinking on relational autonomy stresses the
importance  of  understanding  the  self  as  a  self-in-
context,  and  describes  the  different  options  for
autonomy that become thus available, but also the kind
of  behaviour  that  it  demands  (Cox,  2007;  Friedman,
2013;  Mackenzie  &  Stoljar,  2000).  When  the  self  is
understood as a self-in-context, it becomes clear that a
form of self-restraint is necessary and that one needs to
find one's  way within the limits given by the context
(Cox, 2007), rather than look for a way to be as free of
those limits as possible. Explained in terms of Omer’s
New  Authority,  self-restraint  becomes  a  basis  for
authority and autonomy, because it frees 
those  in  authority  from the  compulsion to  triumph,
and  to  retaliate  when  provoked.  Although  the
traditional authority figure felt  compelled again and
again  to  protect  his  honor,  the  new  one  is  free  to
decline  any  invitation  to  an  imagined  duel  (Omer,
2011, pp. 8–9). 
Omer's method is a good example of the working and
importance  of  swadeshi/swaraj,  a  form  of  relational
autonomy  on  the  interpersonal  level.  But  the  same
principles apply on the social level. The parents can’t
directly change the behaviour of their child in Omer’s
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NVR method, and likewise, social movements that use
nonviolence to establish civil or political change mostly
can’t  control  the system, the oppressor  or adversary.
However,  similar  to  the  situation  of  the  parents  in
Omer's method, they can change the way in which they
operate within the situation or the system, or how they
behave towards their adversary. Summarized: one does
not have to change the system. By changing behaviour,
the system will change. This is not some form of magic,
but a result of systems being sets of relations. 
Swadeshi/swaraj is the element of nonviolence that
affirms “agency,  even in the  subaltern54,  it  turns  the
actor towards the local, the indigenous, the self” (Cox,
2007, p. 112). Even in a position that is perceived as
powerless, some form of agency still exists.
Gandhi’s  above  cited  comments  on  India’s  own
responsibility for its colonization point to that. And, just
like the parents in the NVR method are not to blame for
there children’s behaviour, for Gandhi it is also not a
matter  of  assigning  blame.  Rather,  it  is  a  way  of
affirming that the subaltern is not just a bystander, but
plays a role in the situation as it exists.  Therefore, it
can also play a role in changing it. 
This agency, and the resources with which to express
it  may  not  be  articulate.  It  may  be  latent  or
suppressed  or  ignored  and  devalued  in  the
54 Subaltern is a term used by Antonio  Gramsci (see for instance: Gramsci, 1992) to
denote those social  groups that are not part  of,  not represented by, or are actively
excluded from, the formal power structures of their society. At the same time those
groups are used to define the hegemonic group. For example: during colonisation, the
British as a colonizing power were not a homogeneous group, but consisted of different
socio-economic groups, with varying degrees of status, power and so on. Yet, all British
were part of the political elite, because they were non-Indian and therefore had certain
rights. The political  system was set up to deny the Indian population representation,
even though certain Indians (for example local rulers) were allowed a certain amount of
power (see for instance: Beverley, Fish, & Jameson, 1999; H. Trivedi, 2011).
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contemporary  context,  but  nevertheless  (…)  such
resources are implicit (Cox, 2007, p. 113)
Swadeshi/swaraj represents the need for empowerment
and for the creating a situation in which real autonomy
can  happen.  In  other  words,  it  points  to  building
infrastructure and institutions, to the build up of formal
relations,  that make communal autonomy possible.  In
Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement, this can be found in the
emphasis  on  the  constructive  element.  The  mere
boycott of British goods is not enough; it would still not
mean  true  independence.  To  make  the  Indian
independence  possible  it  is  necessary  to  create
economic autonomy for the masses.  Cotton had been
produced in India from time immemorial. Reviving the
cotton  industry  and  reclaiming  this  as  a  source  of
income  for  India  therefore  made  sense.  Economic
autonomy must  mean self-sufficiency  for  the  masses,
not  just  for  an  upper-class  of  industrial  owners.  The
lower classes would still depend on the cheapest goods
available. Therefore, the people of India should provide
a service to each other by committing to the use and
production  of  khadi,  helping  each  other  to  be
independent. 
And thus, swadeshi/swaraj is about more than just
being able to fend for yourself. It is a form of service.
The  kind  of  autonomy  it  represents  is  not  just
concerned  with  the  self,  but  with  the  self-in-context.
Nonviolence  implies  that  we  act  autonomously,
consciously  within  a  set  of  relations,  with  a  view to
serve  others  and  support  their  autonomy,  create
situations in which this is possible for others and for
ourselves and address situations in which this is not.
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SUMMARY
In this dissertation research I look at nonviolence in the
context  of  humanistic  studies,  a  multi-disciplinary
academic  field  that  critically  explores  issues  of
(existential)  meaning and humanization,  personal  and
social  aspects  of  ‘good  living’.  From  this  academic
background I attempt to answer the central research
question  of  this  study:  What  is  contemporary
nonviolence?
I  use  the  term nonviolence  not  only  to  point  to  the
absence  of  violence,  for  instance  when  solving
problems  or  conflicts,  but  as  substantive  method,  or
even a paradigm. Nonviolence has been a part of every
major  religious  tradition  and  has  been  practised  for
centuries  and  in  every  part  of  the  world.  Yet,  no
language in the world has a general term to express the
idea  of  nonviolence  as  an  authentic  and  proactive
concept.  It  is  only  referred  to  as  a  negation  of
something else. Nonviolence is not violence. 
People who have actively promoted nonviolence in
recent times, have stumbled over this lack of adequate
terms. It caused them to figure out for themselves what
it  means.  Taken at  face value,  nonviolence  has often
been understood to mean passivity, non-interference or
even cowardice. To explain that this was not at all what
they were getting at, practitioners of nonviolence have,
in  many  instances,  come  up  with  their  own  way  to
describe  the  pro-active  nature.  Gandhi,  for  instance,
coined the new term satyagraha (holding on to truth) to
express  his  method  for  waging  struggle.  In  the
Philippines it became alay dangal (to offer dignity). But
these different terms do not clear up the question as to
what  nonviolence  is.  Is  one  expression  of  it
(satyagraha) the same as another (alay dangal)?
The aim of this study is twofold. First is to discern if
it  is  possible  to  understand  nonviolence  as  a
substantive  and  pro-active  concept,  independent  of
specific cultural, religious or practical contexts. And, if
so, what that would look like. The second is to see if
from  such  an  independent  notion  it  is  possible  to
develop  a  framework  for  analysis  and  practice  of
nonviolence. The thesis consists of five independent but
related articles and an overarching chapter, in which I
try to answer these questions. 
 
The Gandhian understanding of nonviolence has been
the starting point of my study. However, even though
Gandhi’s  work  provides  an  important  basis  for
understanding  nonviolence,  many  developments  have
taken  place  in  nonviolent  practice  and  theory  after
Gandhi. To come to an understanding of contemporary
nonviolence  it  is  therefore  important  to  go  beyond
Gandhi and also study the way the Gandhian concepts
have been taken up by others. In doing so I have looked
at  which  concepts  have  carried  over  to  the  work  of
other  thinkers  and  practitioners  and  how  these
concepts have been developed and changed and what
remained the same. 
Although I have looked at the life and work of many
thinkers, practitioners and movements, my study does
not specifically focus on one of them. However, in the
description of my research results I do refer to many
individuals and movements,  as examples or to clarify
and explore the different elements of nonviolence. 
It became clear that nonviolence understood solely
in a strategic sense does not  allow us to  understand
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most of the reasoning and moral aspects that are for so
many  a  fundamental  part.  I  understand  nonviolence
therefore in a principled sense and this study focuses
on  the  philosophical  and  intentional  aspects  of
nonviolence, within which the strategies take shape. 
After an analysis of these diverse descriptions of
nonviolence, I conclude that five basic elements form
the core of modern nonviolence: satya (truth-seeking),
ahimsa  (non-harming),  tapasya  (self-suffering),
sarvodaya  (the  welfare  of  all)  and  swadeshi/swaraj
(relational  autonomy).  These  five  elements  together
point to a specific way of wielding power that is best
denoted with the term ‘integrative power’ as coined by
Kenneth Boulding. 
Each of  these  elements  is  a  complex and layered
notion and I pose that these elements  are present in
and  equally  important  to  each  application  of
nonviolence. In this dissertation I try to analyse these
five elements, what they imply and what their role is in
nonviolence,  by  exploring  the  work  of  Vaclav  Havel,
Haim Omer and René Girard, among others, as well as
radical ecology and endogenous development. 
I  denote  these  elements  with  the  Sanskrit  terms
originating in the work of Gandhi.  I  argue that these
terms  are  suitable  to  adequately  capture  this
complexity and coherence. Gandhi already used these
mostly  ancient  terms in  a  slightly  new and amended
way, often without shedding their original meaning. As
a  result  of  contemporary  nonviolent  efforts  and
experience  gained  since  Gandhi’s  struggle,  their
meaning (in the context of nonviolence) has expanded
even more. This does, however, not necessarily mean
that the terms themselves are used in every context.
Even  so,  it  is  my  claim  that  although  in  different
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contexts different terms are being used, they point to
these same elements. 
The  first  element  is satya,  meaning  ‘truth’  in
Sanskrit. To Gandhi, truth was both universal as well as
particular.  He  was  convinced  that  there  was  such  a
thing  as  universal  truth,  yet  people  could  only
understand it in a relative sense. Gandhi wanted people
to examine each situation, to get to understand what
was at stake for all involved, so as to arrive at a fuller
understanding of truth. Although people should strive
to  understand  the  truth  of  every  situation,  one  can
never  claim  to  be  all-knowing.  In  Gandhian  thought,
truth  is  based  in  experience. We  can  experience
something to be true, yet someone else can come to an
opposite  conclusion  based  on  his  or  her  own
experiences. In times of disagreement, it could be that
the other party sees something more of the truth than
we do, even though we are convinced that we are right.
This does not mean that we should instantly give up our
own ideas about the truth, it means that we allow for
the possibility for both truths to exist. This would make
satya an extremely relative concept, were it not for the
fact that each experience still has universal value. The
experience of truth does not lead to a rule for everyone
to follow, but it does lead to a rule for oneself to follow.
Satya therefore implies that “we are dedicated to the
truth we perceive, to the truth we understand”. 
This element takes a central place in the work of
Václav Havel, and in this study I have focussed on his
ideas to explore satya. Havel’s work shows that satya
demands  that  we  see  the  world  as  an  arena  where
different truths meet and interact,  something that he
denotes  with  ‘the  logic  of  stories’.  Both  Gandhi  and
Havel  stress  that  the  personal  and  the  political,  the
individual  and  the  public  quest  to  live  in  truth  as
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intertwined. The personal search for one’s identity and
truth are done in private, but acting upon one’s truth, is
a public act and has social consequences. So, the role
of satya in nonviolence is not just a moral imperative to
‘live in truth’, but a call to action, to participate in the
creation of social realities that are more nonviolent.
Ahimsa,  literally  meaning  ‘the  absence  of  the
intention to do harm’, is the second element. It implies
nonviolence  on  the  physical  level,  but  also  through
words, behaviour and thoughts.  Ahimsa came to mean
not  only  harmlessness  in  a  negative  sense,  avoiding
harm, but also in a positive sense, as addressing ‘harm’
for instance through social service. When we encounter
circumstances  in  which  we  or  others  experience
injustice and we do not venture to remedy the situation,
we  are  from  the  point  of  view  of  nonviolence  to  a
certain  extent  complicit.  Thus,  acting  without  the
intention to do harm, means addressing the problems
we encounter as best we can. 
Whereas in nonviolence thinking this is understood
foremost  (though  not  solely)  in  a  social  way,  a  very
similar attitude is developed in relation to the natural
world,  in  the  context  of  Radical  Ecology.  Radical
Ecology is a way of thinking that searches how a radical
transformation of human “being in the world” can be
brought  about,  that  would  allow  humans  and  non-
human  beings  both  to  flourish.  In  this  study  I  have
compared the notion of ahimsa to this specific way of
relating to “the other” that Radical Ecology proposes.
This shift in attitude is not in the first place related to
dealing with an antagonistic other (although nature is
sometimes cast that way in western thinking), but with
an “other” that is a different life form. However, in both
cases  the  other  has  a  different  outlook  on  life,  and
different  needs  for  flourishing.  Although  the  term
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ahimsa  is  seldom  mentioned  in  a  radical  ecological
context,  the  shift  in  attitude  it  represents  is  very
similar, amounting to “saying “yes” to all living beings”.
Ahimsa points to the realisation that the lives of all
are  intertwined  and  that  harm  to  one  ultimately
amounts to harm to all. Attitudes in which humanity as
a whole,  or  specific  human groups are,  for  whatever
reason, perceived as superior and therefore entitled to
more  resources  or  chances  for  self-development  are
harmful. Ahimsa denotes an attitude towards others in
which we make every effort not to harm their chances
of  ‘being’,  their  dignity  and  chances  for  self-
development,  by  consciously  changing  the  way  we
relate to them, and by actively cultivating an attitude
that  helps  others  to  flourish,  even  those  we  see  as
enemies, or those who we try to resist. The cultivation
of such an attitude is no simple task as Gandhi, Khan,
King  and  Radical  Ecological  thinkers  have  equally
shown. But from the perspective of nonviolence it is the
only way to come to the fundamental changes.
Out of the five elements tapasya is usually the most
difficult  to  grasp,  certainly  from  a  western  point  of
view. Tapasya translates as both ‘heat’ and ‘suffering’.
The role of tapasya in nonviolence is threefold. First, it
implies the willingness to suffer instead of retaliating
when confronted with violence or injustice. This breaks
the cycle of violence. It is not the same as giving in. It
means addressing the violence by not participating in
the dynamic it calls for; fight, flight or freeze. Tapasya
then  becomes  an  agent  for  self-transformation.  An
example is  the  firm internal  struggle  to  overcome ill
will  to  the  opponent.  Tapasya also  points  towards
dedication  or  discipline.  Living  according  to  ‘truth’
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might  require  discipline  which  can  amount  to
‘suffering’. 
In the context of this study I have compared tapasya
to  the  work  of  philosopher  René  Girard.  To  Girard
violence  is  connected  to  sacrifice.  However,  in  their
writings on nonviolence, Gandhi, King and others speak
of  the  role  of  sacrifice  in  nonviolence  and  the
dedication  of  one’s  life  to  the  well-being  of  all.  The
sacrifice  that  tapasya  refers  to  is  the  creation  of  a
situation in which the humanity of all people can rise to
the surface, rather than adhering to self-preservation at
the expense of the other.
Girard himself remains sceptical about the practical
realities of a nonviolent society, but takes it to mean a
complete  elimination  of  vengeance  and  reprisal.  I
maintain that this is what is meant by tapasya. 
The  fourth  element  is  that  of  swadeshi/swaraj.
Swadeshi means  self-reliance,  being  able  to  care  for
yourself,  act  independently.  In  a  political  sense
swadeshi implies  economic  self-reliance  and  having
your own institutions. For individuals it means to be as
self-sufficient  as  possible,  to  have  agency  and  self-
efficacy and create the circumstances that allow you to
do so. Swaraj means self-rule. This can refer to political
autonomy. But it also implies autonomy at the personal
level,  like  not  giving  in  to  impulses  or  habits  or
coercion  by  others  (tapasya),  not  violating  the
autonomy of others (ahimsa), being able to make your
own choices based on the truth as you understand it
(satya), with a view to the welfare of all (sarvodaya). It
is thus a relational concept of autonomy, meaning that
one’s  autonomy  can  only  exist  in  relation  to  that  of
others.  And  here,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  five
elements are interrelated.
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In  this  study  I  look  at  a  specific  practice  of
nonviolence  to  clarify  swadeshi/swaraj:  a  method  for
working  with  violent  and  self-destructive  children
developed by Israeli Psychologist Haim Omer. Omer’s
method  is  to  a  large  extent  concerned  with
empowerment  and  creating  circumstances  in  which
parents (and by extension also the child) are not swept
away by each other’s responses, but can deal with the
violence in a way that addresses the problem, and also
helps  the  family  as  a  whole  to  function  better.
Swadeshi/swaraj points to such an attitude of autonomy
within a web of relations.
The fifth element of nonviolence is sarvodaya, or the
welfare of all. In a particular situation it would mean
the welfare of all involved in the situation. Solving any
form of injustice or conflict through nonviolence means
addressing the injustice, not the person committing it.
In  the  Christian  vocabulary  of  Martin  Luther  King;
‘condemning the sin, not the sinner’. The welfare of all
can, for instance, not be served if  punishment for an
injustice causes harm in its own right. Means and ends
have to be in accordance. One particular contemporary
practice that is closely connected with nonviolence and
highlights  the  salient  aspects  of  sarvodaya is  that  of
Restorative Justice. Restorative Justice is a practise of
addressing  crimes  in  a  way  that  does  not  seek
retribution  (an  equal  amount  of  harm  dealt  to  the
perpetrator through punishment),  but seeks to repair
as much as possible the damage that is done and the
re-integration of all parties i.e. with the uplift or well-
being of all in mind.
These  five  elements,  form  a  coherent  and  dynamic
whole  that  constitutes  nonviolence.  As  I  understand
nonviolence, each of these elements have to be present,
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as they supplement  and support each other.  The five
elements together form a framework which can be used
as a tool  for  analyses as well  as a  starting point  for
formulating practice.  Nonviolence,  understood  in this
five-fold way, implies a specific form of wielding power,
for which I use, following Kenneth Boulding, the term
integrative power. 
For Boulding, from the three basic ways of wielding,
integrative power is the most important in comparison
to the other two; threat and exchange power, which are
often  together  paraphrased  as  ‘the  carrot  and  the
stick’.  Integrative power is the power of and through
human relationships. It is connected to everything that
establishes a relation either personal or in the form of
institutions or organizations. 
When we look at nonviolence as a praxis,  we can
divide  it  into  two  distinct  but  related  sections,
‘constructive  program’  and  ‘obstructive  program’.
Obstructive  program  -  the  various  forms  of  protest
against  and  non-cooperation  with  violence  and
injustice- is the most widely known part of nonviolence. 
The constructive side of nonviolence points to the
development  of  new  (social)  structures  that  embody
and support the nonviolent realities one strives for. On
the other hand, constructive activities can themselves
become  a  form  of  protest  when  the  creation  of
alternative  (parallel)  institutions  becomes  a  way  to
circumvent  those  that  are  deemed  violent  or
problematic.  In  a  way,  constructive  program aims at
structural nonviolence. 
Therefore,  my  summarized  answer  to  the  main
research question 'what is contemporary nonviolence?'
is  that  contemporary  nonviolence  is  a  pro-active  and
substantial  mode  of  conduct,  of  which  the  universal
characteristics  are  satya,  ahimsa,  tapasya,
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swadeshi/swaraj and sarvodaya, as explained above and
explored  in  more  detail  in  the  rest  of  this  book.
Together  they  amount  to  a  specific  form of  wielding
power, here denoted with the term integrative power.
In addition, nonviolence has both an obstructive and a
constructive side, which both are expressions of these
five elements.
Nonviolence has both personal as well as social 
implications and in this light nonviolence can be seen 
as a tool for humanization, resting in processes of 
existential meaning giving, making nonviolence an 
important topic in the context of humanistic studies. 
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SAMENVATTING
In dit proefschrift  onderzoek ik geweldloosheid tegen
de achtergrond van de humanistiek. Humanistiek is een
multidisciplinaire  wetenschap  die  zingeving  en
humanisering,  de  persoonlijke  en  sociale  kanten  van
'goed leven', kritisch onderzoekt en bestudeert. Vanuit
deze academische achtergrond probeer ik de centrale
vraag  van  dit  onderzoek  te  beantwoorden:  wat  is
hedendaagse geweldloosheid?
Ik gebruik de term geweldloosheid hier niet alleen
om  te  verwijzen  naar  de  afwezigheid  van  geweld,
bijvoorbeeld  bij  het  oplossen  van  conflicten  of
problemen, maar vooral ook om te verwijzen naar een
eigenstandige  methode  of  zelfs  een  paradigma.  Het
idee van geweldloosheid is terug vinden in iedere grote
religieuze  traditie  en  wordt  al  eeuwen  lang  in  de
praktijk gebracht, overal ter wereld. Toch is er in geen
enkele taal een algemene term te vinden die het idee
van geweldloosheid als authentiek en proactief concept
uitdrukt. Telkens wordt het uitsluitend als een negatie
benoemd. Geweldloosheid is geen geweld. Maar, wat is
het dan wel?
Mensen die zich in de recente geschiedenis actief
met  geweldloosheid  hebben  beziggehouden  zijn  ook
steeds  tegen  dit  gebrek  aan  adequate  terminologie
aangelopen. Dat heeft hen er toe aangezet voor zichzelf
uit te zoeken wat geweldloosheid precies inhoudt. Op
het eerste gezicht wordt geweldloosheid vaak verstaan
als passiviteit, niet-inmenging, of zelfs lafheid. Om uit
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te leggen dat dit absoluut niet was waar zij op doelden,
hebben deze beoefenaars van geweldloosheid vaak hun
eigen termen bedacht die wel recht deden aan de pro-
actieve  aard  van  het  concept.  Gandhi  bijvoorbeeld,
bedacht de term satyagraha (vasthouden aan waarheid)
voor zijn methode om voor sociale rechtvaardigheid te
strijden.  Op  de  Filipijnen  werd  het  alay  dangal (het
aanbieden van waardigheid).  Maar deze verschillende
termen geven geen helder antwoord op de vraag wat
geweldloosheid  is.  Is  de  ene  uitdrukking  ervan
(satyagraha) echt hetzelfde als de andere (alay dangal)?
Het doel van deze studie is tweeledig. Ten eerste
om  te  zien  of  het  mogelijk  is  hedendaagse
geweldloosheid  te  begrijpen  als  een  zelfstandig   en
proactief  concept,  los  van  specifieke  culturele,
religieuze of praktische contexten, en zo ja, hoe dat er
dan uit zou zien? Ten tweede om te zien of het vanuit
zo'n eigenstandig concept van geweldloosheid mogelijk
is  een  kader  te  ontwikkelen  voor  analyse  en  het
vormgeven van praktijken. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit vijf afzonderlijke (maar
samenhangende)  artikelen  en  een  overkoepelend
hoofdstuk,  waarin  ik  probeer  deze  vragen  te
beantwoorden.
De  Gandhiaanse  opvatting  van geweldloosheid  is  het
vertrekpunt van dit onderzoek. Echter, hoewel Gandhi's
werk  een belangrijke  basis  vormt voor  het  begrijpen
van  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid,  hebben  er  veel
ontwikkelingen in het denken over en praktiseren van
geweldloosheid plaatsgevonden ná Gandhi. Om tot een
goed begrip ervan te komen is het daarom belangrijk
om verder te kijken en te bestuderen op welke manier
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Gandhi's concepten zijn overgenomen door anderen. Ik
heb bekeken welke elementen terug zijn te vinden in de
theorieën  en  praktijken  van  anderen  en  hoe  deze
concepten zich daar verder hebben ontwikkeld en zijn
veranderd, en wat hetzelfde gebleven is.
Hoewel  ik  het  leven  en  werk  van  verschillende
denkers,  doeners  en  groepen  heb  bestudeerd,  richt
mijn onderzoek zich niet specifiek op één ervan. Bij de
beschrijving van mijn onderzoeksresultaten refereer ik
aan  verschillende  individuen  en  bewegingen  als
voorbeelden en om de elementen te verhelderen en uit
te werken.
Het  is   daarbij  duidelijk  geworden  dat  wanneer
geweldloosheid  uitsluitend  wordt  opgevat  in  een
strategische  zin,  we  de  redeneringen  en  morele
overwegingen  die  voor  velen  een  fundamenteel
onderdeel  zijn  van  geweldloosheid  niet  kunnen
berijpen.  Ik  vat geweldloosheid daarom in principiële
zin op en dit onderzoek richt zich op de filosofische en
intentionele  aspecten  waarbinnen  de  strategieën
worden vormgegeven.
Na een analyse van de diverse beschrijvingen van
geweldloosheid,  concludeer ik dat vijf  basiselementen
de  kern  van  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid  vormen:
satya (het  zoeken  naar  waarheid),  ahimsa (niet-
schaden),  tapasya (het aangaan van lijden),  sarvodaya
(streven naar het welzijn van allen) en swadeshi/swaraj
(relationele  autonomie).  Deze  vijf  elementen  samen,
wijzen  in  de  richting  van  een  specifieke  vorm  van
machtsuitoefening die het best kan worden aangeduid
met de term “integratieve macht” die is bedacht door
Kenneth Boulding.
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Elk van deze elementen is een complex en gelaagd
begrip.  Naar  mijn  mening  zijn  deze  elementen
noodzakelijkerwijs  aanwezig  in  iedere  uiting  van
geweldloosheid en allemaal even belangrijk ervoor. In
dit  proefschrift  tracht  ik  deze  vijf  elementen,  wat  ze
impliceren  en  wat  hun  rol  in  geweldloosheid  is,  te
doorgronden door onder andere het  werk van Vaclav
Havel,  Haim  Omer  en  René  Girard  te  exploreren,
evenals  de  Radicale  Ecologie  en  “endogenous
development”.
Ik duid deze elementen aan met de termen uit het
Sanskriet zoals die voorkomen in het werk van Gandhi,
omdat  die  mijns  inziens  geschikt  zijn  om  de
complexiteit en samenhang van de elementen goed uit
te drukken. Gandhi gebruikte deze (soms eeuwen oude)
termen  al  op  een  enigszins  nieuwe  en  aangepaste
manier, vaak zonder hun oorspronkelijke betekenis los
te  laten.  Als  gevolg  van  de  hedendaagse  geweldloze
inspanningen en ervaringen die zijn opgedaan sinds the
strijd van Gandhi,  heeft  hun betekenis (in de context
van geweldloosheid) zich nog verder uitgebreid. Dat wil
echter  niet  zeggen dat deze termen daadwerkelijk  in
iedere situatie gebruikt worden. Desondanks is het mijn
these  dat  hoewel  in  verschillende  situaties
verschillende uitdrukkingen worden gebruikt, ze steeds
naar deze vijf elementen verwijzen.
Het eerste element is satya, dat 'waarheid' betekent in
het  Sanskriet.   Zoals gezegd is  het werk van Gandhi
mijn  vertrekpunt.  In  Gandhi's  opvatting  is  waarheid
zowel universeel als specifiek of relatief. Hij is er van
overtuigd  dat  er  één universele  waarheid  of  realiteit
bestaat, maar dat mensen die alleen ten dele kunnen
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kennen en begrijpen. Bovendien is in zijn opvatting de
realiteit  meervoudig.  Gandhi  wil  dat  mensen  iedere
situatie onderzoeken en bevragen om te ontdekken wat
daarin  belangrijk  is  voor  alle  betrokkenen.  Op  die
manier  kunnen  mensen  tot  een  groter  inzicht  in  de
waarheid komen. Hoewel hij vindt dat mensen moeten
streven naar een zo volledig mogelijk inzicht in iedere
situatie, kan niemand zeggen dat hij of zij alwetend is. 
In het Gandhiaanse denken is waarheid gegrond in
de ervaring.  We kunnen iets  als  waar  ervaren,  maar
iemand anders kan tot een tegenovergestelde conclusie
komen op basis  van zijn  of  haar  eigen (heel  andere)
ervaringen. In het geval van onenigheid kan het zo zijn
dat de andere partij meer ziet van de waarheid dan wij,
ook al zijn wij er van overtuigd dat we gelijk hebben.
Dat  wil  niet  zeggen  dat  we  onze  ideeën  over  de
waarheid meteen moeten opgeven, het wil zeggen dat
we  de  mogelijkheid  voor  het  bestaan  van  beide
waarheden  moeten  openhouden.  Dat  zou  satya  een
uitermate relativistisch begrip maken, ware het niet dat
iedere  ervaring  nog  steeds  universele  waarde  heeft,
alle  ervaringen  zijn  echt.  De  ervaring  van  één
specifieke waarheid kan niet  leiden tot  een regel  die
iedereen moet volgen (dat zou de echtheid van andere
ervaringen  ontkennen),  maar  wel  tot  een  regel  voor
onszelf. Satya impliceert dus dat we toegewijd zijn aan
de waarheid zoals wij die ervaren.
Hoewel hij het woord niet gebruikt staat dit element
ook centraal in het werk van Václav Havel,  en in dit
onderzoek wend ik  me tot  zijn ideeën om het  begrip
satya verder uit  te werken. Havel laat zien dat satya
vraagt  dat  we  de  wereld  beschouwen  als  een  arena
waar verschillende waarheden elkaar ontmoeten en op
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elkaar inwerken, iets wat hij benoemd als 'de logica van
verhalen'. Zowel Gandhi als Havel benadrukken dat het
persoonlijke  en  het  politieke,  de  individuele  en  de
publieke  zoektocht  naar  waarheid  nauw  met  elkaar
verweven  zijn.  De  persoonlijke  zoektocht  naar  je
identiteit  en  je  eigen  waarheid  is  vooral  een  privé
aangelegenheid, maar het handelen vanuit je waarheid
is een publieke daad en heeft  gevolgen in en voor je
sociale  omgeving.  De  confrontatie  met  andere
waarheden  biedt  een  gelegenheid  om tot  diepere  en
meer complexe inzichten te komen. Het opleggen van
één waarheid die voor iedereen zou moeten gelden is
daarentegen dehumaniserend en gewelddadig omdat zij
de  mogelijkheid  van  andere  ervaringen  ontkent.
Daarom  is  het  nodig  dat  wij  onze  eigen  waarheid
uitdragen,  zodat  anderen  daarmee  geconfronteerd
kunnen  worden.  Havel  laat  zien  dat  dit  nog  niet  zo
simpel  is.  We stellen  onze eigen inzichten ermee ter
discussie,  stellen  onszelf  bloot  aan  kritiek  en  in
situaties  waarin  vooral  één  specifieke  versie  van  de
waarheid gewenst is, bijvoorbeeld in een dictatuur, kan
dit grote gevolgen hebben. Maar het handelen vanuit je
eigen waarheid kan daarmee ook een vorm van verzet
en van sociale verandering zijn. Je toont ermee in de
praktijk aan dat de opgelegde waarheid niet de enige is
en helpt daarmee ruimte te scheppen voor de waarheid
van anderen. De rol van satya in geweldloosheid is dus
niet alleen die van een morele opdracht om in waarheid
te  leven,  maar  ook een  oproep  tot  handelen,  tot  het
realiseren  van  een  sociale  werkelijkheid  die
geweldlozer is.
Ahimsa, het tweede element, betekent letterlijk 'de
afwezigheid van de intentie schade toe te brengen'. Het
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impliceert geweldloosheid op het fysieke niveau, maar
ook in woorden, gedrag en zelfs gedachten. Geleidelijk
aan  heeft  ahimsa  naast  de  negatieve  betekenis  (het
vermijden  van  schade)  ook  een  positieve  betekenis
gekregen, die van het aanpakken van situaties waarin
schade  wordt  toegebracht,  bijvoorbeeld  via  sociale
dienstverlening.  Wanneer  we  geconfronteerd  worden
met  omstandigheden  waarin  ons  of  anderen
onrechtvaardigheid  wordt  aangedaan  en  we  niet
proberen iets aan die  situatie  te veranderen,  zijn  we
vanuit  het  gezichtspunt  van  geweldloosheid  tot  op
zekere  hoogte  medeplichtig.  Handelen  zonder  de
intentie  schade  toe  te  brengen  betekent  dus  het
aanpakken  van  problemen,  voor  zover  dat  in  ons
vermogen ligt.
Binnen het  denken over geweldloosheid  wordt  dit
element in de eerste plaats (maar niet uitsluitend) op
een sociale manier opgevat. Echter, in de context van
de Radicale  Ecologie  wordt  een  soortgelijke  houding
ontwikkeld  maar  dan  in  relatie  tot  de  natuurlijke
omgeving.  De  Radicale  Ecologie  is  een denkstroming
die zoekt naar hoe een radicale transformatie van 'het
mens-zijn in de wereld' tot stand kan worden gebracht,
die  ertoe  kan  leiden  dat  zowel  menselijke  als  niet-
menselijke wezens in gelijke mate kunnen floreren. In
dit proefschrift  heb ik  het begrip ahimsa vergeleken
met deze specifieke manier van 'zich verhouden tot de
ander'  die  de  Radicale  Ecologie  voorstelt.  In  de
Radicale  Ecologie  gaat  het  niet  zozeer  om  een
verschuiving  in  de  verhouding  tot  een  ander  als
tegenstander  (hoewel  de  natuur  soms  wel  zo
afgeschilderd wordt) maar tot een ander die een andere
levensvorm  is.  Desondanks  heeft  de  ander  in  beide
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gevallen een andere visie op het  leven en heeft  heel
verschillende  dingen  nodig  om  te  kunnen  floreren.
Hoewel  de  term  ahimsa  in  de  Radicale  Ecologie
nauwelijks gebruikt wordt is de houdingsverschuiving
die wordt nagestreefd gelijksoortig. Deze komt neer op
het werkelijk kunnen bevestigen van de ander (in al zijn
anders-zijn).
Ahimsa verwijst  naar het besef  dat de levens van
allen met elkaar verbonden zijn en dat het schaden van
de  één  uiteindelijk  neerkomt  op  het  schaden  van
iedereen.  Het  standpunt  dat  specifieke  groepen
mensen, of de mensheid als geheel, op wat voor grond
dan ook superieur zouden zijn aan andere groepen en
daarom recht zouden hebben op meer middelen voor of
kansen  op  zelfontwikkeling  is  schadelijk.  Ahimsa
vertegenwoordigt  een  houding  ten  opzichte  van
anderen  waarin  we  er  naar  streven  hun  kansen  op
leven,  hun  waardigheid  en  hun  mogelijkheden  tot
zelfontwikkeling niet te schaden en zelfs proberen hun
welzijn  en  ontwikkeling  te  bevorderen.  Zelfs  ten
opzichte van tegenstanders en ook terwijl we ons tegen
hen verzetten.  Het cultiveren van zo'n houding is niet
eenvoudig zoals Gandhi, Martin Luther King en ook de
Radicaal  Ecologen  laten  zien.  Maar  binnen
geweldloosheid  is  het  de  enige  manier  waarop  er
werkelijke  veranderingen  tot  stand  gebracht  kunnen
worden.
Van  de  vijf  elementen  is  tapasya  meestal  het
moeilijkst  te  bevatten,  met  name vanuit  een westers
perspectief.  Tapasya  kan  worden  vertaald  zowel  met
'hitte' als met 'lijden' en het speelt op op drie manieren
een rol in geweldloosheid. Ten eerste verwijst het naar
de bereidheid om het lijden aan te gaan, in plaats van
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te kiezen voor vergelding wanneer we geconfronteerd
worden  met  geweld  of  onrechtvaardigheid.  Dit
doorbreekt de geweldsspiraal. Tapasya wil niet zeggen
dat  we moeten toegeven aan geweld of  het  lijdzaam
moeten ondergaan. Het wil zeggen dat we bewust uit
de  gebruikelijke  dynamiek  van  'vluchten,  vechten  of
bevriezen'  stappen.  De  tweede  rol  van  tapasya  is
daarom die van zelf-transformatie. Een voorbeeld is de
innerlijke  worsteling  om  over  aversie  tegen  een
tegenstander  heen  te  komen.  Ten  derde  verwijst
tapasya naar  toewijding  en  discipline.  De  beoefening
van  satya  en  ahimsa  bijvoorbeeld  vereist  training,
geduld en de bereidheid om tegenstand en kritiek te
ontvangen.
In  dit  onderzoek  heb  ik  de  notie  van  tapasya
vergeleken met het werk van de filosoof René Girard.
Een centraal thema in het werk van Girard is dat van
'het offer' dat hij verbindt aan geweld. Echter, mensen
als Gandhi en Martin Luther King hebben het ook vaak
over het brengen van offers, maar juist in de context
van geweldloosheid.  Het offer dat Girard beschrijft  is
dat  van  een  zondebok,  die  wordt  opgeofferd  en
uitgedreven  om  de  cohesie  van  de  oorspronkelijke
groep te waarborgen. Iedere vorm van geweld is een
afspiegeling van dit mechanisme, stelt Girard. Binnen
geweldloosheid  speelt  een  ander  offer  een  rol,  daar
gaat  het  er  om  de  gerichtheid  op  het  eigene  op  te
offeren, zodat er ruimte ontstaat voor diversiteit en het
welzijn van allen ontplooid kan worden.
Girard stelt dat wanneer mensen de dynamiek van
de zondebok en het offeren ervan zouden doorzien, zij
in staat zouden zijn een andere keuze te maken en de
samenleving,  waar  volgens  hem  geweld  nu  een
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fundamentele  rol  in  speelt,  anders  zouden  kunnen
vormgeven. Hoewel hij zelf sceptisch blijft over de reële
mogelijkheid om dit tot stand te brengen stelt hij dat
dat  in  ieder  geval  zou betekenen  dat  mensen  iedere
impuls  tot  vergelding  en  wraak  zouden  moeten
opgeven. Binnen het denken over geweldloosheid staat
men daar minder sceptisch tegenover en verschillende
voorbeelden  uit  de  praktijk  laten  zien  dat  mensen
daarin een heel  eind kunnen komen,  hoewel  dit  veel
moeite kost. Tapasya is het element in geweldloosheid
dat dat uitdrukt.
Het  vierde  element  is  swadeshi/swaraj.  Swadeshi
betekent  zelfstandigheid.  In  politieke  zin  verwijst
swadeshi  naar  economische  zelfstandigheid  en  het
hebben  van  eigen  instituties.  Op  het  persoonlijke
niveau betekent het zo zelfvoorzienend mogelijk te zijn,
en  onafhankelijk   en  doelmatig  kunnen  zijn.  Het
verwijst  ook  naar  het  kunnen  creëren  van
omstandigheden  die  zelfstandigheid  mogelijk  maken.
Swaraj  betekent  zelfbestuur.  Dit  kan  verwijzen  naar
politieke autonomie, maar ook naar autonomie op het
persoonlijke  vlak.  Swadeshi  en  swaraj  hangen  nauw
samen en zijn in dit onderzoek dan ook samengenomen.
Tegelijkertijd  zijn  ze  ook  verbonden  met  de  andere
elementen  van  geweldloosheid.  Swadeshi/swaraj
verwijst  bijvoorbeeld  naar  het  vermogen  impulsen,
gewoonten of dwang van anderen te kunnen weerstaan
(tapasya),  het  kunnen  maken  van  eigen  keuzes
gebaseerd op de waarheid zoals jij die ervaart (satya),
waarbij  je  zicht  houdt  op  het  welzijn  van  alle
betrokkenen  (sarvodaya)  zonder   de  autonomie  van
anderen aan te tasten (ahimsa). Swadeshi/swaraj drukt
daarmee een  relationeel concept van autonomie uit. De
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relationele opvatting van autonomie gaat er van uit dat
autonomie  alleen  gestalte  krijgt  in  relatie  tot  de
autonomie van anderen.
Om dit element verder uit te werken bestudeer ik in
dit  proefschrift  een  specifieke  praktijk;  een  methode
voor  het  omgaan  met  gewelddadige  en/of
zelfdestructieve  kinderen  die  is  ontwikkeld  door  de
Israëlische  psycholoog  Haim  Omer.  De  methode  van
Omer  richt  zich  in  belangrijke  mate  op  de
empowerment  van  ouders  en  opvoeders  en  op  het
creëren  van  omstandigheden  waarin  ouders  en
kinderen  niet  meer  worden  meegezogen  in  elkaars
reacties.  Pas  dan  kunnen  zij  met  de  problematische
situatie  aan  de  slag  gaan  op  een  manier  die  het
probleem werkelijk aanpakt en waardoor het gezin als
geheel beter kan functioneren. Zeker in gezinsverband
staat  het  belang  van  de  relaties,  maar  ook  het
daarbinnen  zelfstandig  kunnen  functioneren  centraal.
Swadeshi/swaraj verwijst juist naar die dynamiek.
Het vijfde element tenslotte,  is  sarvodaya,  oftewel
'het welzijn van allen'.  In specifieke situaties verwijst
dit naar het welzijn van alle betrokkenen in de situatie.
Wanneer  we  door  middel  van  geweldloosheid  een
conflict of een vorm van onrecht willen aanpakken, wil
dat  zeggen  dat  we  proberen  het  probleem  aan  te
pakken zonder daarbij de ook het welzijn van de 'dader'
of  tegenstander  uit  het  oog  te  verliezen.  Omdat
geweldloosheid uitgaat van een relationeel mensbeeld
kan het welzijn van allen niet gewaarborgd worden als
het  verzet  tegen  onrechtvaardigheid  zelf  ook  schade
veroorzaakt. Een eigentijdse praktijk die de prangende
aspecten  van  dit  element  goed  weergeeft  is
herstelrecht. Herstelrecht verwijst naar een heel scala
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van methoden om om te gaan met criminaliteit, en met
daders en slachtoffers van misdrijven, op een manier
die  niet  in  de eerste  plaats  is  gericht  op vergelding.
Hierbij  wordt  gezocht  naar  manieren om,  voor  zover
dat mogelijk is, de schade te herstellen en/of een weg
te vinden waarop zowel dader als slachtoffer op een zo
goed mogelijke manier verder kunnen met hun leven.
Deze  vijf  elementen  zijn  een  coherent  en  dynamisch
geheel  en  vormen  gezamenlijk  geweldloosheid.  In
geweldloosheid  zoals  dat  in  dit  onderzoek is  opgevat
moeten  alle  vijf   elementen  aanwezig  zijn  omdat  ze
elkaar  aanvullen  en  ondersteunen.  Zou  één  van  de
elementen  ontbreken  dan  kan  er  niet  werkelijk  van
geweldloosheid spraken zijn. De vijf elementen samen
vormen  een  analyse-instrument  alsook  een
uitgangspunt  voor  het  formuleren  van  praktijken.
Geweldloosheid  op  deze  vijfvoudige  manier  opgevat,
impliceert  een  specifieke  vorm  van  omgaan  met  en
uitoefenen  van  macht.  Deze  specifieke  vorm  duid  ik
hier aan met de term integratieve macht.
Volgens Kenneth Boulding is van de drie mogelijke
vormen van machtsuitoefening  integratieve  macht  de
belangrijkste  in  vergelijking  met  de  andere  twee:
dreigingsmacht  en  uitwisselingsmacht.  Deze  twee
laatste  vormen worden  vaak  kort  aangeduid  met  'de
wortel  en  de stok'.  Uitwisselingsmacht  is  ieder  geval
van  machtsuitoefening  waarbij  sprake  is  van  één  of
andere vorm van beloning en kan worden samengevat
als 'doe iets dat ik wil, dan doe ik iets dat jij wilt'. Bij
dreigingsmacht  wordt  macht  uitgeoefend  door  te
dreigen met één of andere vorm van straf (via boetes,
vergelding, bestraffing) en kan worden samengevat als
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'doe iets dat ik wil, anders doe ik iets dat jij niet wilt.
Deze twee vormen van machtsuitoefening komen we in
het dagelijks leven tegen op allerlei niveaus en in bijna
ieder  gebied van ons  leven (onderwijs,  opvoeding,  in
relatie tot de overheid, in de economie etc.). 
Integratieve macht echter is machtsuitoefening die
direct  is  verbonden  met  menselijke  relaties,  zowel
persoonlijke relaties als in de vorm van instituties en
organisaties.  Liefde, respect,  maar ook legitimiteit en
instemming  zijn  allemaal  uitdrukkingsvormen  van
integratieve  macht.  Hoewel  het  de  vorm  van
machtsuitoefening is die het minst begrepen wordt, ligt
deze  vorm  ten  grondslag  aan  beide  andere  vormen.
Omdat ieder mens in een web van relaties bestaat en
ook  dreigings-  en  uitwisselingsmacht  relaties
veronderstellen  speelt  integratieve  macht  in  iedere
situatie  een  rol.  Dit  betekent  ook  dat  zelfs  groepen
waarvan op het eerste gezicht wordt veronderstelt dat
zij  geen  of  weinig  macht  hebben  (ze  hebben
bijvoorbeeld niets in handen om mee te dreigen of niets
om mee te belonen) toch macht hebben in de vorm van
integratieve  macht.  Zij  kunnen  bijvoorbeeld  hun
instemming met of deelname aan bepaalde structuren
stoppen of zelf  nieuwe relaties en structuren creëren
die een alternatief bieden.  Bij integratieve macht gaat
het er niet om de ander iets te laten doe, maar om zelf
iets  anders  te  doen  waardoor  (als  gevolg  van  de
relaties)  dingen  op  een  andere  manier  kunnen
verlopen. Zoals de analyse van Boulding ook laat zien,
is dit precies waar het bij geweldloosheid om gaat.
Wanneer  we  naar  praktijken  van  geweldloosheid
kijken  kunnen  we  die  onderverdelen  in  twee
verschillende maar aan elkaar verbonden vormen; het
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constructieve  en  het  obstructieve  programma.  Het
obstructieve  programma bestaat  uit  alle  vormen  van
protest en verzet tegen en niet meewerken aan geweld
en  onrechtvaardigheid.  Dit  is  de  meest  bekende  en
zichtbare vorm van geweldloosheid.
De constructieve kant van geweldloosheid verwijst
naar  de  ontwikkeling  van  nieuwe  structuren  en
verbanden die de geweldloze realiteit  waar men naar
streeft  uitdrukken  en  ondersteunen.  Tegelijkertijd
kunnen constructieve activiteiten zelf ook een vorm van
protest  zijn  wanneer  ze  bijvoorbeeld  leiden  tot
parallelle  instituties  die  de  werking  van  bestaande
(problematische) structuren omzeilen of tegenwerken.
In zekere zin is het constructieve programma een vorm
van structurele geweldloosheid.
Al het bovenstaande in acht genomen is mijn kort
samengevatte  antwoord op de centrale vraag van dit
onderzoek:  'Wat  is  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid?'  als
volgt.
Hedendaagse geweldloosheid is een pro-actieve en
eigenstandige  wijze  van  handelen  waarvan  de
universele  elementen  satya,  ahimsa,  tapasya,
swadeshi/swaraj  en  sarvodaya  (zoals   hierboven
beschreven  en  verder  uitgewerkt  in  dit  boek)  zijn.
Samen verwijzen deze elementen naar een specifieke
vorm  van  machtsuitoefening:  integratieve  macht.
Geweldloosheid  heeft  zowel  een  obstructieve  als  een
constructieve kant, die beide uitdrukkingen zijn van de
vijf genoemde elementen.
Geweldloosheid heeft zowel persoonlijke als sociale
implicaties en in dat licht kan geweldloosheid worden
gezien als een methode voor humanisering, geworteld
212
in  zingevingsprocessen.  Dit  maakt  het  tot  een
belangrijk onderwerp van studie voor de humanistiek.
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SAMENVATTING
vertaling: Leonie van der Werf
In dit proefschrift  onderzuuk ik geweldloosheid tegen
de achtergrond van de humanistiek. Humanistiek is een
multidisciplinaire  wetenschap  die  zingeving  en
humanisering,  de  persoonlijke  en  sociale  kanten  van
‘goed leven’, kritisch onderzöcht en bestudeert. Vanuut
dizze academische achtergrond probeer ik de centrale
vraog van dit  onderzuuk te  beantwoorden:  wat  is  de
hedendaagse geweldloosheid?
Ik  gebruuk  de  term  geweldloosheid  hier  niet
allennig  om  te  verwiezen  naor  de  afwezigheid  van
geweld, bijveurbeeld bij het oplossen van conflicten of
problemen, maar veural ok om te verwiezen naor een
eigenstandige  methode  of  zölfs  een  paradigma.  Het
idee  van  geweldloosheid  is  trugge  te  vinden  in  elke
grote religieuze traditie en wordt al eeuwenlang in de
praktiek bracht, overal ter wereld. Toch is der in gien
enkele taol een algemiene term te vinden die het idee
van geweldloosheid as authentiek en proactief concept
uutdrukt.  Het wordt allenig as een negatie benuumd.
Geweldloosheid is gien geweld. Maar, wat is het dan
wel?
Mensen die zich in de recente geschiedenis actief
met  geweldloosheid  bezigholden  hebben,  bennen  ok
steeds  tegen  dit  gebrek  an  adequate  terminologie
anlopen. Dat hef ze der toe aanzet veur zichzölf uut te
zuken  wat  geweldloosheid  precies  inholdt.  Op  het
eerste gezicht wordt geweldloosheid vaak verstaon as
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passiviteit, niet-inmenging, of zölfs lafheid. Om uut te
leggen dat dit absoluut niet was waor zij op doelden,
hebben dizze beoefenaars van geweldloosheid vaak hun
eigen  termen  bedacht  die  wel  recht  deden  an  de
proactieve aard van het concept. Gandhi bijveurbeeld,
bedacht  de  term  satyagraha  (vastholden  an  de
waorheid)  veur  zien  methode  om  veur  sociale
rechtvaardigheid te strieden. Op de Filipijnen wurd het
alay  dangal  (het  aanbieden  van  waordigheid).  Maar
dizze verschillende termen geven gien helder antwoord
op  de  vraog  wat  geweldloosheid  is.  Is  de  iene
uutdrukking dervan (satyagraha) echt hetzölfde as de
andere (alay dangal)?
Het doel van dizze studie is tweeledig. Ten eerste
om  te  zien  of  het  mogelijk  is  hedendaagse
geweldloosheid  te  begriepen  as  een  zölstandig  en
proactief  concept,  lös  van  specifieke  culturele,
religieuze of praktische contexten, en zo ja, hoe dat der
dan uut zul zien? Ten tweede om te zien of het vanuut
zo’n eigenstandig concept van geweldloosheid mogelijk
is  een  kader  te  ontwikkeln  veur  analyse  en  het
vormgeven van praktijken.
Het proefschrift bestiet uut vief afzonderlijke (maar
samenhangende)  artikels  en  een  overkoepelnd
hoofdstuk,  waorin  ik  probeer  dizze  vraogen  te
beantwoorden.
De  Gandhiaanse  opvatting  van geweldloosheid  is  het
vertrekpunt  van  dit  onderzuuk.  Echter,  hoewel
Gandhi’s  wark  een  belangrieke  basis  vormt  veur  het
begriepen  van  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid,  hebben
der  veul  ontwikkelingen  in  het  denken  over  en
praktiseren  van  geweldloosheid  plaatsvunden  náo
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Gandhi. Om tot een goed begrip dervan te kommen is
het  daorom  belangriek  om  verder  te  kieken  en  te
bestuderen  op  wukke  manier  Gandhi’s  concepten
bennen  overneumen  deur  andern.  Ik  heb  bekeken
wukke  elementen  trugge  te  vinden  bennen  in  de
theorieën  en  praktijken  van  andern  en  hoe  dizze
concepten  zich  daor  verder  ontwikkeld  hebben  en
bennen veranderd, en wat hetzölfde bleven is. 
Hoewel  ik  het  leven  en  wark  van  verschillende
denkers,  doeners  en  groepen  bestudeerd  heb,  richt
mien onderzuuk zich niet specifiek op iene dervan. Bij
de  beschrieving  van  mien  onderzuuksrissultaten
riffereer ik an verschillende individuen en bewegingen
as veurbeelden en om de elementen te verheldern en
uut te warken. 
Het  is  daorbij  dudelijk  worden  dat  wanneer
geweldloosheid  uutslutend  wordt  opvat  in  een
strategische  zin,  we  de  redeneringen  en  morele
overwegingen  die  veur  veulen  een  fundamenteel
onderdeel  bennen  van geweldloosheid  niet  begriepen
kunnen. Ik vat geweldloosheid daorom in principiële zin
op  en  dit  onderzuuk  richt  zich  op  de  filosofische  en
intentionele  aspecten  waorbinnen  de  strategieën
vormgeven worden. 
Nao een analyse van de diverse beschrievingen van
geweldloosheid, concludeer ik dat vief basiselementen
de  kern  van  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid  vormen:
satya (het zuken naor waorheid), ashima (niet schaden),
tapasya (het  angaon  van  lieden),  sarvodaya (streven
naor  het  welwezen  van  allen)  en  swadeshi/swaraj
(relationele  autonomie).  Dizze  vief  elementen  samen,
wiezen  in  de  richting  van  een  specifieke  vorm  van
machtsuutoefening  die  het  best  anduud  kan  worden
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met de term “integratieve macht” die is bedacht deur
Kenneth Boulding. 
Elk van dizze elementen is een complex en gelaagd
begrip.  Naor  mien  mening  bennen  dizze  elementen
noodzakelijkerwies  anwezig  in  elke  uting  van
geweldloosheid en allemaol even belangriek derveur. In
dit proefschrift  tracht ik dizze vief elementen, wat ze
impliceren  en  wat  hun  rol  in  geweldloosheid  is,  te
deurgronden deur onder andere het wark van Vaclav
Havel,  Haim  Omer  en  René  Girard  te  exploreren,
evenas  de  Radicale  Ecologie  en  “endogenous
development”. 
Ik duud dizze elementen an met de termen uut het
Sanskriet  zoas  die  veurkommen  in  het  wark  van
Gandhi, omdat die naor mien mening geschikt bennen
om de  complexiteit  en  samenhang van de  elementen
goed  uut  te  drukken.  Gandhi  gebruukte  dizze  (soms
eeuwen  olde)  termen  al  op  een  enigszins  neie  en
angepaste  manier,  vaak  zonder  hun  oorspronkelijke
betekenis lös te laoten. As gevolg van de hedendaagse
geweldloze  inspanningen  en  ervaringen  die  opdaon
bennen sinds de stried van Gandhi, hef hun betekenis
(in  de  context  van  geweldloosheid)  zich  nog  verder
uutbreid. Dat wul echter niet zeggen dat dizze termen
daodwarkelijk  in  elke  situatie  gebruukt  worden.
Desondanks  is  het  mien  these  dat  hoewel  in
verschillende  situaties  verschillende  uutdrukkings
gebruukt worden, ze steeds naor dizze vief elementen
verwiezen. 
Het eerste element is satya, dat ‘waorheid’ betekent in
het Sanskriet. Zoas zegd is het wark van Gandhi mien
vertrekpunt.  In Gandhi’s  opvatting is  waorheid  zowel
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universeel  as  specifiek  of  relatief.  Hij  is  dervan
overtuugd dat der ien universele waorheid of realiteit
bestiet, maar dat mensen die allennig ten dele kennen
kunnen en begriepen. Bovendien is in zien opvatting de
realiteit  meervoldig.  Gandhi  wul  dat  mensen  elke
situatie onderzuken en bevraogen om te ontdekken wat
daorin belangriek is veur elk die berbij betrökken is. Op
die manier kunnen mensen tot een groter inzicht in de
waorheid  kommen.  Hoewel  hij  vindt  dat  mensen
moeten streven naor een zo volledig mogelijk inzicht in
elke  situatie,  kan  gieniene  zeggen  dat  hij  of  zij
alwetend  is.  In  het  Gandhiaanse  denken  is  waorheid
grond in de ervaring. We kunnen iets as waor ervaren,
maar  iene  anders  kan  tot  een  tegenovergestelde
conclusie  kommen  op  basis  van  zien  of  heur  eigen
(hiele andere) ervarings. In het geval van onienigheid
kan het zo weden dat de andere partij meer zöt van de
waorheid as wij, ok al bennen wij der van overtuugd dat
we geliek  hebben.  Dat  wul  niet  zeggen  dat  we onze
ideeën  over  de  waorheid  opgeven  moeten,  het  wul
zeggen dat we de mogelijkheid veur het bestaon van
beide waorheden openholden moeten. Dat zul satya een
utermate relativistisch begrip maken, ware het niet dat
elke  ervaring  nog  steeds  universele  weerde  hef,  alle
ervarings bennen echt. De ervaring van ien specifieke
waorheid  kan niet  leiden tot  een  regel  die  iederiene
moet volgen (dat zul de echtheid van andere ervarings
ontkennen), maar wel tot een regel veur onszölf. Satya
impliceert dus dat we toewijd bennen an de waorheid
zoas wij die ervaren. 
Hoewel hij het woord niet gebruukt stiet dit element
ok  centraal  in  het  wark  van Václav  Havel,  en  in  dit
onderzuuk wend ik me tot zien ideeën om het begrip
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satya  verder uut  te  warken.  Havel  lat  zien dat  satya
vrag dat we de wereld beschouwen as een arena waor
verschillende  waorheden  mekaar  ontmoeten  en  op
mekaar inwarken,  iets  wat  hij  benuumt  as  ‘de logica
van verhalen’.  Zowel  Gandhi  as  Havel  benaodrukken
dat het persoonlijke en het politieke, de individuele en
de publieke zuuktocht naor waorheid nauw met mekaar
bennen verweven. De persoonlijke zuuktocht naor joen
identiteit  en joen eigen waorheid is  veural  een privé
angelegenheid, maar het handeln vanuut joen waorheid
is  een  publieke  daod  en  hef  gevolgen  in  en  veur  je
sociale  omgeving.  De  confrontatie  met  andere
‘waorheden’  bödt een gelegenheid  om tot  diepere en
meer complexe inzichten te kommen. Het opleggen van
ien waorheid die veur iederiene zul moeten gelden is
daorentegen dehumaniserend en gewelddadig omdat zij
de mogelijkheid van andere ervarings ontkent. Daorom
is het neudig dat wij onze eigen waorheid uutdragen,
zodat  andern  daormet  confronteerd  kunnen  worden.
Havel lat zien dat dit nog niet zo simpel is. We stellen
onze  eigen  inzichten  dermet  ter  discussie,  stellen
onszölf bloot an kritiek en in situaties waorin veural ien
specifieke  versie  van  de  waorheid  wenst  is,
bijveurbeeld in een dictatuur,  kan dit  grote  gevolgen
hebben. Maar het handeln vanuut joen eigen waorheid
kan daormet  ok  een vorm van verzet  en  van sociale
verandering weden. Je tonen dermet in de praktijk an
dat de opgelegde waorheid niet de ienige is en helpt
daormet  ruumte  te  scheppen  veur  de  waorheid  van
andern. De rol van satya in geweldloosheid is dus niet
allennig die van een morele opdracht om in waorheid te
leven,  maar  ok  een  oproep  tot  handeln,  tot  het
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realiseren  van  een  sociale  warkelijkheid  die
geweldlozer is. 
Ahimsa, het tweede element betekent letterlijk ‘de
afwezigheid  van  de  intentie  schade  toe  de  brengen’.
Het  impliceert  geweldloosheid  op  het  fysieke  niveau,
maar  ok  in  woorden,  gedrag  en  zölfs  gedachten.
Geleidelijk an hef ahimsa naost de ‘negatieve’ betekenis
(het vermijden van schade) ok een ‘positieve’ betekenis
kregen,  die  van  het  anpakken  van  situaties  waorin
schade  wordt  toebracht,  bijveurbeeld  via  sociale
dienstverlening. Wanneer we confronteerd worden met
omstandigheden  waorin  ons  of  andern
onrechtvaardigheid andaon wordt en we niet proberen
iets an die situatie te verandern, bennen we vanuut het
gezichtspunt van geweldloosheid tot op zekere hoogte
medeplichtig. Handeln zonder de intentie schade toe te
brengen  betekent  dus  het  anpakken  van  problemen,
veur zover dat in ons vermogen lig.
Binnen het  denken over geweldloosheid  wordt  dit
element in de eerste plaats (maar niet uutslutend) op
een sociale manier opvat. Echter, in de context van de
Radicale  Ecologie  wordt  een  soortgelieke  holding
ontwikkeld  maar  dan  in  relatie  tot  de  natuurlijke
omgeving.  De  Radicale  Ecologie  is  een denkstroming
die zöcht naor hoe een fundamentele transformatie van
‘het  mens-weden  in  de  wereld’  tot  stand  bracht  kan
worden, die dertoe kan leiden dat zowel menselijke as
niet-menselijke  wezens  in  gelieke  mate  kunnen
floreren.  In dit proefschrift  heb ik het begrip ahimsa
vergeleken  met  dizze  specifieke  manier  van  ‘zich
verholden  tot  de  ander’  die  de  Radicale  Ecologie
veurstelt. In de Radicale Ecologie giet het niet zozeer
om een verschoeving in de verholding tot een ander as
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tegenstander  (hoewel  de  natuur  soms  wel  zo  wordt
afschilderd)  maar  tot  een  andere  die  een  andere
levensvorm  is.  Desondanks  hef  de  ander  in  beide
gevallen  een  verschillende  visie  op  het  leven  en  hef
hiele  andere  dingen  neudig  om  te  kunnen  floreren.
Hoewel  de  term  ahimsa  in  de  Radicale  Ecologie
nauwelijks wordt gebruukt is de holdingsverschoeving
die naostreefd wordt gelieksoortig. Dizze komp neer op
het  warkelijk  kunnen bevestigen van de ander,  (in al
zien anders-weden). 
Ahmisa verwes naor het besef dat de leven van allen
met mekaar verbonden bennen en dat het schaden van
de  iene  uuteindelijk  neerkomp  op  het  schaden  van
iederiene.  Het  standpunt  dat  specifieke  groepen
mensen, of de mensheid as geheel, op wat veur grond
dan ok superieur zulden weden an andere groepen en
daorom recht zulden hebben op meer middeln veur of
kansen  op  zölfontwikkeling  is  schadlijk.  Ahimsa
vertegenwoordigt een holding ten opzichte van andern
waorin we der naor streven hun kansen op leven, hun
waordigheid en hun mogelijkheden tot zölfontwikkeling
niet  te  schaden  en  zölfs  proberen  hun  welwezen  en
ontwikkeling  te  bevordern.  Zölfs  ten  opzichte  van
tegenstanders  en  ok  terwijl  we  ons  tegen  heur
verzetten.  Het  cultiveren  van  zo’n  holding  is  niet
ienvoldig zoas bijveurbeeld Gandhi, Martin Luther King
en ok de Radicaal Ecologen zien laoten. Maar binnen
geweldloosheid  is  het  de  ienige  manier  waorop  der
warkelijke  veranderingen  tot  stand  bracht  kunnen
worden. 
Van  de  vief  elementen  is  tapasya meestal  het
moeilijkst  te  bevatten,  met name vanuut  een westers
perspectief.  Tapasya  kan  vertaald  worden  zowel  met
244
‘hitte’ as met ‘lieden’ en het speult op drie manieren
een rol in geweldloosheid. As eerste verwes het naor de
bereidheid om het lieden an te gaon, in plaats van te
kiezen  veur  vergelding  wanneer  we  worden
confronteerd  met  geweld  of  onrechtvaardigheid.  Dit
deurbrek de geweldsspiraal. Tapasya wul niet zeggen
dat  we  moeten  toegeven  an  geweld  of  het  liedzaam
moeten ondergaon. Het wul zeggen dat we bewust uut
de  gebrukelijke  dynamiek  van  ‘vluchten,  vechten  of
bevriezen’  stappen.  De  tweede  rol  van  tapasya  is
daorom die van zölf-transformatie. Een veurbeeld is de
innerlijke  worsteling  om  over  aversie  tegen  een
tegenstander hen te kommen. As derde verwes tapasya
naor toewijding en discipline. De beoefening van satya
en ahimsa bijveurbeeld vereist training, geduld en de
bereidheid om tegenstand en kritiek te ontvangen. 
In  dit  onderzuuk  heb  ik  de  notie  van  tapasya
vergeleken met het wark van de filosoof René Girard.
Een centraal thema in het wark van Girard is dat van
‘het offer’ dat hij verbindt an geweld. Echter, mensen
as Gandhi en Martin Luther King hebben het ok vaak
over het brengen van offers, maar juust in de context
van geweldloosheid.  Het  offer  dat  Girard beschref  is
dat van een zondebok, die opofferd en uutdreven wordt
om  de  cohesie  van  de  oorspronkelijke  groep  te
waarborgen. Elke vorm van geweld is een afspiegeling
van  dit  mechanisme,  stelt  Girard.  Binnen
geweldloosheid speult een ander offer een rol, daor giet
het der om de gerichtheid op het eigene op te offern,
zodat  der  ruumte  ontstiet  veur  diversiteit  en  het
welwezen van iederiene ontplooid worden kan. 
Girard stelt dat wanneer mensen de dynamiek van
de zondebok en het offern dervan zulden deurzien, zij
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in staot zulden wezen een andere keuze te maken en de
samenleving,  waor  volgens  hum  geweld  nou  een
fundamentele  rol  in  speult,  anders  zulden  kunnen
vormgeven. Hoewel hij zölf sceptisch blef over de reële
mogelijkheid om dit tot stand te brengen stelt hij dat
dat in elk geval zul betekenen dat mensen elke impuls
tot  vergelding  en  wraak  zulden  moeten  opgeven.
Binnen het denken over geweldloosheid stiet men daor
minder  sceptisch  tegenover  en  verschillende
veurbeelden  uut  de  praktijk  laoten  zien  dat  mensen
daorin een hiel eind kommen kunnen, hoewel dit veul
muite kost. Tapasya is het element in geweldloosheid
dat dat uutdrukt.
Het  vierde  element  is  swadeshi/swaraj. Swadeshi
betekent  zölfstandigheid.  In  politieke  zin  verwes
swadeshi  naor  economische  zölfstandigheid  en  het
hebben  van  eigen  instituties.  Op  het  persoonlijke
niveau  betekent  het  zo  zölfveurzienend  mogelijk  te
weden, en onafhankelijk en doelmatig kunnen weden.
Het  verwies  tok  naor  het  kunnen  creëren  van
omstandigheden  die  zölfstandigheid  mogelijk  maken.
Swaraj  betekent  zölfbestuur.  Dit  kan  verwiezen  naor
politieke  autonomie,  maar  ok  naor  autonomie  op  het
persoonlijke  vlak.  Swadeshi  en  swaraj  hangen  nauw
samen  en  bennen  in  dit  onderzuuk  dan  ok
samenneumen. Tegeliekertied bennen ze ok verbonden
met  de  andere  elementen  van  geweldloosheid.
Swadeshi/swaraj  verwes  bijveurbeeld  naor  het
vermogen impulsen, gewoonten of dwang van andern te
kunnen  weerstaon  (tapasya),  het  kunnen  maken  van
eigen  keuzes  baseerd  op  de  waorheid  zoas  jij  die
ervaren  (satya),  waorbij  je  zicht  holden  op  het
welwezen van elk die derbij  betrökken is (sarvodaya)
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zonder de autonomie van andern an te tasten (ahimsa).
Swadeshi/swaraj drukt daormet een relationeel concept
van  autonomie  uut.  De  relationele  opvatting  van
autonomie  giet  dervan  uut  dat  autonomie  allennig
gestalte kreg in relatie tot de autonomie van andern. 
Om dit element verder uut te warken bestudeer ik
in dit proefschrift een specifieke praktijk; een methode
veur  het  omgaon  met  gewelddadige  en/of  zölf-
destructieve  kindern  die  ontwikkeld  is  deur  de
Israëlische  psycholoog  Haim  Omer.  De  methode  van
Omer  richt  zich  in  belangrieke  mate  op  de
empowerment  van  olders  en  opvoeders  en  op  het
creëren van omstandigheden waorin olders en kindern
niet meer metzeugen worden in mekaars reacties. Pas
dan kunnen zij  met de problematische situatie  an de
slag gaon op  een manier  die  het  probleem warkelijk
anpakt  en  waordeur  het  gezin  as  geheel  beter  kan
functioneren. Zeker in gezinsverband stiet het belang
van  de  relaties,  maar  ok  het  daorbinnen  zölfstandig
kunnen functioneren centraal. Swadeshi/swaraj verwes
juust naor die dynamiek. 
Het viefde element tenslotte, is  sarvodaya,  oftewel
‘het  welwezen  van  iederiene’.  In  specifieke  situaties
verwes  dit  naor  het  welwezen  van  elk  die  derbij
betrökken is  in de situatie.  Wanneer  we deur middel
van  geweldloosheid  een  conflict  of  een  vorm  van
onrecht  an  wullen  pakken,  wul  dat  zeggen  dat  we
proberen het probleem an te pakken, zonder daorbij ok
het welwezen van de ‘daoder’ of tegenstander uut het
oog te verliezen. Omdat geweldloosheid uutgiet van een
relationeel mensbeeld kan het welwezen van iederiene
niet  waarborgd  worden  as  het  verzet  tegen
onrechtvaardigheid  zölf  ok  schade  veroorzaakt.  Een
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eigentiedse praktijk die de prangende aspecten van dit
element  goed  weergef  is  herstelrecht.  Herstelrecht
verwes  naor  ene  hiel  scala  van methoden  om om te
gaon met criminaliteit en met daoders en slachtoffers
van  misdrieven  op  een  manier  die  niet  in  de  eerste
plaats richt is op vergelding. Hierbij wordt  zöcht naor
manieren om, veur zover dat mogelijk is, de schade te
herstellen  en/of  een  weg  te  vinden  waorop  zowel
daoder as slachtoffer op een zo goed mogelijke manier
verder kunnen met heur leven. 
Dizze  vief  elementen  bennen  een  coherent  en
dynamisch  geheel  en  vormen  gezamenlijk
geweldloosheid.  In  geweldloosheid  zoas  dat  in  dit
onderzuuk opvat is moeten alle vief elementen anwezig
weden omdat ze mekaar anvullen en ondersteunen. Zul
ien van de vief elementen ontbreken dan kan der niet
warkelijk  van  geweldloosheid  sprake  weden.  De  vief
elementen samen vormen een analyse-instrument en ok
een uutgangspunt veur het formuleren van praktijken.
Geweldloosheid  op  dizze  viefvoldige  manier  opvat,
impliceert  een  specifieke  vorm  van  omgaon  met  en
uutoefenen van macht.  Dizze specifieke vorm duud ik
hier an met de term integratieve macht. 
Volgens  Kenneth  Boulding  is  van  de  drie
mogelijke vormen van machtsuutoefening integratieve
macht de belangriekste in vergelieking met de andere
twee:  dreigingsmacht  en  uutwisselingsmacht.  Dizze
twee laatste vormen worden vaak kort anduud met ‘de
wortel en de stok’. Uutwisselingsmacht is elk geval van
machtsuutoefening waorbij sprake is van ien of andere
vorm van beloning en kan samenvat worden as ‘doe iets
dat  ik  wul,  dan  doe  ik  iets  dat  jij  wullen’.  Bij
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dreigingsmacht wordt macht uutoefend deur te dreigen
met  ien  of  andere  vorm  van  straf  (via  boetes,
vergelding,  bestraffing)  en  kan  samenvat  worden  as
‘doe  iets  dat  ik  wul,  anders  doe  ik  iets  dat  jij  niet
wullen.
Dizze  twee  vormen  van  machtsuutoefening
kommen  we  in  het  dagelijks  leven  tegen  op  allerlei
niveaus  en  in  bijna  elk  gebied  van  ons  leven
(onderwies, opvoeding, in relatie tot de overheid, in de
economie  etc.)  Integratieve  macht  echter  is
machtsuutoefening  die  direct  is  verbonden  met
menselijke relaties, zowel persoonlijke relaties as in de
vorm van  instituties  en  organisaties.  Liefde,  respect,
maar  ok  legitimiteit  en  instemming  bennen  allemaal
uutdrukkingsvormen  van  integratieve  macht.  Hoewel
het  de  vorm van machtsuutoefening  is  die  het  minst
wordt begrepen, lig dizze vorm ten grondslag an beide
andere vormen.
Omdat elk mens in een web van relaties bestiet
en  ok  dreigings-  en  uutwisselingsmacht  relaties
veronderstellen  speult  integratieve  macht  in  elke
situatie  een  rol.  Dit  betekent  ok  dat  zölfs  groepen
waorvan op het eerste gezicht verondersteld wordt dat
zij  gien  of  weinig  macht  hebben  (ze  hebben
bijveurbeeld niks in handen om met te dreigen of niks
om met te belonen) toch macht hebben in de vorm van
integratieve  macht.  Zij  kunnen  bijveurbeeld  hun
instemming  met  of  deelname  an  bepaalde  stucturen
stoppen of zölf neie relaties en structuren creëren die
een alternatief bieden. Bij integratieve macht giet het
der niet om de ander iets te laoten doen, maar om zölf
iets anders te doen waordeur (as gevolg van relaties)
dingen op een andere manier kunnen verlopen. Zoas de
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analyse van Boulding ok zien lat, is dit precies waor het
bij geweldloosheid om giet.
Wanneer we naor praktijken van geweldloosheid
kieken  kunnen  we  die  onderverdelen  in  twee
verschillende maar an mekaar verbonden vormen; het
constructieve  en  het  obstructieve  programma.  Het
obstructieve  programma bestiet  uut  alle  vormen van
protest en verzet tegen, en niet metwarken an geweld
en  onrechtvaardigheid.  Dit  is  de  meest  bekende  en
zichtbare vorm van geweldloosheid. 
De  constructieve  kaante  van  geweldloosheid
verwes  naor  de  ontwikkeling  van  neie  structuren  en
verbanden die de geweldloze realiteit  waor men naor
streeft  uutdrukken  en  ondersteunen.  Tegeliekertied
kunnen constructieve activiteiten zölf ok een vorm van
protest  weden  wanneer  ze  bijveurbeeld  leiden  tot
parallelle  instituties  die  de  warking  van  bestaonde
(problematische) structuren omzeilen of tegenwarken.
In zekere zin is het constructieve programma een vorm
van structurele geweldloosheid. 
Al het bovenstaonde in acht neumen is mien kort
samengevatte  antwoord op de centrale vraog van dit
onderzuuk:  'Wat  is  hedendaagse  geweldloosheid?'  als
volgt.
Hedendaagse geweldloosheid is een pro-actieve
en  eigenstandige  wieze  van  handeln  waorvan  de
universele  elementen  satya,  ahimsa,  tapasya,
swadshi/swaraj  en  sarvodaya  (zoas  hierboven
beschreven  en  verder  uutwarkt  in  dit  boek)  bennen.
Samen verwiezen dizze elementen naor een specifieke
vorm  van  machtsuutoefening:  integratieve  macht.
Geweldloosheid  hef  zowel  een  obstructieve  as
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constructieve  kaante,  die  beide  uutdrukkings  bennen
van de vief genuumde elementen
Geweldloosheid hef zowel persoonlijke as sociale
implicaties  en  in  dat  licht  kan  geweldloosheid  zien
worden as een methode veur humanisering, worteld in
zingevingsprocessen. Dit maakt het tot een belangriek
onderwerp van studie veur de humanistiek.
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